Motion for Attorney Fees
24CV091985: DE SOUSA vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees filed by EVANDRO CARVALHO DE SOUSA (Plaintiff) CRS# 897153007644 in Department 520
Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2026 Jamilah A. Jefferson
The Motion for Attorney Fees filed by EVANDRO CARVALHO DE SOUSA on 06/17/2026 is Granted in Part.
NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the courts final order on July 16, 2026 unless, by no later than 10:00 A.M. on July 16, 2026, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or self-represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling.
Oral argument for properly contested matters will be heard on August 7, 2026.
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The Motion of Plaintiff Evandro Carvalho De Sousa (Plaintiff) for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1794, subd. (d).) Based on a detailed review of the itemized billing invoice submitted by Plaintiffs counsel, an assessment of the skill of each attorney involved and the necessary skill required for the tasks identified in Plaintiffs invoice, the Court awards Plaintiff a total amount of $12,734.49, as described below.
Here, Defendant Hyundai Motor America (Defendant) does not contest that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action or that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032; 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) The Opposition focuses only on whether the attorneys fees sought by Plaintiff are reasonable.
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LAW
A. Motion for Attorney Fees Legal Standard
The prevailing party to an action is entitled to costs, which include attorneys fees when authorized by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032; 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)
B. Calculation of Attorney Fees in Contingency Cases 24CV091985: DE SOUSA vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees filed by EVANDRO CARVALHO DE SOUSA (Plaintiff) CRS# 897153007644 in Department 520
The lodestar method is widely accepted in California for calculating statutory attorneys fees where a case is taken on a contingency basis. (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351.)
To calculate a fee award, a trial court must first determine the lodestarthe number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. (Sonoma Land Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 983.) The court may then adjust the lodestar, based on various factors, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Ibid.)
The following factors may be considered in adjusting the lodestar:
(1) novelty or difficulty of the questions involved,
(2) skill displayed,
(3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and
(4) the contingent nature of the fee award.
(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
In contingent fee cases, a fee enhancement compensates the lawyer for having taken the case despite the risk of receiving no payment in the event of a loss or the risk of a delayed payment in the event of a victory. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133, 1137-1138.) The enhancement is intended to approximate market-level compensation for cases taken on contingency, which typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees. (Id. at p. 1138.)
C. Standard of Review
Review of a trial court's award of attorneys fees is highly deferential and may only be reversed only for an abuse of discretion because the trial court is in the best position to judge the value of professional services rendered and the attorneys performance. (Ventura v. ABM Industries (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 275; Sonoma Land Trust, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 983-984; Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
BACKGROUND
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
24CV091985: DE SOUSA vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees filed by EVANDRO CARVALHO DE SOUSA (Plaintiff) CRS# 897153007644 in Department 520 Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Hyundai Palisade on or about November 13, 2021. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Three years later, on September 18, 2024, Plaintiff sued Defendant, asserting Song-Beverly claims for breach of express and implied warranties. (ROA.)
Plaintiff propounded his first set of discovery on July 17, 2023. (Keshishian Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Defendant propounded its discovery requests on Plaintiff on November 20, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. I.) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff provided responses to Defendants written discovery. (Ibid.)
The case involved one Motion to Compel, which was withdrawn. (ROA.) The parties settled and filed a Notice of Settlement on December 16, 2025, thereby mooting the July 31, 2026 trial date. (ROA.) Plaintiff focuses their argument for increased fees because Defendant delayed in finalizing settlement and purchasing car or making payment. Plaintiff argues that he was left with no choice but to proceed with discovery pending the finalized settlement and, therefore, counsel is entitled to those reasonable fees. The Court agrees - in part.
ANALYSIS
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action or that he is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees under the Song-Beverly Act and under the Settlement Agreement, which allows for attorneys fees "reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in the commencement and prosecution of this action[.] (Code Civ. Proc., § 1794, subd. (d).) Plaintiff seeks a total of $38,143.89, consisting of (1) $36,644.40 for attorney fees ($28,188.00 multiplied by 0.3); and (2) $1499.49 in costs, claiming a total of 40.1 hours spent on the case (plus 9 anticipated hours to review opposition, draft reply, and appear from hearing). (MPA.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff is entitled to no more than $7,029.38, as the claimed fees are unsupported, unreasonable, and a lodestar multiplier is inappropriate for a simple Lemon Law case. (Oppo.)
The starting point is the calculation of the lodestar: the reasonable hourly rate times the reasonable number of hours. The question for the Court is whether the number of hours incurred were reasonably incurred in a case involving limited motion and discovery work with the number of persons involved in the case. Defendant correctly notes that this is a simple Lemon Law case with standardized pleadings and discovery requests.
For work performed in Lemon Law cases such as this one, this Court will therefore approve a rate of $350 per hour instead of the proposed hourly rates ranging from $575 to $695 because the work is not complex. (MPA.) That being said, the Court has reviewed the itemized time entries from Plaintiffs counsel and will allow Plaintiff to recover for a total of 30.1 hours.
Given these factors and the likelihood of duplicative billing, the Court reduces the lodestar to $10,535 using the amount of $350 as the average hourly rate, and reducing the total hours by 10 hours.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
24CV091985: DE SOUSA vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, A CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees filed by EVANDRO CARVALHO DE SOUSA (Plaintiff) CRS# 897153007644 in Department 520 Defendant argues that no multiplier should be applied. (Oppo.) Plaintiffs argue for a multiplier based on delay and contingent risk and undue delay. (MPA.) Both factors may be considered by the court. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.). Here, no multiplier is appropriate because a settlement was achieved after essentially no motion practice and a minimal exchange of discovery.
The Court therefore awards Plaintiffs a total amount of $12,734.49 for fees and costs in connection with this litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032; 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B); 1794, subd. (d).) This amount consists of $10,535 in attorneys fees (for the 30.1 hours incurred, at the Courts approved rate of $350 per hour) plus $700.00 for two hours of work at the same rate (which can reasonably be anticipated in connection with this motion), and costs of $1499.49.
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NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the courts final order on July 16, 2026 unless, by no later than 10:00 A.M. on July 16, 2026, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or self-represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling.
NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the courts final order on July 16, 2026 unless, by no later than 10:00 A.M. on July 16, 2026, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or selfrepresented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling.
The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case name], [number]. When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument.
The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. Their email must be provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed.
ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may give email notice that they will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.
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