Gabriel Ortiz v. CrowdStrike Inc., et al.

SO ORDERED.

Line 2 Case Name: Gabriel Ortiz v. CrowdStrike Inc., et al.

Case No.: 25CV476023 Defendants CrowdStrike, Inc. and CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc. (“Defendants”) move to compel arbitration of the claims of Plaintiff Gabriel Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) and to stay this civil action pending completion of the arbitration. Amended Notice of Motion (the “Motion”) at 1:2-13 (filed: Nov. 17, 2025).

The Motion came on for hearing on May 27, 2026, at 9:00 AM in Department 16. After reviewing all the papers and the record, and giving counsel for all parties the full and fair opportunity to be heard, the Court finds and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gabriel Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) was employed by Defendants Crowdstrike, Inc. and Crowdstrike Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Crowdstrike” or “Defendants”) in or around May 2022 as a Sales Development Representative. (Complaint at ¶ 10.) As part of his onboarding process, Plaintiff signed an Arbitration Agreement (“the Agreement”) alongside other documents on March 22, 2022. (Declaration of Beverlee Barrera [“Barrera Decl.” at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges:

During [his] employment, Plaintiff was discriminated against because he is a man of the Hispanic race. The conditions and privileges of his employment at Crowdstrike were applied unequally to him, including being disciplined and terminated for the same offenses that non-Hispanic, non-males were not similarly disciplined or terminated for in their employment.

(Complaint at ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff was terminated on September 22, 2022. (Complaint at ¶ 13.) Three years later, on September 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants and alleges nine causes of action for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act including (1) race/national origin discrimination; (2) race harassment; (3) gender/sex discrimination; (4) sexual harassment; (5) disability discrimination; (6) failure to engage in the interactive process; (8) retaliation; and (9) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation. Defendants now move to compel arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement executed between the parties.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants argue that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the Arbitration Agreement based on the language of the Agreement and because its operations affect interstate commerce. The Agreement states “This Agreement is a contract governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.” (Barrera Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 1.) Defendants assert that they “offer[] [their] software produces nationwide and thus, both [they] and [their] employees (formerly including Ortiz) are continuously involved in transactions involving interstate and international commerce.” (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at p. 3:26-28.) The Court agrees, finds that this satisfies the interstate commerce requirement, and rules that “[e]mployment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA.” (EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 289.)

Under the FAA, the Court’s role is modest and limited to determining “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 [citations omitted]; see also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1165, 1170.)

Defendants also argue the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) governs the Arbitration Agreement. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at pp. 12:16-13:15.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides:

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy in that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement . . . .

C.C.P. § 1281.2

In determining the threshold question of whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the Court employs a three-step burden shifting analysis. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere); see also Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a factual dispute regarding the agreement’s existence. If the opposing party does so, then the burden shifts back to the proponent of arbitration to show the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal. App. 5th at p. 755.)

ANALYSIS

I. There is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate between these parties.

The Court rules that parties here entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiff affixed his electronic signature to the Agreement on March 22, 2022. (Barrera Decl. at ¶ 3, Ex. A at p. 5, Ex. B.) “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as whether a party signs the agreement.” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777.) Moreover, “[u]nder Civil Code section 1633.7 . . . an electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature.” (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.)

The authenticity of an electronic signature may be established by detailing the “security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement.” (Id. at p. 1062.) Defendants have used DocuSign since 2017 for onboarding documentation, including employee contracts. (Barrera Decl. at ¶ 2.) “Crowdstrike sends onboarding documents to employees through DocuSign directly to the personal email provided by the candidate and employee.” (Ibid.)

Records reflect that on March 21, 2022, Defendants sent an onboarding envelope to Plaintiff’s personal email address. (Barrera Decl. at ¶ 3.) The envelope contained various documents including an offer letter, an At- Will Employment, Non-Disclosure, Invention Assignment, and Restrictive Covenant Agreement, and the Arbitration Agreement. (Ibid.) The DocuSign history shows that Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement on March 22, 2022 at 4:46 p.m. (Barrera Decl., Ex. B.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Agreement.

Accordingly, this process is sufficient to authenticate Plaintiff’s signature and to establish an agreement to arbitrate between the parties.

II. The Scope of the Agreement Covers all of Plaintiff’s Claims

The Court rules that the scope of the Agreement covers all claims of Plaintiff in this case. The Agreement provides:

Except as it otherwise provides, this Agreement applies to any dispute arising out of or related to Employee’s (sometimes also referred to as “your” or “your”) application or selection for employment, employment, and/or termination of employment with Crowdstrike, Inc. or one of its affiliates, subsidiaries or parent companies (“Company”). Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, this Agreement applies to any dispute, past, present, or future, that the Company may have against you and that you may have against (1) Company; (2) its officers, directors, principals, shareholders, members, owners, employees, or agents; (3) Company’s benefit plans or the plan’s sponsors, fiduciaries, administrators, insurers, affiliates, or agents; and (4) all successors and assigns of any of them.

(Barrera Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 1 [emphasis in original].)

Here, Plaintiff’s claims concern a past dispute concerning his employment and termination thereof. Plaintiff’s claims are for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act for events that occurred during his employment. Plaintiff has sued Crowdstrike, Inc., as well as its parent company Crowdstrike Holdings, Inc., which may also enforce the Agreement. (Reply at p. 3:10.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against both entities are encompassed by the Arbitration Agreement.

A. The EFAA Does Not Apply

Plaintiff argues that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) applies. (Opposition at pp. 3:1-5:21.) The EFAA provides that “at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute . . . no predispute arbitration agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a).)

Additionally, the EFAA provides that its applicability “shall be determined under Federal law.” (9 U.S.C. § 403, subd. (b).) “There is a split among federal district courts in and outside the Ninth Circuit about the appropriate standard for determining ‘the allegations that are necessary to invoke the EFAA in the first place and to determine whether the statute is applicable to the case.’” (MacKay v. PetSmart, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168963 [citing Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 757 F.

Supp. 3d 498 (Diaz-Roa)].) Some courts have relied on the pleading standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, while others have relied on the plausibility standard. (Van De Hey v. EPAM Sys. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 28, 2025) 24-cv-08800-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48775 at p. 8 (Van De Hey).) Under the plausibility standard, a plaintiff need only “plead nonfrivolous claims relating to sexual assault or to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment, with the sufficiency of those claims to be reserved for proper merits adjudication.” (Diaz-Roa, supra, 757 F.Supp.3d at p. 533.)

For the reasons stated below, the Court is doubtful Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy either standard.

Gov. C. § 12940(j)(1) prohibits “harassment” based upon “sex” or “sexual orientation.” “Courts have recognized two theories of actionable sexual harassment under FEHA. The first is quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances. The second is hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.” (Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 141 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) To prevail on a claim for quid pro quo harassment, the plaintiff must prove that “a term of employment was expressly or impliedly conditioned upon acceptance of a supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.” (Mogilefsky v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414.)

To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [the plaintiff] must show “that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [plaintiff's] protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff's] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.)

“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment” when they give rise to a hostile work environment or are part of a quid-pro-quo exchange. (29 C.F.R. § 1604.11; see Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 [“ ‘. . . California courts have relied upon federal law to interpret analogous provisions of the state statute.’ [Citation.]”].)

“Whether the conduct of the alleged harassers was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment depends on the totality of the circumstances. ‘These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ [Citations.] ‘Common sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing...and conduct [that] a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’ [Citations.]” (Rehmani v. Super. Ct. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 951-952.)

“A single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. In that regard, the Legislature hereby declares its rejection of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s opinion in Brooks v. City of San Mateo (2000) 229 F.3d 917 and states that the opinion shall not be used in determining what kind of conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.” (Gov’t Code, § 12923, subd. (b); see Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 880 [criticizing older cases requiring concerted and repeated pattern of harassment to create a hostile work environment in summary judgment context].)

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege which theory he relies on for his sexual harassment claim. And the fact allegations do not support either theory. Plaintiff does not allege that a term of employment was conditioned on a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances. Plaintiff does not allege that an employee or supervisor made requests for sexual favors. There are no fact allegations regarding verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. There are no fact allegations that any such conduct interfered with his work performance.

Additionally, there are no fact allegations of harassment, let alone harassment that was severe or pervasive. As Defendants note, “Oritz does not allege who harassed him because of his gender, or the ‘who, what, where, when why’ as to the purported PIP, the East Coast work assignment, the alleged comments, the ‘procedural presentation,’ or how these actions were severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment.” (Reply at p. 4:23-26.) The Court finds that the Complaint fails to allege facts showing even a single incident of harassing conduct.

Plaintiff’s allegations are instead that he was discriminated against because of his race and gender by being disciplined and terminated when other non-Hispanic and nonmale counterparts were not. Plaintiff alleges only in a conclusory manner that he “suffered sexual harassment because he is male.” (Complaint at ¶ 36.) As explained above, no facts have been alleged to support this assertion. As noted in Van De Hey “[t]hough these allegations are troubling if true and may indeed describe sex discrimination, they do not state a claim for sexual harassment under the FEHA.” (Van De Hay, supra, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48775 at p. 12.)

Accordingly, the Court rules that conclusory labeling in the Complaint of a sexual harassment claim without alleging any facts to support such a claim does not make the EFAA applicable to this case. (Arouh v. GAN Ltd. (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2024) 8:23-cv- 02001-FWS, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53039 at p. 16.)

B. The Agreement is Not Unconscionable

Finally, Defendants contend that no other grounds exist for revocation because the Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable. Plaintiff “does not identify fraud, unconscionability, or any other defense that would render the Arbitration Agreement invalid.” (Reply at p. 3:11-12.) The Court nevertheless considers whether the Agreement as unconscionable as briefed in the moving papers.

The party challenging a contractual arbitration provision bears the burden of proving that it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126 (OTO).) This may be done on a sliding scale, where the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required, and vice versa. (Id. at pp. 125-126.) Nevertheless, both must be shown. Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or surprise to the “weaker” party based on unequal bargaining power, whereas substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 125-129.) The Court thus proceeds to consider whether the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

1. There is no procedural unconscionability here.

The circumstances that the court examines to determine whether there was “oppression” in the signing of an agreement generally include: “ ‘(1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.’” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 126-127 [quoting (Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1348].)

The Agreement here is a stand-alone five-page document that calls out the jury waiver in bold letters. (Barrera Decl., Ex. A.) Defendants note that Plaintiff had ten years of sales experience when he received the offer, thus he was sophisticated enough to understand the terms of the Agreement. (Id., Ex. D.) While Plaintiff was required to sign the Agreement as a condition of employment, “the cases uniformly agree that a compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127) (emphasis added).

After carefully reviewing and considering all the facts and circumstances of the signing of the Agreement, the Court finds that that Plaintiff was given a reasonable amount of time to consider the Agreement; there was no unfair pressure exerted on Plaintiff to sign the Agreement; the length and complexity of the Agreement is fair and not excessive; Plaintiff is experienced and well educated; and there is no evidence that Plaintiff was deprived of a chance to have an attorney review the Agreement with him. Accordingly, there is no procedural unconscionability here.

2. There is no substantive unconscionability here.

Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create overly harsh or one-sided results. (Armendariz Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 (Armendariz).) The court assesses whether the agreement reallocates risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected matter. (Jones, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1539.) “In assessing substantive unconscionability, the paramount consideration is mutuality.” (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 241 [internal citation and quotation marks omitted].) Arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable where they lack a “modicum of bilaterality,” “without at least some reasonable justification for such onesidedness based on ‘business realities.’” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 117.)

Armendariz instructs that there are “five minimum requirements for the lawful arbitration of such rights pursuant to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement. Such an arbitration agreement is lawful if it ‘(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use arbitration as a condition of employment “effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” ’ ” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 102.)

The Arbitration Agreement satisfies these factors, rendering the Agreement lawful. The Arbitration Agreement provides that arbitration will be administered by JAMS pursuant to the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures (“JAMS Rules”). (Barrera Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 3.) The parties are to mutually select an arbitrator or submit to the JAMS Rules for selection. (Ibid.) The arbitrator may award any remedy a party is entitled to under the law. (Ibid.) The Agreement further includes the “Discovery And Subpoenas” clause and provides that discovery will be conducted in accordance with the JAMS Rules. (Barrera Decl., Ex.

A at ¶ 6.) The Agreement further submits to the JAMS Rules for the payment of fees, but provides “in no event will you be responsible for any portion of those fees in excess of the filing or initial appearance fees applicable to court actions in the jurisdiction where the arbitration will be conducted. After you pay your portion of any initial filing fee, the Company shall pay any remaining portion of the initial fee and will also pay all costs and expenses unique to arbitration, including without limitation the arbitrator’s fees.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)

Thus, no unreasonable costs are thrust upon the employee. Lastly, the Agreement provides that the arbitrator shall issue a written award, “stating the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Hence, there is no substantive unconscionability here.

As there is neither procedural nor substantive unconscionability, the Agreement is not unconscionable and is enforceable between these parties. And as this enforceable Agreement’s arbitration clause covers all of Plaintiff’s claims here, Defendant’s Motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims must be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the Court’s findings and rulings above, the Court ORDERS that:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED, and

2. This civil action is STAYED in its entirety pending completion of this arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.4; 9 U.S.C. § 3.)

SO ORDERED.

Date: May 27, 2026 Hon. Vincent I. Parrett Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

Line 3 Case Name: Gabriel Ortiz v. CrowdStrike Inc., et al.

Case No.: 25CV476023

[See Order above. In light of the Court’s Order at Line 2 above GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay this Civil Action, Defendants’ Demurrer is now STAYED as well. After this stay is lifted upon completion of this arbitration, Defendants have leave to re-notice this Demurrer then if they wish (assuming there is anything left of this case that point).]

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