BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al.

Proc., § 1281.2.) Stated differently, an arbitration must be compelled where there is a valid, binding arbitration agreement unless the opposing party proves the agreement is unenforceable on unconscionability or other grounds. (See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 96-100, 114; Gatton v. T-Mobile USA

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p. 1518.) “A party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.) “Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence any defense to the petition.” (Ibid.)

On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an “agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature.

(Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–544; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)

“The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164.) “However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Id., at p. 165.) The moving party meets the initial burden by attaching to the moving papers a copy of the alleged arbitration agreement or setting forth its terms verbatim. (Ibid.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’” (Ibid. [quoting Condee v.

Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219].) Once the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden, the opposing party must produce evidence to challenge the agreement's authenticity. (Ibid.) If the opposing party meets its burden, the moving party must then offer admissible evidence to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is valid. (Ibid.) Notably, in a recently published opinion that constitutes binding precedent in this jurisdiction, the Third District Court of Appeal followed the analytical framework set forth in Gamboa. (See, Brockman v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 586- 588 [citing Gamboa].)

Analysis

Defendant’s General Manager, Spencer Freeman, submits his declaration in support of the motion. Mr. Freeman avers:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

5. On the date Plaintiff executed the subject Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnification Agreement, the following procedure was required for all participants to access and use the Urban Air facility:

a. At all times relevant to this action, upon entry to the facility, all prospective participants were required to complete a waiver prior to being admitted to any attractions.

b. At all times relevant to this action, the waiver was presented electronically at on-site kiosks located within the facility.

c. At all times relevant to this action, at the kiosk, participants have to scroll through the entire waiver agreement, which was presented as a continuous document, before proceeding to the signature page.

d. At all times relevant to this action, participants were required to complete all prompts, including entering identifying information such as their name and date of birth, and electronically sign the waiver.

e. At all times relevant to this action, no prospective participants were allowed to proceed into the facility or use the facility without a valid signed waiver.

6. Plaintiff was required to follow the above process and execute the waiver prior to accessing and using the Urban Air facility on the date of the incident.

7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s executed waiver, which was retrieved from Urban Air’s electronic system using Plaintiff’s identifying information entered at the time of execution. The Facility utilizes an electronic waiver management system known as “Command Center,” which is controlled and maintained by Urban Air’s franchisor. The Command Center system stores electronically executed participant waivers and related participant information entered at the time of execution. The Waiver states Plaintiff’s date of birth “07/06/1990” and Plaintiff’s email cortneybrown3@gmail.com.

(Declaration of Spencer Freeman (“Freeman Decl.”), ¶¶ 5-7.)

Defendant has satisfied its initial burden by submitting a copy of the Release purportedly bearing Plaintiff’s signature.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. She does not question whether her claims fall within the scope of the Provision. She argues that she did not sign the Release, and therefore, Defendant fails to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

show that she agreed to be bound by the Provision.

Plaintiff submits her declaration in opposition to the motion. Plaintiff states, in pertinent part:

5. I have read and reviewed the Agreement submitted by Defendant and attached to this Declaration as Exhibit A.

6. I do not recognize the signature on the Agreement attached as Exhibit A as my signature.

7. I do not have any recollection of seeing the Agreement before the commencement of this litigation and do not believe that I had ever seen the Agreement before the commencement of this litigation.

8. I have no recollection of signing any agreement or form at the trampoline facility on the day of the subject incident, and I do not believe that I signed any form or agreement at the trampoline facility on the day of the subject incident or at any time.

9. Moreover, while “CC” is a nickname sometimes used by friends and family, it is not my custom and practice to use that nickname when completing documents, which further leads me to believe that I was not the one who completed the Agreement attached as Exhibit A.

10. I had not been to the subject trampoline facility prior to the date the subject incident took place, and indeed had never been to trampoline park similar to the Defendant’s business prior to the date on which the injury occurred. On the date the subject incident took place, I had no prior notice of, or knowledge of, Defendant’s policies or procedures requiring the signing of a Release prior to the use of the facility.

(Declaration of Cortney Brown (“Brown Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-10.)[2]

According to Plaintiff:

“[n]one of Defendant’s moving papers, including Mr. Freeman’s Declaration, provide any independent proof that Plaintiff herself read the Release or signed the Release. Indeed, Mr. Freeman’s Declaration fails to identify a single witness (or other form of evidence such as security video) establishing the Plaintiff was advised that signing the Release was a precondition of using the facility, or if she was asked directly if she had read and signed the Release. Mr. Freeman’s Declaration speaks only to the standard operating procedures, a description of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

what should happen, without establishing what actually happened with Plaintiff on the day of the subject incident.

(Opposition, 4:9-16.)

Plaintiff acknowledges that some of her personal identifying information contained in the Release accurately reflects her personal information. Her opposition states that “Plaintiff was present at the facility that day with her sons Jewelius Lee and Kyree Nolen, and Kyree’s father, Kevin Nolen. It is anticipated that Defendant might argue that the Release may have been signed by Kevin Nolen. Such an argument would fail to create a binding contract, and therefore an enforceable arbitration clause, against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff and Mr. Nolen were not married at the time of the subject incident. Mr. Nolen had no authority, real or implied, to bind Plaintiff to the terms of the contract or to sign away Plaintiffs right to pursue recovery in the state courts.” (Opposition, 5:6-13.) As noted above, however, there is no evidence showing that Mr. Nolen and Kyree Nolen were also at the Park with Plaintiff and Jewelius.

In reply, Defendant insists that it has established that Plaintiff executed the Release and agreed to be bound by its terms. It explains that, as set forth in Mr. Freeman’s declaration:

all individuals seeking admission to the Urban Air facility are required to execute an electronic Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnification Agreement before they are permitted to enter the facility or participate in any attractions. (Freeman Decl., ¶ 5.) . . . The waiver is presented electronically through Urban Air’s Command Center system, and participants are required to scroll through the agreement before proceeding to the signature page. (Id.) . . . After completing the waiver, participants proceed to the check-in counter, where staff verify the participant’s identifying information - including name and date of birth—before admission is granted. (Id.) Individuals who have not completed the waiver are not permitted to access the facility or participate in any activities. (Id.)

(Reply, 4:10-13.)[3]

Defendant advances that Plaintiff’s declaration does not rebut Defendant’s evidentiary showing because “a claimed inability to remember signing an agreement is not affirmative evidence that the agreement was never executed, nor does it undermine Defendant’s authenticated electronic business records establishing that Plaintiff completed the waiver as part of the mandatory admission process.” (Reply, 8:1-4.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s declaration sufficiently challenges the authenticity of the signature. In Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, the court recognized the split in authority regarding whether a party opposing a motion to compel arbitration could meet its burden to contest the validity of the agreement bearing a handwritten

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

(as opposed to an electronic) signature by providing evidence that they did not recall signing or seeing the agreement. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833-837.) The court in Gamboa provided examples of ways an opposing party can challenge the authenticity of an agreement. For example, “the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

The court found sufficient plaintiff’s declaration which stated (1) she had reviewed the arbitration agreement included in the employer's moving papers, (2) she did “‘not remember these documents at all,’” (3) no one had ever told her about an arbitration agreement or explained it until after her lawsuit began, and (4) “‘[h]ad I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.)

The Second District affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, stating, “we need not decide whether Gamboa challenged the authenticity of her purported signature on the arbitration agreement. It was enough that she challenged the authenticity of the agreement by saying under penalty of perjury that she did not remember it.” (Id. at p. 168.)

Conversely, in Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, the First District found that “[i]f a party confronted with his or her handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege that the signature is inauthentic or forged, the fact that that person does not recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature's authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Id. at p. 758; Ramirez, supra, at p. 834.)

The Iyere court explained that it reached the opposite conclusion as the Gamboa court because, “[w]hile handwritten and electronic signatures once authenticated have the same legal effect, there is a considerable difference between the evidence needed to authenticate the two.” (Iyere, supra, at p. 758.) “An individual cannot affirm or disavow an electronic signature from the face of a computer printout, but an individual normally can recognize or disavow a handwritten signature that purports to be his or her own.” (Ibid.)

The Ramirez court agreed with the conclusion and underlying rationale articulated in Iyere. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.)

In the case at bar, Plaintiff’s declaration provides more than simply stating that she does not recall signing the Release. Plaintiff specifically states, “I do not recognize the signature on the Agreement attached as Exhibit A as my signature” -- essentially asserting that the signature is inauthentic or forged. (Brown Decl., ¶ 6.)

The burden therefore shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is valid. The Court finds that Defendant fails to carry that burden.

With respect to proving the authenticity of an electronic signature, Civil Code section 1633.9 “addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signature - that is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the proponent claims it is.” (Ruiz v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Moss Bros. Auto Grp., Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) The statute provides: “An electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).)

Again, Mr. Freeman’s declaration states: (1) upon entry to the facility, all prospective participants were required to complete a waiver prior to being admitted to any attractions, (2) the waiver was presented electronically at on-site kiosks located within the facility, (3) at the kiosk, participants have to scroll through the entire waiver agreement, which was presented as a continuous document, before proceeding to the signature page, (4) participants were required to complete all prompts, including entering identifying information such as their name and date of birth, and electronically sign the waiver, and (4) no prospective participants were allowed to proceed into the facility or use the facility without a valid signed waiver. (Freeman Decl., ¶ 5.)

Missing from Mr. Freeman’s declaration is any evidence regarding how the facility verifies that the person proceeding into the facility or using the facility is actually the person that signed the Release. There is no evidence that the facility has a person standing near the kiosk or observing the kiosk who physically witnessed Plaintiff at the kiosk signing the Release. Defendant assumes that since the Release includes Plaintiff’s date of birth, email address and nickname, that Plaintiff must have signed the Release.

Plaintiff, however, was not alone at the Park, and it is possible that her son, who was thirteen years old at the time, entered the information and signed the Release.

Given the evidence before it, the Court finds that Defendant fails to satisfy its burden to show a valid and binding arbitration agreement.

The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

Moving counsel’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact Plaintiff’s counsel and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact Plaintiff’s counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

[1] Based on Jewelius’ date of birth identified on the Release, he was 13 years old at the time of the incident. [2] The Court observes that in her opposition, Plaintiff claims that she was at the Park with her

sons Jewelius and Kyree Nolen, and Kyree’s father, Kevin Nolen. Her declaration does not state that Kyree Nolen and Kevin Nolen were also at the Park with Plaintiff and Jewelius.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV004350: BROWN vs URBAN AIR TRAMPOLINE AND ADVENTURE PARK, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

(Porterville Citizens for Responsible Hillside Development v. City of Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 895, fn. 9. [“It is axiomatic that arguments of counsel are not evidence”].) As a result, there is no evidence in the record that Kyree Nolen and Kevin Nolen were also present at the Park. [3] The Court notes that Mr. Freeman’s declaration does not include a statement that, “[a]fter

completing the waiver, participants proceed to the check-in counter, where staff verify the participant’s identifying information— including name and date of birth—before admission is granted,” even though it is purportedly “cited” in the reply brief.