Lynley Kerr Hogan v. Brian Bernasconi et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: July 9, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 23CV417765 Lynley Hogan v. Brian Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Bernasconi et al. Line 2 24CV443761 Aaron Trout et al. v. Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Jose Paz-Leja et al. Line 3 24CV443761 Aaron Trout et al. v. Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Jose Paz-Leja et al. Line 4 24CV445461 Oscar Hernandez Plaintiff Oscar Hernandez Ochoa’s motion to deem admitted requests Ochoa v. Johnny Yan for admission, set one, against defendant Johnny Yan. (Code Civ. et al. Proc., § 2033.280.) At a hearing on another motion in this case on July 7, 2026, plaintiff orally withdrew all pending discovery motions based on defendants serving code-compliant responses. The motion is taken OFF CALENDAR.

Calendar Line 1 Case Name: Lynley Kerr Hogan v. Brian Bernasconi et al. Case No.: 23CV417765

At issue is a special motion to strike all causes of action alleged against defendant Catherine Somers (Somers) in the operative second amended complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Notice is proper and the motion is opposed by Plaintiff Lynley Kerr Hogan (Plaintiff).

Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed in June 2023, named only defendant Brian Bernasconi (Bernasconi) as a defendant. That complaint alleged five causes of action related to a podcast interview that was recorded in June 2023: (1) breach of contract (a contract between Plaintiff and Bernasconi); (2) conversion; (3) defamation; (4) harassment; and (5) “negligent and intentional emotional distress.” Bernasconi’s demurrer to that complaint, which was not opposed by Plaintiff, was heard by the court (Judge Chung) in March 2024. Judge Chung overruled the demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action, and sustained the demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action with leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC), filed in April 2024, alleged four causes of action against Bernasconi (again the only defendant): (1) breach of contract; (2) conversion; (3) defamation; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The harassment claim was abandoned. Bernasconi moved for a protective order, which was granted and issued in late 2024. The order required Bernasconi to provide a copy of the recording of the podcast to Plaintiff. The order continued that the recording “and any materials created based on same, including but not limited to, excerpts of the podcast, summaries of the podcast, oral recitations of the podcast (hereafter referred to as the ‘Protected Materials’), shall be used by Plaintiff for the sole purpose of preparation for trial in this case, the trial itself, or for purposes of settlement and shall not be used at any time for any other purpose.” (Protective Order, filed 10/8/24, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

The court takes judicial notice of the protective order on its own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) without prejudice in May 2025, in part due to concerns about a potential conflict between the proposed SAC and the protective order. A second motion for leave to file a SAC was granted in November 2025. The operative SAC was filed that same month. The SAC alleges eight causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) conversion; (3) defamation—slander per ser; (4) defamation—slander per quad; (5) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (6) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act; (7) violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The SAC adds Somers as a defendant for the first time, adding her to the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. There are no exhibits attached to the SAC and it lacks paragraph numbers.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) authorizes a person to bring a special motion to strike allegations “arising from any act . . . in furtherance of [his or her] right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The special motion to strike is also

referred to as an “anti-SLAPP” motion (standing for “strategic lawsuit against public participation”).

Courts evaluate anti-SLAPP motions using a two-step analysis. (Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116.) “First, the moving defendant must identify ‘all allegations of protected activity’ and show that the challenged claim arises from that activity.” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 934, citations omitted.) “Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the ‘burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.’ Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court determines ‘whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.’” (Ibid.)

First Step: Protected Activity

“A defendant meets his or her burden on the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis by demonstrating the acts underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action fall within one of the four categories spelled out in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 50-51 (Collier).) Examples of protected activity include:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

(§ 425.16, subd. (e).) “In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 670.)

Second Step: Probability of Prevailing

The plaintiff meets its burden of showing a probability of prevailing by demonstrating “‘that the [challenged claims are] both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (Soukup) (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) The “plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid.)

“Courts have described this procedure as a ‘motion for summary judgment in “reverse.” Rather than requiring the defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s pleading by showing it is legally or factually meritless, the motion requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he possesses a legally sufficient claim which is “substantiated,” that is, supported by competent, admissible evidence.’ [Citations.] Consistent with this summary-judgment-like procedure, the court 6

‘must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of [the party opposing the anti- SLAPP motion].’ ” (Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 136, 152 (Area 51).)

A plaintiff must show that there is admissible evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 108.) While the burden on the second prong belongs to the plaintiff, in determining whether a party has established a probability of prevailing on the merits of his or her claims, a court considers not only the substantive merits of those claims, but also all defenses available to them. (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v.

Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398.) Affidavits or declarations not based on personal knowledge, or that contain hearsay or impermissible opinions, or that are argumentative, speculative, or conclusory, are insufficient to show a “probability” that the plaintiff will prevail. (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26 (Gilbert); Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 714 (Dwight R.).) On the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. (Monster Energy Co. v.

Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) In order to demonstrate a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must also produce admissible evidence sufficient to overcome any privilege or defense the defendant has asserted. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 (Flatley); Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 819-821 (Bergstein).)

DISCUSSION

Somers’s special motion to strike the portions of the SAC brought against her is granted as follows. Because Somers was added as a defendant for the first time in the SAC, her motion is timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (f).

First Prong

The “any other conduct” language in section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) applies to even private communications concerning issues of public interest; no public forum is required. (Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736.) The conduct must be “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” “The term ‘issue of public interest’ is construed broadly in the anti-SLAPP context. [Citation.] An issue of public interest is ‘any issue in which the public is interested.’ [Citation.]

The issue does not need to be ‘ “significant” ’ to be covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Daniel v. Wayans (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 386.) In FilmOn.com, Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), the Supreme Court set forth a two-step test for evaluating the nexus between a statement and an issue of public interest: “First, we ask what ‘public issue or [] issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech.” (Ibid., quoting Code Civ.

Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) “Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at pp. 149–50.) “It is at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (Id. at p. 150.)

Somers has satisfied the first prong of the analysis. Somers’s declaration in support of the motion, and the SAC itself, confirm that all causes of action alleged against Somers arise from activity protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4)–– 7

namely Plaintiff’s agreement to participate in a podcast interview that was to be available to the public concerning matters of interest to the local community in Los Gatos, California, including Plaintiff’s participation in Los Gatos Town Council Meetings. Plaintiff identifies herself in the SAC as a “regular public speaker at Los Gatos Town Council meetings.” (SAC, p. 2:13-16.) The SAC alleges Plaintiff was invited to the podcast for “an uncensored platform to share her story,” but that Bernasconi instead “shouted, cursed, interrupted, called Plaintiff names, and made derogatory remarks about Plaintiff’s race, religion, economic status, and conservative associations.” (SAC, p. 4:16-18, 5:1-10.)

Somers declares that the podcast interview addressed “Plaintiff’s public activities at Town Council meetings and her involvement in local controversies that had been the subject of prior litigation and public discussion in the Los Gatos community.” (Somers dec., filed 1/23/26, ¶ 7.) The action involves an issue of local public interest. Somers’s declaration, and the SAC itself, establish that the FilmOn two-step test is satisfied here.

Every cause of action alleged against Somers in the SAC is at least a “mixed” causes of action subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 [“When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.”].) So-called “mixed” causes of action are still subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.

Second Prong

On the second prong of the analysis, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that each cause of action in the SAC alleged against Somers is both “legally sufficient” (meaning sufficiently pleaded against Somers) and supported by admissible evidence. (See Area 51, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Plaintiff cannot rely solely on the SAC to make this showing, she must submit competent admissible evidence. (Monster Energy, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788.) Plaintiff fails to meet that burden. The only evidence submitted in opposition to the motion is a declaration from Plaintiff authenticating four attached exhibits (labeled A through D).

Exhibit A is identified as a transcript of the podcast recording prepared by Plaintiff. Its submission violates the protective order. Exhibit B is a copy of a text message exchange between Plaintiff and Somers. Exhibit C is a purported transcript of a recorded conversation between Plaintiff and non-party Lee Fagot. Exhibit D consists of copies of emails from Lee Fagot. None of these exhibits provide support for the causes of action in the SAC as alleged against Somers. The conclusory statements in Plaintiff’s declaration also fail to provide support for the causes of action as alleged against Somers.

Again, declarations not based on personal knowledge, or that contain hearsay or impermissible opinions, or that are argumentative, speculative, or conclusory, are insufficient to show a “probability” that the plaintiff will prevail. (Gilbert, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 26; Dwight R., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.)

The March 7, 2024 order on the demurrer to the original complaint does not suggest that any cause of action alleged against Somers is sufficiently stated. Somers was not named as a defendant in the original complaint. At most, the demurrer order stands for the proposition that the first, second, and third causes of action (the causes of action for which the demurrer was overruled), adequately stated causes of action against Bernasconi as then alleged. The order cannot be construed as providing any support for the causes of action newly added in the SAC, nor for any causes of action alleged against Somers.

The SAC alleges that Bernasconi deleted the podcast recording (even though the record in this case shows that Plaintiff was later given a copy of the recording of the podcast pursuant to a protective order). The SAC does not allege that this deletion breached any express term of the supposedly written contract. Even as currently pleaded, it fails to state a breach of any identified written contract term by Somers.

Plaintiff also fails to respond to defenses raised by Somers in her motion, further demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323; Bergstein, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 819-821.) Every cause of action in the SAC alleged against Somers is based on events occurring in June 2023. Defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).) Because Somers was not added as a defendant in this case until November 13, 2025 when the SAC was filed, the fourth cause of action is time-barred as brought against her.

“The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo).) “A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.

If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed. Among the requirements for application of the section 474 relation back doctrine is that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint.” (Ibid., internal citations omitted.)

The SAC does not satisfy the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 474. And the prior pleadings in this case establish that Somers’s identity was always known to Plaintiff. None of the causes of action alleged against Somers in the SAC relate back to the original complaint.

It is not necessary to address every cause of action alleged against Somers because Plaintiff failed to meet her burden on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. But the court will briefly address them to demonstrate that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on any cause of action alleged against Somers.

First Cause of Action—Breach of Contract

To properly state a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a (valid) contract; (2) Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) Defendant’s breach, and; (4) damage to Plaintiff resulting from that breach. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 228.)

For more than two years, Plaintiff’s complaints consistently alleged that the only parties to the allegedly written contract were Bernasconi and herself. Somers was added as a defendant for the first time in the SAC. The terms of the allegedly written contract are set out on page 4 of the SAC. The first cause of action fails to describe any breach of these terms by Somers, much less any damage to Plaintiff proximately caused by breach of the terms by Somers. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action. 9

Second Cause of Action—Conversion

Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)

Assuming for purposes of argument that the second cause of action adequately alleges Plaintiff’s ownership of the recording, it fails to allege a conversion by Somers. The only act of conversion alleged in the second cause of action is the deletion of the original recording. And the SAC specifically alleges several times that it was Bernasconi, not Somers, who deleted the recording. “Where a pleading includes a general allegation, such as an allegation of an ultimate fact, as well as specific allegations that add details or explanatory facts, it is possible that a conflict or inconsistency will exist between the more general allegation and the specific allegations.” (Perez v.

Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235.) “To handle these contradictions, California courts have adopted the principle that specific allegations in a complaint control over an inconsistent general allegation.” (Id. at pp. 1235–1236.) “Under this principle, it is possible that specific allegations will render a complaint defective when the general allegations, standing alone, might have been sufficient.” (Id. at p. 1236.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action—Defamation

The fourth cause of action fails to describe any defamatory acts taken by Somers. And the fourth cause of action became time-barred as alleged against anyone other than Bernasconi more than a year before the SAC was filed. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action—Unruh Civil Rights Act

Statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. (Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795; Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) When a statutory cause of action is alleged, “the plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d. 1, 5.) As pleaded in the SAC, the fifth cause of action does not meet this standard.

In addition, the Unruh Act is a public accommodations statute that focuses on discriminatory behavior by business establishments. (Stamps v. Super. Ct. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1452.) “The Act expresses a state and national policy against discrimination on arbitrary grounds.” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167.) “Its provisions were intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by ‘banishing’ or ‘eradicating’ arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments.” (Ibid.) “The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each person’s inherent right to ‘full and equal’ access to ‘all business establishments.’ ” (Ibid.) Somers is a defendant in this case only in her individual 10

capacity. Somers is not a business establishment. “LG PodCats,” the apparent business entity referenced in the SAC, is not a defendant in this case. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action—Tom Bane Civil Rights Act

This is also a statutory cause of action that is not pleaded with sufficient particularity in the SAC. The crux of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threats, intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to under the law. (Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 791-792.)

The sixth cause of action mentions Somers once: “Bernasconi’s shouting, cursing, interruptions, false accusations, name-calling, derogatory remarks including ‘White Christian Nationalist,’ and Somers’ acquiescence, were motivated by Plaintiff’s race, religion, and associations, unlike respectful LG PodCats interviews with others, mirroring Zamora’s hate crime.” (SAC, p. 10:4-8.) That isolated reference does not state a cause of action against Somers. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

Seventh Cause of Action—Ralph Civil Rights Act

This is another statutory cause of action that Plaintiff has not alleged with the required particularity. Civil Code section 51.7 “broadly provides that all persons have the right to be free from violence and intimidation by threat of violence based on, among other things, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or position in a labor dispute.” (Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1146.) “Under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that defendant aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.” (Gabrielle A. v.

County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291.) The seventh cause of action fails to describe any such behavior by Somers. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

Eighth Cause of Action—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.

And the defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. If properly pled, a claim for sexual harassment can establish the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show emotional distress, this court has set a high bar.

Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of such a substantial quality or enduring quality that no

reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

“[T]he trial court initially determines whether a defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Where reasonable men can differ, the jury determines whether the conduct has been extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Otherwise stated, the court determines whether severe emotional distress can be found; the jury determines whether on the evidence it has, in fact, existed.” (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1614.) Conduct that merely hurts another person’s feelings is not enough. (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.) Conduct is not outrageous simply because it is tortious, criminal, or intended to cause distress. (McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1517.)

The eighth cause of action fails to describe any alleged conduct by Somers that would support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing against Somers on this cause of action.

ATTORNEY FEES

The prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike “shall be entitled” to recover his or her attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c).) The purpose of this fee-shifting provision is both to discourage meritless lawsuits and to provide financial relief to the SLAPP lawsuit victim. “[A]ny SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

Somers’s motion includes a request for attorney fees. Somers is a prevailing defendant. But the fee request is denied because Somers is self-represented. “[B]y definition, the term ‘attorney fees’ implies the existence of an attorney-client relationship, i.e., a party receiving professional services from a lawyer.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1092.) “Cases that have allowed the recovery of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute are similarly marked by the existence of an attorney-client relationship.

This decisional authority and the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (c) support the conclusion that the commonly understood definition of attorney fees applies with equal force to section 425.16 and a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover attorney fees if represented by counsel.” (Ramona Unified School Dist. v. Tsiknas (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 510, 524, internal citations omitted; see also Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 494 [“[A] party, whether or not he is an attorney, who is not represented by counsel and who litigates an anti- SLAPP motion on his own behalf may not recover attorney fees under the statute.”].)

CONCLUSION

Defendant Somers’s special motion to strike the SAC’s first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action as alleged against her is granted.

Somers’s request for attorney fees is denied.

The trial setting conference scheduled for July 14, 2026, at 11:00 a.m. in Department 10 remains as set. Plaintiff and defendant Bernasconi are ordered to meet and confer in 12

advance of the trial setting conference to determine two or three trial dates that are nine or 10 months after the trial setting conference.

The court will prepare the order.

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