Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to Strike Complaint
responsive pleading for months, resulting in his default. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a).)
Further, while defendant has submitted a proposed cross-complaint in support of the motion, he has failed to submit a proposed answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10 [demurrer], 430.30 [objection to complaint by demurrer and/or answer], 431.30 [answer], 435-436 [motion to strike]; see also id., § 585, subds. (a)-(b) [types of responses to the complaint that prevent the entry of default].) A cross-complaint is treated as an independent action from the complaint and does not “answer” or otherwise “respond” to a complaint. (See Ohio Casualty Ins.
Group v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 444, 448 [“A cross-complaint is generally considered to be a separate action from that initiated by the complaint.”]; Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 132 [a complaint and cross-complaint are treated as independent actions for most purposes, except with respect to the requirement of one final judgment].) Defendant has therefore also failed to submit “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action,” as required by section 473.5. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473.5, subd. (b).)
The Case Management Conference is VACATED, and the Court now sets an OSC re: Dismissal (Entry of Default/Default Judgment) for January 14, 2027, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C12.
Clerk shall give notice.
7. Lauretano vs. UDR Eight80 II LP
26-01537862
1. Demurrer to Complaint 2. Motion to Strike Complaint 3. Case Management Conference
Defendant UDR Eight80 II, LP’s Demurrer
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Defendant UDR Eight80 II, LP’s demurrer to Plaintiff Courtney Lauretano’s Complaint is OVERRULED.
“The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows: (1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2) as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273, as modified on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2023); Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.) “[W]hether conduct is ‘outrageous’ is
usually a question of fact.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1274, as modified on denial of reh’g (May 15, 2023).)
“[T]he standard for judging outrageous conduct does not provide a ‘bright line’ rigidly separating that which is actionable from that which is not.” (Ibid.) “Indeed, its generality hazards a case-by-case appraisal of conduct filtered through the prism of the appraiser’s values, sensitivity threshold, and standards of civility.” (Ibid.) “The process evoked by the test appears to be more intuitive than analytical. ...” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the Complaint does not allege sufficiently outrageous conduct and does not allege intent or reckless disregard for the possibility of causing emotional distress.
Since the question of whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of fact, it is not appropriately resolved in an attack on the pleadings.
The element of intent is sufficiently alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant exposed Plaintiff to the uninhabitable conditions, despite being repeatedly put on notice of these conditions and failing to address them, with reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s mental and emotional well-being. (See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶101-102.)
Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.
Motion to Strike
Defendant’s Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc. §436; Civ. Code §3294, subd. (b).)
Civil Code section 3294 states:
“(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the
employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”
“In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in section 3294, it must include specific factual allegations showing that defendant’s conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for punitive damages. [citation] Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally. [citation].” (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)
Plaintiff does not specifically allege the identity and conduct of an officer, director or managing agent of Defendant that constitutes malice, fraud, and/or oppression.
As this defect can reasonably be cured through amendment, Plaintiff shall have 30 days to file a First Amended Complaint.
The Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to January 14, 2027, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C12.
Defendant shall provide notice.
8. Morrissey vs. Noujaim
25-01506560
Motion for Preference
WITHDRAWN 9. Salinas vs. Bazoft Automotive
23-01352644
1. Motion to be Relieved as Counsel of Record 2. Motion to be Relieved as Counsel of Record 3. Motion to be Relieved as Counsel of Record
The motions by Anthony Chavos, Laurie Rau, Chavos & Rau APLC, to withdraw as counsel for defendants Bazoft Automotive d/b/a South Coast Mitsubishi, Nissan Extended Service Corporation, Inc., and Sentry Select Insurance Company, are CONTINUED to September 18, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department C12.
Moving parties were required to serve the motions at least 16 court days prior to the hearing, with an additional five calendar days for regular mail service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) E-service