ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al.

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard at 1:30 p.m. in Department 8C in the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. James McFetridge presiding.

Any party who wishes to contest the tentative ruling below must:

(1) request a hearing by calling the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-8380, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the noticed hearing date, and leave a voicemail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that they have notified the opposing party of their intention to appear; and

(2) advise the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

If a hearing is not requested by 4:00 p.m. on the Court day before the noticed hearing date, the tentative ruling will become the final order of the Court.

If a hearing is requested, the Court prefers in-person attendance by the parties. However, parties may appear by Zoom unless the Court specifically orders in-person attendance. Parties choosing to appear by Zoom are reminded, however, that a Zoom appearance is still a formal appearance before the Court. Parties appearing via Zoom should do so from a quiet location, free from undue distractions, and wear attire suitable for an in-person court appearance.

The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16039062174

SIP Address:

16039062174@sip.zoomgov.com

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

(833) 568-8864

ID: 16039062174

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s (“Hyundai”) motion to compel arbitration against Plaintiff Nicholas A. Ables (“Plaintiff”) is DENIED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

Request for Judicial Notice

Hyundai’s request for judicial notice as to Plaintiff’s complaint is granted.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this Lemon Law action against Hyundai on March 11, 2026, arising out of his purchase of a 2024 Hyundai Palisade (the “Subject Vehicle”). Plaintiff has not brought suit against the selling dealership.

Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against Hyundai for violations of the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”). Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle came with express and implied warranties from Hyundai and was delivered with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty.

The Subject Vehicle came with a copy of Hyundai’s Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information (the “Warranty Booklet”), which contains an arbitration agreement that states, in pertinent part:

“PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS THIS SECTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE YOU FROM FIRST PURSUING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH BBB AUTO LINE AS DESCRIBED IN THE “ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION” PROVISION IN SECTION 3 OF THIS HANDBOOK.

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, any service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or the duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims related to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicle's purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law. If either you or we elect to resolve our dispute via arbitration (as opposed to in a court of law), such binding arbitration shall be administered by and through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

We will pay all fees for any arbitration except for the initial filing fee of $200. The arbitration will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about arbitration, including the applicable rules and how to commence arbitration, please contact:

AAA at www.adr.org; 800-778-7879. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law. The arbitrator (and not a court) shall decide all issues of interpretation, scope, and application of this agreement. In any arbitration, the arbitrator shall be bound by the terms of this agreement and shall follow the applicable law.

The arbitrator shall not have the power to commit manifest errors of law, and any award rendered by the arbitrator that employs a manifest error of law may be vacated or corrected by a court of competent jurisdiction for such error. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and us and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others, or issue any award or remedy in arbitration against or on behalf of anyone who is not a named party to the arbitration, as permitted by law.

In other words, you and we may bring claims against the other only in your or our individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

the maximum extent permitted by law. You and we acknowledge and agree that, to the fullest extent permitted by law, we are each waiving the right to participate as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action lawsuit, class-wide arbitration, private attorney general action, or any other representative proceeding. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and must be stayed pending arbitration of the arbitrable claims and remedies.

If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement cannot be enforced as to a particular request for public injunctive relief, then that request for public injunctive relief (and only that request for public injunctive relief) must be brought in court and must be stayed pending arbitration of the arbitrable remedies. If arbitration is elected by either party, the parties collectively agree that they waive their right to a jury trial. Notwithstanding the above, either you or we may file a lawsuit in small claims court for any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration, if the small claims court has jurisdiction.

In addition, either you or we may invoke any AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules that allow you or we to have a small claims court decide any claims that otherwise require binding arbitration. This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Judgment upon any award in arbitration may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT- OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

PROVISION.

(Warranty, Exhibit 3, Ameripour Decl., pages 14-16.)

Additionally, on or about August 26, 2023, Plaintiff purportedly enrolled the Subject Vehicle in Hyundai’s Bluelink services. (Declaration of Vijay Rao (“Rao Decl.”), ¶ 5.)

In order to enroll in Hyundai’s Bluelink services, customers must agree to the theneffective Bluelink Connected Services Agreement (the “CSA”), the terms and conditions of which also include a binding arbitration provision. (Rao Decl., ¶ 4.)

The arbitration provision in the CSA provides, in part:

Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

[]

The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to: claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising) []

(CSA, Exhibit 2 to Rao Decl., pages 27-28.)

Hyundai moves to compel arbitration and stay the present litigation pending the arbitration results pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 and the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), on the basis that Plaintiff is bound by the arbitration clause contained in the Warranty and the CSA. Hyundai argues Plaintiff’s claims fall squarely

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

within the scope of the arbitration clauses and, as a result, Plaintiff’s claims should be stayed pending arbitration.

Legal Standard

California has a public policy which encourages arbitrations and courts have repeatedly approved and upheld arbitration clauses. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [California has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the Court shall order the parties to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the FAA is essentially the same:

“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”

(9 U.S.C. §2.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)

“In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable consistent with standard contract principles. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 787.) Included among these is the long-accepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)

Nonsignatories generally may not compel contractual arbitration. (See JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.) However, there are exceptions where arbitration agreements may be enforced by a non-signatory. Nonparties asserting a party’s rights must show some basis for extending the agreement to them. (Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1728.) Further, a “third party” non-signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement only through the grounds available under state contract law, such as agency, alter ego, or intended benefit. (See Arthur Andersen LLP v.

Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 631.) Under California law, a nonsignatory may assert a third party beneficiary theory. (See, e.g., Thornton v. Career Training Center, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 116.) Nonsignatories may also enforce arbitration agreements through the doctrine of equitable estoppel (see, e.g., Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696 [claims asserted against non-signatory “intimately intertwined” with contract containing arbitration clause]).

Discussion

Hyundai alleges Plaintiff’s claims against it are subject to arbitration pursuant to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

Warranty Booklet, which includes the arbitration agreement set forth above.

Hyundai argues given that Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle in California, is bringing this action pursuant to the warranty, and has alleged that repairs have been performed under the warranty, the arbitration provision in the Warranty Booklet applies. Further, Hyundai argues Plaintiff is equitably estopped from asserting that his lack of signature on the Warranty Booklet precludes arbitration because he is asserting claims directly based upon the warranty. (Motion at 11:22 – 12:4.)

The Court finds Hyundai has failed to show that an agreement to arbitrate exists pursuant to the Warranty Booklet. Neither Hyundai, nor Plaintiff, signed the Warranty Booklet. In fact, there is no signature line in the Warranty Booklet for any party to accept the terms with a signature. The Warranty Booklet simply explains the terms of the warranty, with an opt out option if the buyer so chooses. There is also no evidence Plaintiff signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the Warranty Booklet, nor is there evidence the Warranty Booklet was even presented to Plaintiff prior to, or after, purchase.

Rather, Hyundai simply attaches the Warranty Booklet as an exhibit to defense counsel’s declaration. (Ameripour Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 3.) There is no declaration by a representative of Hyundai or a Hyundai dealership stating that the Warranty Booklet was, in fact, provided to Plaintiff or that it is provided to all Hyundai purchasers, or that the Warranty Booklet is even applicable to Plaintiff’s vehicle.

In Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279, the Ninth Circuit found that an arbitration provision in Samsung’s warranty handbook with an opt out provision was not enforceable as to the plaintiff. After analyzing California law, the Court found that the plaintiff did not “expressly assent to any agreement in the brochure. Nor did [plaintiff] sign the brochure or otherwise act in a manner that would show ‘his intent to use his silence, or failure to opt out, as a means of accepting the arbitration agreement. [citation.]

Under California law, an offeree’s inaction after receipt of an offer is generally insufficient to form a contract. [citation]. Therefore, Samsung’s offer to arbitrate all disputes with [plaintiff] ‘cannot be turned into an agreement because the person to whom it is made or sent makes no reply, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent,’ id., unless an exception to this general rule applies.” (Id. at 1286.) The Ninth Circuit further reasoned, “Nor would a reasonable person understand that receiving the seller’s warranty and failing to opt out of an arbitration provision contained within the warranty constituted assent to a provision requiring arbitration of all claims against the seller, including claims not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

involving the warranty.” (Id. at 1290.) Here, too, the same analysis applies. The Warranty Booklet does not operate as a contract with an enforceable arbitration agreement.

Additionally, Hyundai argues it may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Hyundai argues that even if the Warranty Booklet lacks Plaintiff’s signature, Plaintiff has received a direct benefit from the Warranty, and therefore cannot avoid the arbitration clause.

The Court is not persuaded by Hyundai’s argument that equitable estoppel applies here because Hyundai is a party to the Warranty, and thus not a nonsignatory third party. (See Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 706 [“By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement”]; see also Boucher v. Alliance Title Company, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 272; Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Hyundai fails to show that an agreement to arbitrate exists pursuant to the Warranty Booklet or that equitable estoppel applies. Having concluded as such, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s unconscionability arguments as to the Warranty Booklet.

In the alternative, Hyundai moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the CSA, which states, in pertinent part:

Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C

permitted by law.

[]

The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to: claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising) []

(CSA, Exhibit 2 to Rao Decl., pages 27-28.)

Hyundai has also failed to show the arbitration provision in the CSA covers Plaintiff’s claims in this action.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any defect or breach of warranty related to the Bluelink services. Hyundai has not shown that the arbitration clause in the CSA would apply to his claims. While that clause does cover disputes and claims regarding “this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for,” the reference to “the Vehicle” is at best an ambiguous reference. Any ambiguities in the CSA are construed against the drafter, which is the Hyundai in this case. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.) Here, the Court must read the reference to “the Vehicle” as having some connection to the Bluelink services. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are outside the scope of the CSA.

Because Hyundai has failed to show that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his claims, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the unconscionability of the arbitration clause.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV006272: ABLES vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8C