Doe R.M. v. Ulloa, et al

Second, County argues Plaintiff is able to provide a code-compliant response as evidenced by his reference to the SOD, because if Plaintiff can complete this statement, he can provide code-compliant responses providing the same information. Fundamentally, this argument elevates form over substance and lacks logical coherence. Plaintiff’s verified response to SROG 217 (seeking the amount of claimed general damages) directs County to see his statement of damages. County has a copy of the SOD because it includes it in the moving papers. (Busch Decl., Exh.

C.) Plaintiff’s SOD under category 1 for general damages states he is seeking 10 million dollars for pain, suffering, and inconvenience and 15 million dollars for emotional distress. (Ibid.) The fact that Plaintiff’s counsel prepared and signed the statement of damages is immaterial. Plaintiff verified his responses to SROG 217 referring to the SOD.

Moreover, while Plaintiff’s answer to SROG 217 did not necessitate reference to a SOD, it is sufficient to answer the SROG by reference to the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained (See, Section 2030.230); in this case the SOD is that writing. By looking at the SOD, the Court and County know that Plaintiff is seeking 25 million dollars in general damages across two specific categories. Apparently, that is Plaintiff’s response to the amount of general damages he is seeking. In this regard, Plaintiff’s response to SROG 217 is not evasive or incomplete.

To the extent County is arguing that Plaintiff should be required to provide a supplemental response to SROG 217 that repeats this information on pleading paper with another verification truly elevates form over substance to a pointless degree. County further argues that Plaintiff’s objections lack merit. However, there is no need to address the objections because, despite raising them, the analysis above shows that Plaintiff provided an adequate response that apprised County about the amount of general damages sought across two categories. In other words, Plaintiff answered the question despite asserting objections. County can evaluate the case based on the information supplied in response to SROG 217. County has not shown that anything else is required.

Therefore, County’s motion to compel a further response to SROG 217 is denied.

Sanctions Since County’s motion is unsuccessful, it is not entitled to monetary sanctions; but County is susceptible to sanctions if it did not act with substantial justification. In the discovery context, substantial justification means well-grounded in both law and fact. (City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 291.) As analyzed above, County’s reasons for pursuing a further response to SROG 217 were not well-grounded in both law and fact. Indeed, County’s reply concedes that Plaintiff’s SROG 217 response discloses his claimed general damages are 25 million dollars, but again urges the SOD reference is not code-compliant. (County Reply, 2:8- 10.) Again, this argument elevates form over substance. Therefore, County was not substantially justified in pursuing this motion.

Counsel Suh requests monetary sanctions against Kristin Busch and Collins & Collins, attesting her hourly rate is $550, which is high for the limited number of years Suh has been practicing in California. (Suh Decl., ¶11.) An appropriate rate would be $400, equivalent to the rate approved for Counsel Busch in the County’s February 2026 protective order motion. (Busch Decl., Exh. G, p. 8.) Suh requests six hours of time; but Plaintiff’s opposition papers only contained a memorandum and declaration with no opposing separate statement. Thus, four hours of time is more appropriate. Thus, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against County is granted in the sum of $1,600.00, payable within 30 days of the court’s order.

Dated: July 21, 2026

____________________________ Judge Kory Mathewson

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