GIVANS, et al. vs GIVENS, et al.

Plaintiffs purport to dispute SSF Nos. 13-15, but they cite no admissible evidence that CLC 21CV001443: GIVANS, et al. vs GIVENS, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Commericial Loan Group (Defendant) CRS# 417754413843 in Department 19 would have either actual or constructive notice of any claimed adverse interest by Plaintiffs in the subject properties. In particular, Plaintiffs refer to "recorded Transfer on Death Deeds” that allegedly affected title to the subject properties. But Plaintiffs have not introduced the “Transfer on Death Deeds” into evidence or presented any admissible evidence as to the content of those “Transfer on Death Deeds” or that they were recorded.

On March 3, 2020, Givens (in his role as trustee of the Trust) signed a promissory note for $420,000, secured by a deed of trust on the Chestnut property; the deed of trust was recorded on March 11, 2020. (SSF Nos. 16-17.)

On May 7, 2020, Givens (in his capacity as trustee of the Trust) applied for a loan from CLC, to be secured by the MacArthur property. (SSF No.18.) In determining whether to grant the loan, CLC reviewed the Los Angeles Superior Court’s January 9, 2020 order granting Givens’ petition to confirm the validity of the Trust, a notarized copy of the Trust, and Jackson’s death certificate. (SSF No. 19.) CLC also ran a title report on the MacArthur property, which did not identify any ownership interests adverse to Givens in his role as successor trustee of the Trust. (SSF No. 20.)

Again, Plaintiffs purport to dispute SSF Nos. 19-20, but they cite no admissible evidence that CLC would have either actual or constructive notice of any claimed adverse interest by Plaintiffs in the subject properties. In particular, Plaintiffs have not introduced the “Transfer on Death Deeds” into evidence or presented any admissible evidence as to the content of those “Transfer on Death Deeds” or that they were recorded.

On August 25, 2020, Givens (in his role as trustee of the Trust) signed a promissory note for $350,000, secured by a deed of trust on the MacArthur property; the deed of trust was recorded on August 28, 2020. (SSF Nos. 21-22.)

In July 2020, Plaintiff Clifford Givan filed a motion in the Los Angeles Superior Court probate action to vacate the January 9, 2020 petition order confirming the validity of the Trust. (SSF No. 26.) On August 19, 2020, the court entered a minute order granting Clifford Givan’s motion and rescheduling the hearing on Givens’ petition to confirm validity of the Trust for October 2, 2020. (SSF No. 27.) CLC was not aware of the court’s August 19, 2020 minute order at any time before recording the deed of trust on the MacArthur property. (SSF No. 30-31.) Plaintiffs purport to dispute SSF Nos. 30-31, but their dispute consists of a factually unsupported argument that CLC somehow should have discovered the existence of that minute order. Plaintiffs do not explain how or why CLC should have been aware of that minute order.

The Los Angeles Superior Court eventually held the rehearing on Givens’ petition to confirm the validity of Trust on December 7, 2023. (See CLC’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 8.) The court denied Givens’ petition, on the basis that it found Givens’ evidence insufficient to establish that the Trust existed or was valid. (Id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Additional Fact No. 6.)

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (the operative pleading in this case) asserts causes of action against CLC for quiet title, cancellation of instruments, and negligence.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

21CV001443: GIVANS, et al. vs GIVENS, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Commericial Loan Group (Defendant) CRS# 417754413843 in Department 19

A good faith encumbrancer for value who first records takes its interest in the real property free and clear of unrecorded interests. (See First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1440.) A good faith encumbrancer is one who acts without knowledge of or notice of competing liens on the subject property. (Id. at 1441.) With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee, if the third person acts in good faith and for valuable consideration and without actual knowledge that the trustee is improperly exercising his powers, the third person may assume without inquiry the existence of the trust power and its proper exercise. (See Probate Code § 18100.)

The undisputed facts, as supported by admissible evidence, establish that CLC had no actual or constructive notice of any claimed competing interests to title of the subject properties when it recorded the deeds of trust secured by the subject properties. Plaintiffs’ argument that CLC had actual or constructive notice of their claimed interest in the subject properties appears to be based entirely on the “Transfer of Death Deeds” that have not been introduced into evidence. Plaintiffs have therefore not presented any admissible evidence as to what these documents said or that they were recorded.

Furthermore, although the Los Angeles Superior Court issued an order on December 7, 2023 denying Givens’ petition to confirm the validity of the trust, that order necessarily could not have imparted actual or constructive notice to CLC in 2020 that the Trust was invalid or that there were any competing claims to the subject properties. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Trust was forged is likewise not supported by any admissible evidence. (See SSF No. 7 and Plaintiffs’ response.) In the absence of any admissible evidence that CLC had actual or constructive notice of any claimed adverse interest in the subject properties when CLC recorded the deeds of trust securing the subject properties, Plaintiffs have not created a triable issue of material fact as to whether their causes of action against CLC for quiet title or cancellation of instruments have any merit.

As to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence, a lender does not owe a duty of care to a borrower if the lender’s actions do not exceed the normal role of a lender of money. (See, e.g., Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Association (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096.) Moreover, “absent extraordinary and specific facts, a bank does not owe a duty of care to a noncustomer.” (See Software Design & Application Ltd. v. Hoefer & Arnett Inc. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 472, 479.) Plaintiffs submit no evidence suggesting that at the time the subject deeds of trust were recorded, CLC was aware of Plaintiffs’ existence or of any competing claims to title of the subject properties. (See SSF Nos. 15, 20, and 25.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs submit no evidence suggesting that CLC’s role in the transactions with Givens exceeded the normal role of a money lender. Based on the evidence presented, CLC did not owe any duty of care to Plaintiffs that would support a cause of action for negligence as a matter of law. (See Software Design, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at 478.)

CLC’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Court did not read or consider CLC’s “Reply to Plaintiffs’ Additional Separate Statement”;

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

21CV001443: GIVANS, et al. vs GIVENS, et al. 07/15/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Commericial Loan Group (Defendant) CRS# 417754413843 in Department 19 that document is prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4).

The Court rules as follows on CLC’s Objections to Evidence:

As to the Declaration of Clifford Givan, Objection No. 1 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. CLC has not demonstrated any prejudice from the service of Clifford Givan’s declaration one day after service of the other opposition papers.

Objections Nos. 2-7 are SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. (See Evidence Code § 1523.) In addition, the statement quoted in Objection No. 5 lacks foundation and is inadmissible speculation.

As to the Declaration of Keith Givan, Objections Nos. 1-6 are SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. (See Evidence Code § 1523.) In addition, the statement quoted in Objection No. 4 lacks foundation and is inadmissible speculation.

Defendant Commercial Loan Corporation, erroneously sued as Commercial Loan Group, is DISMISSED from this case, with prejudice.