Hassan Abpikar v. Todd A. Roberts, et al.

Did you know that he has a fraud conviction, and he has pattern of presenting fraudulent claims? Do you know he is under investigation and he will probably end up in jail? Did you know he uses 'young girls' to sell cars for him, because young girls are trustworthy? What is your 20 year old young daughter Elidia Jade Nichols doing with this old man? Keep your young daughter away from him. We are going to deny your state farm claim. Can you give me your email so I can send his criminal records and convictions, so you can see it for yourself that is the truth?" (FAC, ¶¶23 see also 25 - 26 and 29.)

On 3 July 2024, Roberts emailed Nichols a copy of Abpikar's purported criminal history but nowhere does it state that Abpikar has a fraud or con artistry conviction or a pattern of fraudulent claims. (FAC, ¶¶31 and 38 and Exh. A) Roberts's statements to Nichols were all knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. (FAC, ¶¶24, 26 and 29.) Abpikar has no criminal history involving fraud or con artistry and has never made a fraudulent claim before any insurance company or any other entity. (Id.)

Abpikar has never used or abused young or old [girls] and has never had any domestic issue involving young or old girls. (Id.) Roberts's statements to Nichols were

intended to and did cause Nichols to distrust Abpikar. (FAC, ¶¶27 and 32.) Roberts's statements and actions caused Abpikar and Nichols to voluntarily dismiss the Underlying Action despite having legitimate claims. (FAC, ¶¶33 - 34.) On or about 30 September 2024, Nichols notified Abpikar of the phone conversation and email from Roberts, but Nichols did not explain the details of the call nor forward the email from Roberts to Abpikar. (FAC, ¶39.) It was not until 19 January 2026 when Abpikar met with Nichols and Nichols's daughter that Abpikar first learned of the details of the phone conversation between Nichols and Roberts and the false statements made by Roberts. (FAC, ¶¶40 - 41.)

On 30 January 2026, Nichols forwarded, for the first time, the 3 January 2024 email from Roberts to Abpikar. (FAC, ¶41.) On 9 February 2026, plaintiff Abpikar, as a self-represented litigant 1, filed the instant action against defendant Roberts. On 19 February 2026, plaintiff Abpikar filed the now operative FAC against defendant Roberts and adding defendant State Farm. The FAC asserts causes of action for: (1) Abuse of Process [against defendant Roberts] (2) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage [against defendant Roberts] (3) Intentional Misrepresentation [against defendant Roberts] (4) Defamation/ Slander [against defendant Roberts] (5) Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17200) (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress [against defendant Roberts] (7) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress [against defendant Roberts] (8) Civil Conspiracy (9) Vicarious Liability/ Respondeat Superior [against defendant State Farm] On 30 March 2026, defendant Roberts filed an answer to plaintiff Abpikar's FAC. On 20 April 2026, defendant Roberts filed the motion now before the court, a special motion to strike plaintiff Abpikar's FAC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

II. Analysis.

A. Defendant Roberts’s special motion to strike portions of the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, the California Supreme Court established the trial court’s duty in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike: Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant’s burden is to demonstrate

1 Although a judge should ensure that self-represented litigants are not being misled or unfairly treated (see Gamet v.

Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284), self-represented litigants are not entitled to special treatment with regard to the Rules of Court or Code of Civil Procedure. “[W]e cannot disregard the applicable principles of law and accord defendant any special treatment because he instead elected to proceed in propria persona. [Citations.]” (Stein v. Hassen (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 294, 303.) “A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney [citation] ‘but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts.’” (Lombardi v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-209.)

that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. [Citation.] If the court finds [that defendant has made its threshold showing], it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (Id. at 67.) “[I]n order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing [citation], the plaintiff need only have ‘stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’” (Navellier v.

Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88, quoting Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123.) “Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Id. at 88-89, quoting (Superseded by statute, as stated in Hart v. Darwish, 12 Cal.App.5th 218) Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Id. at 89; see also Park v.

Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (stating that “[i]f the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit’”); see also Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442, 457 (stating that “[t]o demonstrate the ‘requisite minimal merit,’ [the plaintiff must establish a prima facie factual showing”); see also Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 793 (stating that “a plaintiff’s burden at the second anti-SLAPP step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of action has at least ‘minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute’”).) “In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.” (Superseded by statute, as stated in Hart v.

Darwish, 12 Cal. App. 5th 218), Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821; see also Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 515, 530 (stating that a plaintiff or cross-complainant in “a SLAPP motion [is allowed] a certain degree of leeway in establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims due to ‘the early stage at which the motion is brought and heard [citation] and the limited opportunity to conduct discovery’”); see also Monster Energy Co., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.795 (stating that “at the second anti-SLAPP step, a court ‘does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence... [i]t ‘accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law... [w]e resolve conflicts and inferences in the record in favor of plaintiff”).)

1. Defendant Roberts establishes that plaintiff Abpikar’s FAC arises from protected activity. Defendant Roberts argues the entirety of plaintiff Abpikar’s FAC arises from allegations of communications between Roberts and Nichols, made in his capacity as an attorney for a defendant (State Farm) in the Underlying Action, during the course of litigating the Underlying Action, and concerning the Underlying Action which fall within the ambit of section 425.16. “A defendant meets the burden of showing that a plaintiff’s action arises from a protected activity by showing that the acts underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action fall within one of the four categories of conduct described in section 425.16, subdivision (e). [Citation.]

Those four categories are: ‘(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement made

in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.’” (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569; emphasis added.) Here, plaintiff Abpikar’s FAC is explicitly premised upon “the E-mails sent on July 3, 2024 by [defendant Roberts] [an Attorney at Law] to Albert Nichols who is ...

Co-Plaintiff [in the Underlying Action], and Details of the Phone call made by [defendant Roberts] on July 3, 2024 who directly contacted Albert Nichols 30 (thirty) days AFTER being served with the summons and Complaint [in the Underlying Action].” (See page 2 of the FAC; see also FAC, ¶9, ¶18—“Defendants ... engaged in a deliberate course of conduct designed to intimidate, discredit, isolate, and undermine Plaintiff in connection with pending litigation,” ¶¶21 – 23 and 33 – 34— “Attorney Roberts [sic] actions were designed to induce Abpikar to abandon his legal claims, which ultimately resulted in Abpikar and Co- Plaintiff Albert [Nichols] voluntarily dismissing their lawsuit (the Underlying Action).”) It is well established that the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute extends to lawyers and law firms engaged in litigation-related activity.

As our Supreme Court explained, “‘Any act’” under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) “includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action. [Citation.] This includes qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation.” (Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056.) In fact, courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 [120 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 576].) “‘Under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210 (italics added.) Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that “a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v.

Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266.) Hello yeah I [73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383].) (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113-114; emphasis added.) In opposition, plaintiff Abpikar stresses the communications upon which the FAC is premised are false, but offers no relevant legal authority to overcome defendant Roberts’s argument that the communications were made by an attorney as part of his representation of a client in a pending judicial proceeding and, as such, are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.

In short, plaintiff Abpikar’s arguments address the second step in the analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion, i.e., probability of prevailing. Plaintiff Abpikar’s attempt to distinguish Finton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 200 is unavailing. The court finds all the claims asserted by plaintiff Abpikar in the FAC arise from protected activity. As defendant Roberts has made a threshold showing that the challenged allegations arise from protected activity, the court must then determine whether plaintiff Abpikar has demonstrated a probability of prevailing.

2. Plaintiff Abpikar fails to demonstrate that he has a probability of prevailing. Defendant Roberts asserts plaintiff Abpikar cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing because Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) bars all of plaintiff Abpikar’s claims asserted in the FAC. The litigation privilege, as pertinent here, states: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] ... [¶] (b) In any ... (2) judicial proceeding ... .” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) “The principal purpose of [Civil Code] section 47[, subdivision (b),] is to afford litigants ... the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 213 [266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365].)

The privilege also “promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients' interests.” (Id. at p. 214.) “Although originally enacted with reference to defamation [citation], the privilege is now held applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication [citations], and all torts except malicious prosecution. [Citations.] Further, it applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation ... . [Citations.]” (Silberg v.

Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) “The breadth of the litigation privilege cannot be understated. It immunizes defendants from virtually any tort liability (including claims for fraud), with the sole exception of causes of action for malicious prosecution. [Citation.]” (Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 333 [119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460].) “Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. [Citation.]” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 [120 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 576].) ... “‘Silberg leaves no room for doubt: For policy reasons, even an act committed fraudulently or with malice is privileged under section 47, subdivision (b).’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) ... Without the litigation privilege, attorneys would simply be unable to do their jobs properly. (Finton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 211-212.) The litigation privilege “applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.” (Silberg v.

Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) Since all of the claims asserted in plaintiff Abpikar’s FAC are premised on communications that were made in the course of judicial proceedings by litigants [counsel] to achieve the objects of the litigation that have some connection or logical relation to this action, they are protected by the litigation privilege. (See Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p.1057; see also Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 (stating that “[t]he privilege in section 47 is ‘relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing’... [because the statements] were privileged under section 47...

Plaintiff cannot meet her burden under the second step in applying the anti-SLAPP statute of demonstrating a probability of prevailing”); see also JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522 (stating same); see also Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 965 (stating that “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protects any statements or writings that have ‘some relation’ to a lawsuit”).) In opposition, plaintiff Abpikar contends the litigation privilege does not extend to the knowingly false criminal accusations made by defendant Roberts in his communications with Nichols.

Even if the court were to accept plaintiff Abpikar’s evidence in that regard, the litigation privilege is broad. As noted above, “It immunizes defendants from virtually any tort liability (including claims for fraud), with the sole exception of causes of action for malicious prosecution. Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it. ... For policy reasons, even an act committed fraudulently or with malice is privileged under section 47, subdivision (b).” (Finton, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 211-212.)

For the reasons discussed, defendant Robert’s special motion to strike plaintiff Abpikar’s FAC is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff Abpikar’s requests for affirmative relief are DENIED. In his opposition, plaintiff Abpikar makes multiple requests for affirmative relief including (1) an order allowing plaintiff Abpikar to conduct discovery; and (2) an order requiring defendant Roberts to preserve and produce a purported recording of the 3 July 2024 conversation between defendant Roberts and Nichols. Plaintiff Abpikar’s requests for affirmative relief are DENIED. (See Code Civ. Proc., §425.16, subd. (g)— “The court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding [the stay of discovery upon filing of an anti-SLAPP motion].” See also Code Civ. Proc., §§2031.010 et seq.—procedures for demanding inspection of documents and electronically stored information, protective orders, and compelling compliance thereof.)

Plaintiff Abpikar also requests leave to amend in the event the court grants defendant Roberts’s special motion to strike. “Allowing a SLAPP plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once the court finds the prima facie showing has been met would completely undermine the statute [and] would totally frustrate the Legislature's objective of providing a quick and inexpensive method of unmasking and dismissing such suits.” (Labeled as at risk, relies on an overruled prior decision (Church of Scientology v.

Wollersheim, 42 Cal.App.4th 628) Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074; see also Mobile Medical Services, etc. v. Rajaram (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 164, 171—“Once the trial court has determined the speech at issue is constitutionally protected, it may not grant leave to amend to omit facts to take the claim out of the protection of section 425.16.”) Consequently, plaintiff Abpikar’s request for leave to amend is DENIED.

III. Order.

Defendant Robert’s special motion to strike plaintiff Abpikar’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, § 425.16 is GRANTED.

___________________________ ______________________________________________ DATED: HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara

---oooOooo---