Crisafulli v. Sonoma Media Investments, LLC

There was no opposition. After the hearing of March 4, 2026, the court granted the motion in full, issuing a 12-page ruling explaining the applicable law and its findings. The Settlement, as detailed in the court’s order, covers a class about 157 current and former non-exempt employees (the “Class Members”) employed by Defendant in California during the class period, defined as September 12, 2020, through March 15, 2025 (the “Class Period”). The PAGA Period is defined as September 12, 2023, through March 15, 2025, and those who worked during the PAGA Period are referred to as the PAGA Employees.

The parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims in the FAC for a nonreversionary “Gross Settlement Amount” (“GSA”) of $350,000, exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes, a common fund which includes all costs, fees, and other allocations. Attorneys’ fees will amount to 35% of the GSA while the attorneys will recover actual costs and expenses up to 7

$25,000, from the GSA. Each named Plaintiff will receive an enhancement payment of $7,500, a total of $15,000, from the GSA. Another $25,000 from the GSA will be allocated to the PAGA amount with 65% payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining allocated to the PAGA Employees. Settlement administration costs will not exceed $9,000 and will be paid form the GSA. As a result the net settlement amount (“Net Amount”) is estimated to be about $153,000 and this will be distributed to the Class Members.

Since this is nonreversionary, no amount will revert to Defendant and the full amount will be distributed to the members and LWDA. Any unclaimed portions will be distributed to the state Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the employee. Individual shares will be apportioned with 20% as wages and the rest as penalties, interest, and non-wage damages. Wages will be reported on IRS Form W-2 and the rest on IRS Form 1099. As set forth in detail in court order granting preliminary approval, the court specifically found “the Settlement to be potentially fair and reasonable for the purposes of preliminary approval” with the amount “substantial in total and not a de minimis amount for each member, on average”; the enhancement for named Plaintiffs to be reasonable, based on sufficiently detailed evidence and explanation, and in line with applicable authority; Plaintiffs had properly notified the LWDA; the payment to the LWDA to be sufficient; the attorneys’ fees at 35% of the GSA to be reasonable and in accordance with applicable authority; the costs capped at $25,000 maximum to be reasonable; the proposed class notice (the “Notice”) to be sufficient; and the class and Settlement to meet the requirements for class certification.

The court set the matter for a hearing of July 15, 2026, regarding final approval. Plaintiffs filed their notice and Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement on June 22, 2026. Motion In their Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, Plaintiffs move the court for final approval of the Settlement. They set forth the Settlement terms and procedures, contending that it is fair and reasonable in compliance with the applicable authority. They also explain that they have completed the notice requirements, serving the Notice, and There is no opposition.

Authority Governing Approval of Class Settlements Settlement of a class action requires court approval after a hearing. California Rule of Court (“CRC”) 3.769(a). The Court ultimately must determine that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. CRC 3.769(g); Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785; Nordstrom Commission Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 581. Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801; see also Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc., Rule 23(e).

The trial court has broad powers and discretion to do so. Clark, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 798; Kullar v Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116; 127-128; Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 434. Court approval of a class action settlement is a two-step process. CRC 3.769; Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 336. As explained in Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, at 336-337,

The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a class action settlement is fair. It should consider factors such as the strength of plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status through trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. [Citations.] 8

But the “list of factors is not exclusive and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of factors depending on the circumstances of each case. [Citation.]” [Citation.] In sum, the trial court must determine that the settlement was not the product of fraud, overreaching or collusion, and that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.

The Reed court added, at 337, that the party seeking settlement approval has the burden of showing the settlement to be “fair and reasonable” but that nevertheless “there is a presumption of fairness when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the trial court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” See also Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43; Dunk v.

Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. A trial court must nonetheless consider sufficient information to determine the value of the claims and strength of the case. Kullar v Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, at 120, 130, 132; Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, at 798-801; Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399; and Nordstrom Commission Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576. Accordingly, a trial court will abuse its discretion in finding a settlement to be fair and reasonable if it fails to “receive and consider sufficient information on a core legal issue, affecting the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, to make the requisite independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms of the settlement.”

Kullar v Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116,120, 130, 132; Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 798-801. The court must be able to form “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th, 120, 132. A party to the settlement agreement may bring a noticed motion for preliminary approval. CRC 3.769(c). If a party does so, it must file the settlement agreement and send notice to class members.

Ibid. Rule 3.769(c) states, in full, “[a]ny party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.” Preliminary approval is appropriate as long as the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonableness and may be appropriate for possible final approval. As the court stated in Officers for Justice v.

Civil Serv. Comm’n (9th Cir.1982) 688 F.2d 615, at 628, “[i]t is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” See also In re Mego Financial Corp. Secs. Litig. (9th Cir.2000) 213 F.3d 454, at 459. The court in Mego Financial Corp. found that a class settlement recovering about 16% of the total potential recovery was reasonable. An action under the Labor Code PAGA, at Labor Code (“Lab.Code”) section 2698, et seq., is a representative action where plaintiff stands in the role of the Labor Commissioner to recover penalties for certain violations of California labor law.

Arias v. Sup.Ct. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 985- 986; Lab.Code section 2699. An employee may have a private right of action to sue directly and also a right to bring a PAGA action based on the same conduct. Lab.Code section 2699(g)(1); Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 375. PAGA does not indicate what factors a court must consider for approving a settlement but federal decisions addressing PAGA settlements have found it appropriate, but not necessarily required, to consider traditional class-action standards and those set forth in Hanlon v.

Chrysler Corp. (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, or “any other coherent analysis.” O’Connor v. Uber Technologies (N.D. Cal.2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1134. As set forth in Hanlon, courts have 9

considered factors such as the strength of the claim, risk, expense, complexity, amount and terms of settlement, discovery, and experience of counsel. Incentive or enhancement awards to named plaintiffs as class representatives are allowable and even “fairly typical” in class actions. In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-1394; Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-807; see also Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir.2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958.

They are discretionary and they are intended to compensate the named representatives for work and effort as well as “financial or reputational risk” in being willing to bring the action. In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases, supra; Clark, supra. Under Lab. Code sections 226(e), 1194(a), and 2699(g), prevailing employees are entitled to an award of fees and costs. The Supreme Court in Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 noted that in settlement of class-action cases such as this, there are two different methods for determining a reasonable and appropriate award of attorney’s fees, both methods being acceptable and within the discretion of the court.

One is the traditional lodestar approach and the other is the percentage method. In figuring fees in such cases, courts generally use the “lodestar” approach, basing the decision on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate in the community for similar work. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136 (anti-SLAPP context); Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 28 (Serrano III) (private attorney general doctrine, now CCP section 1021.5); Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 819 (under Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act).

The court should consider a wide variety of factors, including the nature of the litigation, the difficulty, the amount involved, the skill, the success, the attorneys’ experience, the importance of the litigation, and the time consumed. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 638-639; Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 656-657. Finally, the court may apply a fee enhancement modifier to take into account a risk in contingency situations of not being reimbursed due to the nature of the work.

Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1140. Courts under this approach multiply the time spent by the reasonable fee, rather than focusing on the fees “actually” charged. PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1096. The court must determine “whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.” Karapetian v. Kia Motors Am., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2013) 970 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1036, quoting, Nightingale v.

Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104; see also, Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, at 998. The prevailing party “bears the burden of demonstrating all of the following: ‘the [attorneys’] fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” Karapetian, citing, Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App. 4th at 104, quoting, Levy, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at 816. The court retains discretion to reduce the fee award where fees were not reasonably incurred.

Ibid, citing, Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (“Padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.”); Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 90-92 (“A reduced [attorneys’ fees] award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney...submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections”). “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended is not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.”

Ibid, citing, Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at 104; see also, Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 815–816.

The reasonable hourly rate is generally “that prevailing in the community for similar work.” City of Santa Rosa v. Patel (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 65, 69, quoting PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; see also Rey v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1241; see also, Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132 (hourly rate used in lodestar calculation is “the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community;”); Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 640, fn. 31 (lodestar calculation uses the “comparable salaries earned by private attorneys with similar experience and expertise in equivalent litigation,” or “hourly amount to which attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled.”); Children’s Hosp. & Med.

Ctr. v Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783 (the court is often called upon to determine reasonable hourly rates of attorneys who appear in front of it and in order to determine “reasonable market value” and must determine whether the requested rates are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work” in the community.). In Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, employees brought a class action for wage-and-hour violations against their employer and eventually entered into a settlement with defendant.

The trial court overruled a class member’s objections and approved the settlement, which included provision for the class attorneys to recover 1/3 of the settlement as attorneys’ fees. The court of appeal affirmed and ultimately the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was appropriate to employ a percentage method as the primary calculation for an award of attorneys’ fees. The court noted that awards of attorneys’ fees are reviewed for abuse of discretion on the basis that the trial judge is the best judge of the value of the services so the trial court’s decision is presumed to be reasonable and will not be overturned unless “clearly wrong.”

Laffitte, 488. The court noted, at 490,

Two primary methods of determining a reasonable attorney fee in class action litigation have emerged and been elaborated in recent decades. The percentage method calculates the fee as a percentage share of a recovered common fund or the monetary value of plaintiffs' recovery. The lodestar method, or more accurately the lodestar-multiplier method, calculates the fee “by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” [Citation.]

The two approaches to determining a fee contrast in their primary foci: “The lodestar method better accounts for the amount of work done, while the percentage of the fund method more accurately reflects the results achieved.” [Citation.]

The court then noted the various argument supporting and criticizing the two methods before concluding, at 503,

that use of the percentage method to calculate a fee in a common fund case, where the award serves to spread the attorney fee among all the beneficiaries of the fund, does not in itself constitute an abuse of discretion. We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and 11

the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation [Citations]—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.

In the end, it found that the settlement term award up to 1/3 of the award as attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion. A payment of attorneys’ fees as high as roughly 1/3 of the total recovery is generally in line with class action fee awards based on the percentage of the benefit. Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n11. As the court in Chavez stated, where an attorney’s initial award was 30.3 percent of the benefit the final fee award was 27.9 percent of the benefit, this was ‘not out of line with class action fee awards calculated using the percentage-of-the-benefit method: “Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.” [Citation.]’ Awards even higher than 1/3 or 33% have sometimes been found appropriate and approved.

See, e.g., Roos v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1472. In Roos, the court found a fee award in a class-action settlement of 37.5% not to be an abuse of discretion, noting that the settlement had allowed an award of up to 37.5% subject to a subsequent final determination of the amount, and that the award at the limit was ultimately approved based on the showing that was below the amount that could have been awarded using the lodestar method. Service Plaintiffs filed proof of service showing electronic service of the motion and online submission of the notice and moving papers to the LWDA.

Discussion

The court, as noted, has already granted preliminary approval, finding the Settlement to be fair and reasonable, and finding it and proposed class notice to comply with the applicable standards. The court’s findings on all of the issues and factors for determining the Settlement to be fair and reasonable are set forth in this court’s order granting preliminary approval. At this stage, therefore, the issues remaining for the court to address are any final outstanding fairness issues, compliance with the notice requirements and the other terms of the court order granting preliminary approval, and consideration of the number of class members who have objected, opted out, or disputed the amounts.

Plaintiffs provide declarations of both named Plaintiffs (“Giovacchini” and “Crisafulli”), attorney Alexandra Rose (“Rose”) and Case Manager for the settlement administrator, Ilym Group, Inc. (“Ilym”), Amanda Howard (“Howard”). These detail the notice process and demonstrate that this has been completed according to the court’s order. In her declaration (the “Rose Dec.”), Rose once again details the history and terms of the Settlement, shows that the attorney’s fees of $122,500 amount to 35% of the GSA as approved; shows that actual fees based on the hours worked would exceed the fee award; and shows that costs are at the approved limit of $25,000.

Rose Dec., ¶¶10-34, 36-37. At ¶35, she explains that the administration costs to Ilym amount to only $7,250, below the $9,000 which the court approved in the order for preliminary approval. In her declaration (the “Howard Dec.”), Howard details the assembly of the class list, distribution of the approved class notice, responses from the class members, and specific plan for distributing the settlement funds following approval. She states, among other things, that after Ilym received the class list of 157 members, it updated the mailing addresses of the members using the National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database; Ilym received 30 notices returned from the USPS as undeliverable and performed an advanced search for those, obtaining an updated address for 27.

It successfully mailed a new notice to the updated addresses. It was unable to find a new address 12

for the remaining three, leaving only those three, out of the Notices for 157 members, being undeliverable. Howard also explains that no member has submitted an objection, request for exclusion, or a dispute of the computation for hours and settlement allocation. She notes that the deadline for submitting any objection, exclusion request, or dispute had expired by the date of the declaration. Howard also explains that the Net Settlement Amount is about $155,250, after subtracting the attorneys’ fees, costs, administration expenses, and the enhancement payments for the named Plaintiffs.

This, she explains, results in an average payment to members of about $988.85 with the highest being about $2,770.64 and the lowest about $11.74. She also details the individual PAGA payments to PAGA employees, with the average being about $119.86, the highest about $182.86, and the lowest about $4.57. The court finds that settlement notice has been completed according to the court’s order and no member has objected to the settlement, disputed the calculations, or sought to be excluded. There are no other outstanding issues, based on this court’s prior findings resolving all other issues for fairness and compliance with applicable authority.

The court GRANTS the motion. The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

6. 24CV06214, Midland Credit Management Inc. v. Alton

This matter is on calendar for the motion of Defendant Elisha Alton (“Alton”) to vacate the entry of default entered on January 28, 2025, and the default judgment entered on February 4, 2025. This motion was initially heard on March 4, 2026. At that time, this court continued the hearing to allow Alton to provide proof of service demonstrating service of notice of the hearing. On July 10, 2026, Alton filed a supplemental declaration and proof of service that supplemental declaration was served, prior to it being filed, on July 9.

Proof of service for notice of the hearing remains defective. As noted in this court’s prior ruling, “Defendant filed proof of service for the moving papers but this was attached to the moving papers and shows service prior to filing and obtain a hearing date. Accordingly, there is no proof of service for anything showing notice of the hearing.” This court will continue the hearing on this matter one final time to allow Alton to file proof of service of the new hearing date on this motion. The hearing is CONTINUED to August 26, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16.

If proof of service of the August 26, 2026, hearing date is not filed for that date, the motion will be denied. This court’s minute order shall constitute the order of the court.

7. 25CV02737, Looney v. C Casa Napa, LLC

Plaintiff Gary E. Looney dba Collectronics of California (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order appointing Landon McPherson as receiver to take possession of and, if necessary, sell the liquor license of defendant C Casa Napa (“Judgment Debtor”) in order to carry out the judgment entered in this case in the amount of $15,397.81.

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