MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al.

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

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TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Vinnie Mehta’s motion for leave to record a second notice of pendency of action is denied.

Plaintiff’s approximately 19 page long memorandum of points and authorities failed to comply with the page limitations set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, subdivisions (d). Nor has Plaintiff obtained permission from the Court to file an oversized memorandum of points and authorities as required by the California Rules of Court. (CRC, Rule 3.1113, subd. (e).) In the future, Plaintiff must conform to the applicable page limits or obtain an order from the Court allowing Plaintiff to exceed those limits in accordance with the Rules of Court.

In this action, Plaintiff Vinnie Mehta’s original complaint alleged causes of action for fraud, unfair business practices, breach of contract, specific performance and declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant THD Enterprises, Inc. (“THD”) and defendant Melanie Hirsch own Bauers Car Wash in Citrus Heights. Plaintiff alleged that she entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (“Real Estate Agreement”) and a Business Purchase Agreement (“Business Agreement”) with THD and Hirsch to purchase the land, business and fixtures of the car wash. Plaintiff alleged that escrow was opened and that she deposited $100,000 in earnest money as required by the agreements. She alleged that THD and Hirsch refuse to perform. Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against the Citrus Heights property on February 4, 4024.

On January 23, 2025, the Court (Judge Southworth) granted THD’s motion to expunge the lis pendens. The Court found that the lis pendens failed to comply with CCP § 405.22 and that in any event, Plaintiff failed to establish the probable validity of any real property claim. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to show that she failed to satisfy a condition precedent to the Real Estate Agreement because it required a deposit of $450,000 which Plaintiff had not made. Plaintiff also failed to satisfy the financing contingency in the Real Estate Agreement which required that she be approved for “Seller financing.” The Court found that Plaintiff failed to show that she was approved for financing by THD.

On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which alleges causes of action for promissory fraud, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance and rescission. In addition to the factual allegations from the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that there were two additional agreements

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

preceding the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement, specifically a Letter of Intent which on its face states that it is not legally binding, and a Bulk Sales Purchase Agreement. However, that agreement preceded the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement and Plaintiff even alleges that the parties needed to execute the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement in order to complete the desired transaction. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 18.)

Almost six months after the FAC was filed, Plaintiff now seeks leave to record a second lis pendens pursuant to CCP § 405.36. According to Plaintiff, certain facts were not disclosed to the Court in connection with the prior motion to expunge and THD presented an untruthful declaration.

“Once a notice of pending action has been expunged, the claimant may not record another notice of pending action as to the affected property without leave of the court in which the action is pending.” (CCP § 405.36.)

The Court must note that neither party presents any legal authority with respect to the proper standard on a motion for leave to file a notice of pending action. Plaintiff’s motion essentially argues that she has a valid real property claim and that the claim has probable validity. Plaintiff cites to CCP §§ 405.3 and 405.32 which govern motions to expunge. Pursuant to CCP § 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” “Probable validity” requires Plaintiffs to show that “it is more likely than not that [they] will obtain a judgment against [Defendants] on the claim.” (CCP § 405.3.)

Thus, according to Plaintiff, the standards governing a motion to expunge apply here. But it the Court were to apply that standard and find that Plaintiff was entitled to record a second lis pendens, it would essentially deprive THD of its statutory right to move to expunge the second lis pendens. This is true because if the Court adopted Plaintiff’s analysis on this motion, the Court would necessarily make the relevant findings for a motion to expunge in the context of a motion brought by the party who would ultimately resist a motion to expunge.

The Court finds that this is not the appropriate analysis under CCP § 405.36.

THD contends that CCP § 405.36 requires “newly arisen facts or claims” or “new and materially different facts”, however, the statute contains no such language though as seen below, there is authority that supports this assertion. T THD also states that “Courts have repeatedly held that a plaintiff cannot evade an expungement order by attempting to re-record the same notice under the guise of a new filing.” (Opp. 3:2-3.) While THD suggests that the instant motion is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, those doctrines are inapplicable within the context of the same case.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

The Court observes that the Code Comment to CCP § 405.36 states that “[t]his section continues the rule of Ranchito Ownership Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 764 (“Ranchito”), which disallowed rerecording of an expunged lis pendens without consent of the court. Although the court in McKnight v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 291 ruled that a lis pendens expunged as “void and invalid” for defects in service, recording or filing, could be rerecorded, this section requires leave for re– recording of any expunged lis pendens. It is expected that leave to re–record a lis pendens expunged as “void and invalid” can be obtained when appropriate at the expungement hearing.” (Code Comment to Cal Code Civ Proc § 405.36.) Thus, an examination of Ranchito is instructive in determining how to properly analyze this motion.

In Ranchito, a motion to expunge a lis pendens was granted. The party that filed the previous lis pendens then filed a second lis pendens. Ranchito concluded filing a second lis pendens following expungement without Court approval was improper and that the party who filed the second lis pendens failed to make any showing that the order expunging the lis pendens should be modified. In addressing the argument that a second lis pendens could never be filed in the same action following expungement “with or without judicial approval”, Ranchito stated: “These statutes contain no prohibition against a judicial reexamination of that balance after the court has once made its order expunging the notice, and we see no policy reason for our declaring that such an absolute prohibition exists.

Although we decline to adopt Ranchito’s position that the trial court has no power under any conceivable circumstances to undo its order expunging a notice of lis pendens, we do not deem it appropriate in this case to suggest the conditions under which the trial court may do so. For the purpose of this case it is sufficient that we explain why we believe that the Kroms have not shown good cause for reexamination of the expungement order.” (Ranchito, supra, 130 Cal. App. 3d 764, 773.) Thus, the Court distills from Ranchito that a party seeking leave to file a second lis pendens following expungement, must demonstrate good cause for leave.

In addition, Ranchito also provides support for the proposition that good cause for a second lis pendens must be based on something that could not have been presented in connection with an opposition to a prior motion to expunge. As stated by the Court of Appeal, “[i]f the Kroms had had, in September 1979, a factual basis for believing that their suit had merit, they could have told their attorneys, who could easily have presented that information in opposition to the motion to expunge.” Ranchito, supra, 130 Cal.

App. 3d at 774-775.)

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for leave to file a second lis pendens. As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the Court was not presented with the entire picture when it granted THD’s motion to expunge and that THD presented an “untruthful declaration”. According to Plaintiff, it was not disclosed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

that Anmolpreet Singh (“AJ”) was Plaintiff’s husband. Plaintiff now attempts to offer AJ’s declaration and explain events leading up to the subject agreements. In the previous motion to expunge, Plaintiff attempted to argue that she satisfied the financing contingency in the Real Estate Agreement and provided a letter from the Bank of Stockton dated November 6, 2023, indicating that [AJ] was approved for a loan for purchase of the Citrus Heights property in the amount of $1,550,000. The Court stated that the “letter relates to an unidentified individual who is not a party to the Real Estate Agreement and is not a party in this action, and further, the letter references an amount that is not the purchase price that is set forth in the Real Estate Agreement.” (1/23/2025 Minute Order) “Evidence that some unidentified individual was approved for a loan of any amount does not constitute evidence whether Plaintiff qualified for Seller financing as required by the Real Estate Agreement, an express contingency to THD’s duty to perform.

Further, even if had some connection to this transaction, the letter is dated November 6, 2023, which is well after the July 31, 2023, closing date identified in the Real Estate Agreement and Business Agreement.” (Id. [emphasis in original].) The fact that Plaintiff failed to identify her husband in connection with the original motion is not good cause to allow filing a second lis pendens. That information was always in Plaintiff’s possession and to the extent that the relationship between Plaintiff and AJ was relevant to the maintenance of a lis pendens, there was no barrier to Plaintiff presenting that information in opposition to THD’s motion to expunge.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s identification, approximately nine months after THD’s motion to expunge was granted, and six months after the FAC was filed, is not good cause for a second lis pendens.

Plaintiff also argues that the Court was not presented with the Letter of Intent and a Bulk Sales Purchase Agreement. According to Plaintiff, the “contracts” must be interpreted with the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement to reflect that the parties intended the $450,000 deposit to be part of the Seller Financing. As noted above, the Letter of Intent states that it is not legally binding, and the Bulk Sales Purchase Agreement preceded the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement.

Plaintiff even acknowledges that the Real Estate Agreement and the Business Agreement contain integration clauses. Again, this information was within Plaintiff’s possession and there is no reason, much less any justification, as to why the information was not presented in connection with the motion to expunge. While Plaintiff indicates that she has new counsel who has conducted a more in-depth review of the case, this is not good cause for a second lis pendens.

Plaintiff also argues that the Court “accepted the false narrative offered by the Seller that it was a simple case of an explained refusal by the Buyers to present their financial information to qualify for seller financing. The Court was not presented with the extensive and revealing communication between the parties, an incomplete picture

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

exacerbated by Hirsch’s pleading misrepresentations.” (Mot. 6:1-5.) Plaintiff contends the FAC and this motion “tell the true story” which is that Plaintiff was an experienced buyer of gas stations with financial means to complete the transaction, that Plaintiff was eager to purchase the property, that Plaintiff provided the required financial information, and that THD reneged on a promise to clear liens on the property. Again, this is all premised on information that was within Plaintiff’s possession at the time of the motion to expunge.

There is no evidence here which Plaintiff has demonstrated could not have presented in connection with her opposition to THD’s motion to expunge. Rather, Plaintiff appears to present evidence which existed and Plaintiff knew of, but yet simply did not provide in opposition to the earlier motion. In fact, Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that she should be allowed to file a second lis pendens because the Court’s earlier ruling was wrong. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior ruling should be reconsidered because it is erroneous, this motion is akin to if not effectively, a motion for reconsideration.

If construed as such, it still must be denied. “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.

The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (CCP § 1008(a) [emphasis added].) Here, as Plaintiff is a “party affected by the order,” Plaintiff was required to file any motion for reconsideration within the time frame of CCP § 1008(a). However, the motion was filed well after the 10-day period in CCP § 1008(a) and is untimely.

Moreover, there are no new facts, circumstances or law which would support a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, Plaintiff’s motion is premised on information that was in her possession before THD’s motion to expunge was filed. “Courts have construed section 1008 to require a party filing an application for reconsideration or a renewed application to show diligence with a satisfactory explanation for not having presented the new or different information earlier.” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v.

Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) Where a moving party “easily could have obtained” the proffered “new” evidence previously, or had the “new” evidence in its possession since the outset of litigation, the evidence is not “new” for purposes of section 1008. (New York Times, 135 Cal.App.4th at 213-14.) “The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV002369: MEHTA vs THD ENTERPRISES INC, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Leave of Court to Record a Second Notice of Pendency of Action in Department 53

discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (Id.; see also Foothills Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 688, 692 disapproved on another ground in Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 [plaintiff's belief that certain evidence was not necessary at hearing on summary judgment motion insufficient to justify reconsideration].)

As previously discussed, everything that Plaintiff refers to in support if her motion to file a second lis pendens is information that Plaintiff either had or could have easily obtained and could have presented in connection with her opposition to THD’s motion to expunge. While Plaintiff has obtained new counsel and filed a FAC since that time attempting to set forth slightly new theories, it is still based on the underlying transaction for the purchase and sale of the Citrus Heights property. As the Court of Appeal in Ranchito stated, “[i]f the Kroms had had, in September 1979, a factual basis for believing that their suit had merit, they could have told their attorneys, who could easily have presented that information in opposition to the motion to expunge.” Ranchito, supra, 130 Cal.

App. 3d at 774-775.) Allowing Plaintiff to re-file a lis pendens almost nine months after the first lis pendens was expunged, and almost six months after the FAC was filed, under these circumstances would “invite more of the abuse which the statute was intended to cure.” (De Martini v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal. App. 5th 1269, 1277 [citations omitted].)

Again, the Court does not address whether Plaintiff has stated a real property claim or whether any real property claim is probably valid. It simply finds that Plaintiff has presented no good cause for a second lis pendens.

In summary, the Court finds that there is no good cause for allowing Plaintiff to file a second lis pendens. The motion is denied.

The notice of motion includes the incorrect address for the Court. The correct address for Department 53 of the Sacramento Superior Court is 813 6th Street, Sacramento, California 95814. In addition, the notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the correct address for Department 53 and of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.