CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: *** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Defendant/Cross-defendant Bruce Mintzer’s motion to quash Defendant/Crosscomplainant Jeffrey Pang & Company, Inc.’s (“JPC”) records subpoena directed to nonparty Alive Commercial Real Estate (“Alive”) is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

JPC’s counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and the opposing party of the specific discovery requests that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Factual Background

This action was commenced by plaintiff Chicago Title Company om May 2024, with a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

complaint in interpleader relating to $100,000 on deposit in connection with an incomplete 2023 real estate transaction and competing claims for these funds by Mintzer and JPC. JPC has filed a cross-complaint against Mintzer, alleging the latter breached the parties’ real estate contract and subsequently sold the subject property to an unknown third party in 2024. Trial was previously set for July 2026 but was recently vacated pursuant to JPC’s motion.

In October 2025, JPC issued a subpoena for various records held by nonparty Alive, which JPC describes as “Mintzer’s real estate broker.” This subpoena includes 51 separate requests for documents which JPC asserts relate to both the failed 2023 transaction and also Mintzer’s subsequent 2024 sale to a third party.

Moving Papers. Defendant Mintzer now moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1985.3 and §1987.1 on the grounds that “the demands of the subpoena are impermissibly overbroad, request privileged documents, infringe on privacy rights, and request documents that are irrelevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:3-6.)

Opposition. Defendant JPC opposes, arguing that just prior to the production date, defendant Mintzer “raised several boilerplate objections and instructed Alive not to produce documents” and despite JPC’s request for “clarification on the objections,” Mintzer proceeded to file this motion to quash. According to the opposition, this motion still fails to “provide the requested clarification” and also fails to provide “any factual analysis supporting [Mintzer’s] objections” but JPC maintains that the requests clearly seek documents which are not privileged and are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, thereby mandating denial of this motion and an award of $4,715 in sanctions.

The latter is particularly true insofar as this motion was filed merely to delay this litigation and increase its costs, which has necessitated other motions and the vacating of the July 2026 trial date.

Legal Standards for Discovery

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

The party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections has the burden to justify its objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.)

Discussion

At the outset, although the foregoing authorities make clear that the standards for discovery are quite broad and are to be liberally construed, defendant Mintzer’s present motion under Code of Civil Procedure §1985.3 and §1987.1 specifically seeks an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena. Notably, §1987.1 explicitly authorizes a motion which seeks to limit or modify the subpoena at issue but the present motion does not seek such relief. Thus, the Court will address this motion as presented and seeking only an order quashing the subject subpoena in its entirety on the following grounds: “[T]he demands of the subpoena are impermissibly overbroad, request privileged documents, infringe on privacy rights, and request documents that are irrelevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:3-6.)

The first ground advanced by the moving papers is that the subpoena’s 51 demands for production are “impermissibly overbroad.” The Court has carefully reviewed and considered each of JPC’s 51 individual requests and while it may be true that some of them could certainly have been more carefully crafted and narrowly tailored to obtain specific arrays of documents, this Court cannot find that any of the individual requests, much less all 51 of them, are so unreasonably overbroad so as to justify an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

Moreover, given California’s liberal standard for discovery discussed above, this Court rejects Mintzer’s suggestion that none of the 51 separate requests are “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” or seek documents legally relevant to the current litigation. Indeed, the Court finds that all 51 requests are fairly characterized as seeking documents which easily satisfy the applicable standard of being “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” At a minimum, each of JPC’s requests seeks documents and/or information which in this Court’s view is either directly relevant to the JPC’s claims against Mintzer or reasonably likely to assist JPC in evaluating its claims against Mintzer, facilitating a settlement and/or preparing for trial. (Lipton v.

Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1611- 1612.) After all, permissible discovery is not limited to that which is admissible at trial but is instead broadly permitted to encompass anything which might reasonably lead to admissible evidence and additionally, any doubt regarding the permissibility of discovery is to be resolved in favor of allowing the discovery. (Id.; Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 98.) Consequently, defendant Mintzer’s boilerplate objections based on being irrelevant and/or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence fall far short of justifying an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena.

Defendant Mintzer next contends this subpoena seeks “privileged documents,” including those protected under both the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. (Not. of Mot., p.2:3-6; Mov. MPA. p.6:1-p.7:3.) After carefully reviewing and considering each of JPC’s 51 individual requests, this Court finds no request which on its face specifically seeks any document which would likely be is protected under either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.

As such, the Court finds no reason why any individual request should be quashed on the grounds of privilege. While Mintzer may at first blush plausibly argue that at least some documents responsive to certain of the 51 individual requests by JPC could potentially encompass documents falling within the protections of the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine, the Court finds that any such protections have likely been waived by Mintzer by virtue of providing such documents and/or information to a third party (i.e., Alive) outside of any attorney-client relationship.

Consequently, this Court is not persuaded that Mintzer’s assertion of the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine is a valid ground on which to quash the entirety of the subject subpoena or even the entirety of any one of the 51 individual categories sought by this subpoena.

Furthermore, to the extent defendant Mintzer may contend there is a discrete document or set of documents which is both privileged and responsive to one or more of the 51 separate requests included within the subject subpoena, the more appropriate relief he

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

should have sought was to merely exclude such privileged documents from Alive’s compulsory production or alternatively, to move for an order under Code of Civil Procedure §1987.1. For unknown reasons, defendant Mintzer appears to have pursued none of these options.

Aside from the foregoing reasons why defendant Mintzer’s arguments relating to the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine do not warrant the relief sought by the present motion to quash, defendant Mintzer’s reliance on these protections fall short for a separate and distinct reason. As noted above, the party resisting a discovery request bears the burden of justifying its objection to the discovery (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [citing Coy v.

Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d at 220-221]) and more specifically, when a party seeks to avoid discovery based on privilege including the attorney-client privilege, that same party has the burden of showing those facts necessary to establish the existence of the privilege asserted (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102; see also OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894 [party asserting privilege must present facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing privilege]).

Although the moving points & authorities vaguely assert that the subject subpoena’s requests seek documents privileged documents and refers to the moving separate statement as additional justification for the privilege objections, this moving separate statement is likewise devoid of facts sufficient to establish the existence of any document in the possession of the deponent (i.e., Alive) which currently remains protected from disclosure pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine.

More critically, however, is the absence of any facts in the moving declaration by attorney Murphy which are sufficient to establish a prima facie showing that some responsive documents currently in the possession of Alive remain shielded from discovery under the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. Accordingly, defendant Mintzer has failed not only to carry his burden of justifying his privilege objections but also to demonstrate sufficient justification for an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena, or even the entirety of any one of the individual requests therein.

The final ground advanced by defendant Mintzer as support for the present motion to quash is that the subpoena infringes on his privacy rights and especially relating to his personal financial information. As will now be shown, this final ground falls short of justifying an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena. First, none of the 51 individual requests specifically seeks documents which would necessarily include any of defendant Mintzer’s personal financial information and while some of the individual requests could conceivably encompass a discrete array of documents containing such personal financial information, this does not persuade the Court that the entirety of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

subject subpoena, or even the entirety of any one of the individual requests, should be quashed. Instead, as explained above, the appropriate course of action for defendant Mintzer would likely have been to redact from the responsive documents the allegedly private personal financial information or alternatively, to seek pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1987.1 an order limiting or modifying the scope of the specific requests which are claimed to encompass documents containing such claimed private personal financial information. However, defendant Mintzer appears to have pursued none of these options.

Moreover, as with defendant Mintzer’s assertion of objections based on the attorneyclient privilege and the attorney work product doctrine, the moving papers and especially the moving declaration by attorney Murphy provide no facts sufficient to demonstrate that the deponent (i.e., Alive) currently possesses responsive documents which include any allegedly private personal financial information of defendant Mintzer. Thus, he has failed to adequately substantiate his objections to the subpoena on grounds of privacy relative to his personal financial information (see, e.g., Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d at 220-221]) and also failed to provide the Court with a valid basis on which to quash the entirety of the subject subpoena, or even the entirety of any one of the individual requests therein.

Finally, even if the moving papers had provided sufficient evidentiary support for the privacy objection relative to defendant Mintzer’s personal financial information, California law is clear that one’s right to privacy does not constitute a categorical bar to discovery. Instead, where privacy rights are implicated and properly presented for resolution, the Court must ultimately balance the competing interests to determine whether or not disclosure of the allegedly private information is warranted under the circumstances, taking into account various factors including the relevance of the information and its necessity for a fair resolution of the litigation. (See, e.g., Alch v.

Superior Court (Time Warner Entertainment Co.) (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423- 1425, 1432-1433.) In the case at bar, JPC has sued defendant Mintzer for the latter’s alleged breached of their 2023 real estate contract and his subsequently sale of the subject property to a third party in 2024 and thus, JPC has issued a subpoena for records held by nonparty Alive which generally seek documents relate to both the failed 2023 transaction and the subsequent 2024. As such, the documents sought by JPC certainly appear to be directly relevant to the claims currently alleged against defendant Mintzer and most would in this Court’s view be necessary for JPC to prove such claims.

This, in turn, tends to substantiate the subject subpoena and to weigh against defendant Mintzer’s argument, based on privacy rights, to quash the entirety of the subject subpoena, or even the entirety of any one of the individual requests therein.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV009122: CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION vs JEFFREY PANG & COMPANY, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 05/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Business Records in Department 16D

In the end, because the present motion seeks only an order quashing the entirety of the subject subpoena but is not properly substantiated with competent, admissible evidence bearing on the two substantive objections based on privilege and/or privacy objections, the present motion will be denied.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant Mintzer’s motion to quash defendant JPC’s subpoena for records from nonparty Alive is DENIED in its entirety.

Defendant JPC’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED. Although this motion to quash has been denied, the Court is unable to conclude it was filed without substantial justification.

Defendant JPC to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)