Blaire Trambley v. Craig Reid et al

1 The Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Vollmers Decl. in support of the present motion, contains a Docusign Envelop ID header and a date stamp underneath Solage’s signature on page 7, which does not appear on the version of the Arbitration Agreement, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Vollmers Decl. in support of the motion in the Class Action. (See Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2, p. 7.) These markings are not addressed or raised by either party. The Court assumes the inclusion of the date stamp and Docusign header was an inadvertent technological error, based on the fact that the date stamp shows May 28, 2026, almost two years after the date of Plaintiff’s signing the Arbitration Agreement, and close in time to when Defendants signed and filed the present moving papers. Thus, the Court disregards these markings for purposes of the present Motion.

B. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) of the February 19, 2026 Minute Order in the Class Action is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s objections to Defendants’ evidence as follows:

Nos. 1-2 (Vollmers Decl., ¶ 6): OVERRULED.

The Court finds there is sufficient foundation for these statements from Ms. Vollmers describing her personal knowledge of the onboarding and hiring process including the HireForms tool used.

Plaintiff’s citation to Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, without a pin-cite, is unhelpful to the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s objections. Nevertheless, the Court does not find the instant circumstances analogous to Ruiz. In Ruiz, the court found that a declaration attempting to authenticate an arbitration agreement did not meet the evidentiary burden, where it only asserted that “Ruiz was the person who electronically signed the ... agreement,” but “never explained how Ruiz’s printed electronic signature, or the date and time printed next to the signature, came to be placed on the ... agreement” nor did it “explain how [the declarant] ascertained that the electronic signature on the ...agreement was ‘the act of’ Ruiz.” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 843-44.)

Here, while the Vollmers Decl. is not abundant in details, it explains her role and proficiency in the hiring process and as custodian of those company records and explains that Defendants’ use an electronic platform, HireForms, for that process, including for onboarding documents. (Vollmers Decl., ¶¶ 1, 3, 6, 8, 9.) The Court finds that the Vollmers Decl. is sufficient to sustain a finding that the document is what it purports to be, sufficient to authenticate the Arbitration Agreement attached as Exhibit 2 to the declaration. (Evid. Code, § 1400.)

No. 3 (Vollmers Decl., ¶ 7): OVERRULED.

The Court finds there is sufficient foundation for this statement and recognizes its limited applicability only as to Ms. Vollmers’ knowledge.

No. 4 (Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2): OVERRULED.

The Court finds that the Vollmers Decl. sufficiently authenticates the Arbitration Agreement and does not find the Agreement to be inadmissible by the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code § 1271.)

C. LEGAL STANDARD

A proceeding to compel arbitration is, in essence, a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. (1984)

161 Cal.App.3d 393, 399.) On a motion to compel arbitration, supported by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the underlying controversy, the court must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether the agreement is enforceable. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Sec. Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The moving party bears the burden of proving the existence of the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) The opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence of and proving (by a preponderance) any fact necessary to any defense raised. (Ibid.) California law strongly favors arbitration. (Prima Donna Development Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 22, 35.)

D. DISCUSSION

1. Existence of Arbitration Agreement

The Court previously found, in the Class Action, the Arbitration Agreement between Solage and Plaintiff valid and enforceable, and further found that the Agreement’s definition of “Company” provides that covered claims asserted against Auberge are also subject to arbitration.

In opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in the Class Action, Plaintiff (who was represented by the same counsel as in the present action) argued that Defendants failed to authenticate her electronic signature and that there was no meeting of the minds because the evidence showed that Plaintiff reviewed the Arbitration Agreement for just sixteen seconds and that Plaintiff has no recollection of reviewing or submitting to the Agreement’s terms. The Court rejected those arguments. (See RJN, Exh. 3, pp. 2-3.)

In opposition to the present motion, Plaintiff raises those same arguments. (See Opp., 3:23-7:17.) For the same reasons provided in its previous Minute Order as to Plaintiff’s attempt to create a factual dispute as to the authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments. (See RJN, Exh. 3, pp. 2-3.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants met their burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Defendants.

2. Scope of Claims Covered by Arbitration Agreement

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim must be resolved in individual arbitration consistent with Leeper v. Shipt (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, review granted, Leeper v. Shipt (2025) 566 P.3d 234. (Mem., pp. 5-7.) Specifically, Defendants argue that the Arbitration Agreement specifically covers claims brought under PAGA in an individual capacity, and only the representative PAGA claim is excluded from arbitration. (Mem., p. 6; Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2., ¶¶ 5-6.) The Court finds that Defendants have presented evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim is covered by the Arbitration Agreement, signed by Plaintiff on July 30, 2024. (See ibid.; Vollmer Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 2, ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff appears to concede this point by failing to address or dispute it through the Opposition.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants met their burden of proving that the scope of the Arbitration Agreement covers Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim against Defendants in this action.

3. Plaintiff Fails to Show that the Arbitration Agreement is Unconscionable

“Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present before a contract or term will be deemed unconscionable.” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC, 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 178.) “Both, however, need not be present to the same degree. A sliding scale is applied so that the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) As noted, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence of and proving (by a preponderance) any fact necessary to any defense raised. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 413.)

a. Plaintiff Fails to Show Procedural Unconscionability

The Court previously found, in the Class Action, that Plaintiff failed to show that the circumstances of the formation of the Arbitration Agreement involved oppression or surprise such that a significantly heightened scrutiny of the fairness of its terms was required. (RJN, Exh. 3, pp. 3-4.) As noted, Plaintiff submitted substantially the same evidence with her present Opposition as with her opposition to the motion in the Class Action. Moreover, Plaintiff’s procedural unconscionability arguments within her Opposition are almost identical to those raised in opposition to the motion in the Class Action. For that reason, the Court refers to its prior order and finds that Plaintiff has not shown procedural unconscionability. (Ibid.)

b. The Court Does Not Find the Arbitration Agreement Substantively Unconscionable

Although the foregoing conclusion regarding procedural unconscionability prevents a finding of unconscionability, the Court elects to briefly address the substantive unconscionability piece. “Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 246.)

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because the Agreement is overbroad in scope and lacks mutuality, waives a jury trial, has indefinite duration, and unfairly targets claims likely to be brought by an employee and not the employer.

With respect to the last argument regarding claims likely to be brought by an employee and not the employer, the Court previously denied this argument because Plaintiff failed to identify any portion of the Arbitration Agreement that was purportedly more likely to be used by an employer than an employee and, in any event, Baltazar v. Forever 21 Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1248, fn.4 holds that a provision is not “unfairly one-sided merely because one side is, as a practical matter, more likely to make use of it.” (RJN, Exh. 3, p. 5.) Plaintiff now identifies a

portion of Paragraph 11 as the challenged provision and argues that the Defendants and the Court misplaced reliance on Baltazar. (Opp., 13:27-14:2.) Paragraph 11 provides for either party to seek injunctive relief or other provisional remedies in court. This is the substantially same provision that the court in Baltazar considered with respect to the same argument raised by the plaintiff. Baltazar rejected the argument. (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 1246-47 [affirming that an arbitration agreement between employer and employee is not substantively unconscionable insofar as it allowed the parties to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court, even if employer was more likely than employee to seek provisional relief during the pendency of an arbitration].) Thus, Plaintiff’s reasserted argument is unavailing.

With respect to the lack of mutuality, Plaintiff argues that any claims the Defendants’ officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents may have against Plaintiff do not have to go to arbitration, but all of Plaintiff’s claims against them do. (Opp., 12:10-12, citing Cook v. Univ. of S. Cal. (2024) 102 Cal.App.4th 312, 328.) Specifically, Paragraph 5 of the Arbitration Agreement states that “Covered Claims” include “Claims Employee may have against the Company or against its officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise, or that the Company may have against the Employee.” (Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2, ¶ 5.

Emphasis added.) Cook held that similar language in an arbitration agreement “provide[d] a significant benefit to [the defendant employer’s] related entitles without any reciprocal benefit to [the plaintiff employee].” (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at 328.) As in Cook, Defendants offer no justification for this one-sided treatment, as Defendants failed to file anything by way of a Reply. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds merit to Plaintiff’s argument that the Arbitration Agreement’s lack of mutuality in the claims that are subject to arbitration is unfairly in Defendants’ favor.

With respect to the indefinite duration, Plaintiff again cites to Cook. (Opp., 13:1-8.) However, Cook is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the arbitration agreement there expressly stated it would continue unless and until both parties specifically terminated the agreement, defeating the terminatable at will doctrine. (Id., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 325-26.) Second, there, the court found the arbitration agreement was not limited to arbitration of employment-related claims. (Id., at 329.)

Here, the Court does not find this term substantively unconscionable, as (1) there is no express term regarding the expiration of the agreement and therefore the terminatable at will doctrine presumably applies, and (2) the scope of the Arbitration Agreement is reasonably limited to Plaintiff’s employment, such that the fact that it expressly survives the termination of Plaintiff’s employment may be construed as for the purpose of including claims regarding termination of Plaintiff’s employment within the scope of arbitration.

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable due to its implied duration.

With respect to the waiver of jury trial, Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 11 waives the right to a jury trial for any claims between the parties, even those outside of the Covered Claims going to arbitration, and therefore this provision is an impermissible pre-dispute jury waiver. (Opp., 12:21-27, citing Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91, 110.) The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s broad interpretation of Paragraph 11. While Paragraph 11 does not expressly reference the Covered Claims, it is clear to the Court, based on qualifying language therein, that the discussion of a jury trial waiver in Paragraph 11 is only with respect to the

claims to be arbitrated. (See Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2, ¶ 11 [“The Parties understand and fully agree that by entering into this Agreement to arbitrate, the Parties are giving up their constitutional right to have a trial by jury and giving up the Parties’ normal rights of appeal following the rendering of a decision, except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. The Parties anticipate that by entering into this Agreement, they will gain the benefits of a speedy and less expensive dispute resolution procedure....”].) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable due to the wavier of trial by jury provision in Paragraph 11.

c. Conclusion

“A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 138. Italics added.) “The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.” (Id. at 126.)

As discussed above, Plaintiff has only shown that one provision of the Arbitration Agreement contains substantive unconscionability—the portion of the sentence in Paragraph 5 identified in italics as follows: “Claims Employee may have against the Company or against its officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise, or that the Company may have against the Employee” (“Paragraph 5 provision”).

That said, Plaintiff failed to show a lack of meaningful choice in deciding whether to sign the Arbitration Agreement, thus preventing a finding of overall unconscionability. Even assuming arguendo the Court could make a finding of unconscionability, the Court does not find, in the context of the lack of evidence of oppression or surprise in the circumstances of the agreement’s formation, that this single Paragraph 5 provision justifies withholding enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement in its entirety.

First, Plaintiff does not contend that her present claims involve claims against Defendants’ “officers, directors, supervisors, managers, employees, or agents in their capacity as such or otherwise.” While the Court notes an agent was originally included as a defendant party, that party has since been dismissed from the matter. (See Compl., ¶ 8; 4/27/26 Dismissal.) Thus, it does not appear that Defendants are benefiting from, or Plaintiff is suffering any detriment by, the Paragraph 5 provision and, therefore the purported lack of mutuality is not at issue.

Second, if it were at issue, the Arbitration Agreement provides that “[i]n the event that any provision or any portion of any provision thereof or any surviving agreement made a part hereof becomes or is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction or arbitrator to be illegal, unenforceable, or void, this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect without said provision or portion of provision.” (Vollmers Decl., Exh. 2, ¶ 15.) “An unconscionable contractual term may be severed and the resulting agreement enforced, unless the agreement is permeated by an unlawful purpose, or severance would require a court to augment the agreement with additional terms. [Citation.]” (Penilla v. Westmont Corp. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 205, 223.) “‘In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provision

altogether, the overarching inquiry is whether the interests of justice would be furthered by severance; the strong preference is to sever unless the agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.’ [Citation.]” (Magno v. The College Network, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 277, 292.)

As noted, Plaintiff has only shown this single Paragraph 5 provision as evidence that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable. The Court does not find that provision to permeate the agreement with an unlawful purpose. Based on the lack of evidence of oppression or surprise in the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement, and the paucity of provisions shown to be unfair, the Court does not find that the agreement is permeated by unconscionability such that it should not be enforced against Plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is GRANTED.

[2] DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S REPRESENTATIVE PAGA CLAIM

TENTATIVE RULING: The Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendants are granted 10 days’ leave to answer the Complaint. (See Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g).)

A. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Defendants Solage Management, Inc. (“Solage”) and Auberge Resorts LLC (“Auberge”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur, pursuant to Code of Civil of procedure section 430.10, subd. (c),2 to Plaintiff Blaire Trambley’s (“Plaintiff”) representative claim under the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). Defendants so move on the ground that the representative PAGA claim is barred because there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action—specifically in the case of Burwell v. Solage Management, Inc., et al., Napa County Superior Court, case no. 25CV001894 (Burwell Action).

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed December 22, 2025, is entitled “Complaint for Enforcement Under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, et seq.” and asserts a single cause of action for “Violation of the California Labor Code § 2698 et seq.” on behalf of “Plaintiff [], individually, and on behalf of other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act.” By way of the Court’s concurrent ruling on Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim has been ordered to arbitration. This leaves only Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim before the Court in the present matter.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) of the court records in the Burwell Action (Exhibits G and J) and in the present matter (Exhibit I) is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The RJN of the LWDA letters in both actions (Exhibits F and H) is DENIED on the ground that the subject matter thereof is not appropriate matter for judicial notice.

The Complaint in the Burwell Action is brought by a former employee of Solage, Christine Zantman Burwell (“Burwell”). The Complaint asserts, both individually and on behalf of a class of certain similarly situated employees, eight claims for violation of various provisions 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

of the Labor Code, three additional claims for failure to pay wages, a claim for Unfair Business Practices, and a claim for civil penalties under PAGA. On February 24, 2026, the Court adjudicated Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in the Burwell Action, and (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s class claims, (2) compelled her individual non-PAGA claims to arbitration,3 and (3) stayed Plaintiff’s PAGA claim (both individual and representative) pending completion of arbitration. Thus, the current state of the Burwell Action is that the only claim before the Court— the entire PAGA claim—is stayed pending arbitration of Burwell’s individual non-PAGA claims.

B. LEGAL STANDARD

“The party against whom a complaint ... has been filed may object, by demurrer ..., to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: ... (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” (§ 430.10.) This ground is also known as the “statutory plea of abatement.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.) It requires “absolute identity of parties, causes of action [and] remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.” (Ibid.)

C. DISCUSSION

Despite their Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, Defendants appear to concede through their Memorandum that the Burwell Action and present action do not involve absolutely identical parties or causes of action and therefore do not satisfy the requirements of section 430.10, subdivision (c). (Mem., 4:9-11, 5:10-6:21.) Moreover, this point is raised by Plaintiff in Opposition, and Defendants fail to dispute or address it by failing to file a Reply.

Rather, Defendants’ Memorandum argues that the present action should be stayed pending the Burwell Action under the common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. While section 430.10, subdivision (c) was an attempt to codify that common law rule, the statutory and common law pleas in abatement are applied differently. (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 788 [“Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea of abatement do not exist.”].)

Namely, the common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require identical parties or causes of action. (Ibid.; see also Mem., 4:5-8, 12-19.) The common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction only requires that “the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 788.)

Defendants’ demurrer fails for the following reasons.

3 Unlike the arbitration agreement for Plaintiff Tramblay which, as discussed in the Court’s concurrent ruling, expressly split a PAGA claim between individual (subject to arbitration) and representative (excluded from arbitration) capacities, Burwell’s arbitration agreement excluded from its scope all claims arising under PAGA, whether relating to Plaintiff’s own employment or the employment of others.

First, neither Defendants’ Notice of Demurrer nor Demurrer include “the common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction” as a ground for the relief sought, in violation of Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a) and section 1010. The Court generally cannot grant different relief, or relief on different grounds, than that stated in the notice of motion. (See Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.)

Even were the Court to consider it as a ground for their demurrer, the common law rule does not support Defendants’ primary relief sought through the demurrer—to dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend. (See Mem., 3:1-3, 7:27-28, 8:6-7.) Rather, “[w]here a demurrer is sustained on the ground of another action pending, the proper order is not a dismissal, but abatement of further proceedings pending termination of the first action.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 788.)

Turning to Defendants’ alternative relief requested—a stay pending the resolution in the Burwell Action—the Court does not find that Defendants have shown that the conditions for issuance of the common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction exist here. Namely, Defendants ignore that the common law rule applies “when two superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation” and “is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy, and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.” (Plant Insulation Co., supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 786-87.) Here, as Plaintiff notes in Opposition, both matters are before the same court and therefore the common law rule does not appear applicable.

Moreover, Plaintiff persuasively argues in Opposition that staying her case pending the Burwell Action would not promote the interests of justice, economy, or efficiency because the Burwell Action has not been resolved and may not ever be resolved and, therefore, there is a great risk that evidence related to Plaintiff’s claims will grow stale or be lost to time. While Plaintiff does not dispute that the real party in interest in PAGA actions (the State) cannot recover duplicative penalties for the same alleged wage and hour violations.

However, Plaintiff argues that, in light of both cases being before the same court, ordinary case management tools can be implemented to manage the overlap and avoid any duplication without the need for an indefinite stay of the present case. The Court also finds support for denial of a stay by Plaintiff’s reference to Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 546-47 which stands for the proposition that: “PAGA does not make other potentially aggrieved employees parties or clients of plaintiff’s counsel, does not impose on a plaintiff or counsel any express fiduciary obligations, and does not subject a plaintiff or counsel to scrutiny with respect to the ability to represent a large class.” (See Opp., 3:21-27.)

Thus, there is no mechanism to ensure Plaintiff’s rights are protected through the Burwell Action if the present action is stayed, and vice versa.

Based on all the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

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