Motion of Plaintiffs for Leave to File First Amended Complaint
the purposes of judicial efficiency in resolving claims ready for disposition by the Court. The motion for leave to file the PTAC with thus be denied. For the same reasons, the Court will deny leave to amend in its granting of the Commission's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Although the Court denies this motion, it is important to point out that in so doing the Court is not expressing any position on the viability, or not, of Sable's arguments with respect to prospective conduct. As this matter now sits, Sable is free to assert in a different action any claims that it may have based upon these new legal theories arising out of federal actions subsequent to the April 10 Orders and the filing of this action. Although declaratory relief is, by its nature, prospective relief, the allegations in the PTAC are sufficiently vague that any declaration issued by the Court on a broader basis would be advisory. The inappropriateness of the Court addressing by declaratory relief newly proposed conduct is further demonstrated by the complex and seemingly fast-changing legal landscape.
(C) Leave to Amend Sable's Answer to Commission Cross-Complaint
Sable's proposed amended (and supplemental) answer to the Commission's FACC, on the other hand, raises different issues. Where Sable's SAC asserts claims arising out of the Commission's past conduct, the Commission's FACC asserts claims for permanent injunctive relief. The general rule is "that equity acts in injunctive proceedings upon the situation[] as it appears at the termination of litigation as distinguished from that at the time of or prior to the commencement of the action ...." (Mallon v.
City of Long Beach (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 178, 187.) The scope and limits of permanent injunctive relief sought by the Commission in its FACC may be affected by the new issues raised in the FAA. It is therefore appropriate to permit the pleading of such new matter by supplemental answer. The motion will be granted to permit the filing of the FAA. To the extent it is disputed that matter raised in the FAA constitutes a defense as a matter of law, those issues are best raised by appropriate motion rather than in addressing leave to amend.
(3) Remaining Issues
Based upon the above discussion, there are no remaining issues for disposition in Sable's SAC against the Commission. This disposition renders moot Sable's motion to compel the deposition of Cassidy Teufel as to issues relevant to Sable's SAC. At the same time, there remain issues, at least including remedial issues, to be resolved by trial or otherwise as to the Commission's FACC against Sable. It is unclear whether the deposition of Cassidy Teufel is necessary or appropriate as to these remaining issues.
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Tentative Ruling: Larry Lawson, et al., v. John Coggi, et al.
Tentative Ruling: Larry Lawson, et al., v. John Coggi, et al.
Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion
Hearing Date / Time Wed, 07/01/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings Motion of Plaintiffs for Leave to File First Amended Complaint
Tentative Ruling For Plaintiffs Larry Lawson and Nancy Duong aka Nancy Lawson: Jeffrey S. Sanger, Miguel A. Avila, Sanger, Hanley, Sanger & Avila, LLP
For Defendant Melinda Coggi: Philip D. Dracht, Dracht Law, PC
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiffs Larry Lawson and Nancy Duong aka Nancy Lawson for leave to file an amended complaint is denied.
Background
On March 18, 2025, plaintiffs Larry Lawson and Nancy Duong aka Nancy Lawson (collectively, the Lawsons) filed their complaint in this action against defendants John Coggi and Melinda Coggi (collectively, the Coggis). As alleged in the complaint: The Lawsons and the Coggis, respectively, own real property in the Shadow Hills Single Family Lot Owners Association (Shadow Hills SFLOA) in Santa Barbara. (Complaint, P. 7.) On January 19, 2019, the Lawsons and the Coggis sued the Shadow Hills SFLOA and others alleging wrongs committed in their housing development (the Shadow Hills Action). (Complaint, P. 8.)
At about the same time, the Lawsons and the Coggis entered into an oral agreement by which the Lawsons agreed to pay some or all of the Coggis' legal fees and costs in connection with the Shadow Hills Action. (Complaint, P. 9.) In May 2020, the Lawsons and the Coggis entered into a written agreement (Repayment Agreement) memorializing the oral agreement for the repayment of fees. (Complaint, P. 10 & exhibit A). The Shadow Hills Action was settled by a settlement agreement on January 7, 2025. (Complaint, P. 13.)
The Lawsons advanced and paid $493,847.63 in legal fees billed to the Coggis. (Complaint, P. 14.) The Coggis have paid only $15,000 to the Lawsons, in May 2024, leaving an unpaid balance of $478,847.63. (Ibid.) In this action, the Lawsons now assert one cause of action for breach of contract based upon this nonpayment.
On August 26, 2025, the Lawsons requested, and the court entered, default against defendant John Coggi. On September 3, 2025, Melinda Coggi (hereafter, Coggi) filed her answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 14 affirmative defenses. On November 12, 2025, the court held a case management conference and set a trial date for September 2, 2026. This trial date was confirmed at a case management conference held on April 8, 2026. In the case management conference statement filed by the Lawsons on March 24, 2026, the only motion stated as contemplated was a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. On May 15, 2026, the Lawsons filed this motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. The motion is opposed by Coggi.
Analysis
"The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (a)(1).)
"A motion to amend a pleading before trial must: "(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; "(2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and "(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).)
"A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify: "(1) The effect of the amendment; "(2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; "(3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and "(4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).)
Coggi argues that the motion seeks to expand a simple breach of contract action into a "sprawling fraud and asset-tracing suit" (Opposition, at p. 1) with a September 2 trial date, creating substantial prejudice to Coggi. "Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any