Motion: Judgment on the Pleadings
(4) Toro's Notice of Motion There are a number of other issues that prevent summary judgment in favor of Toro as to the cross-complaint by Oltmans. For example, Torro frames its motion in its notice as follows: "The basis for this motion is that Toro cannot be liable to Plaintiffs ... because there are no acts or omissions by Toro which caused injury to Plaintiffs, therefore Oltmans' Cross-Complaint in the subject action is without merit...." (Motion, p. 2.)
However, as alleged in the Oltmans CC, Torro could be required to indemnify Oltmans under several theories, including contractual express indemnity, that do not turn on whether Toro actually caused injury to the Daniels. (Compare Motion, p. 2 with Oltmans CC, pp. 5-8.) "An indemnitee seeking to recover on an agreement for indemnification must allege the parties' contractual relationship, the indemnitee's performance of that portion of the contract which gives rise to the indemnification claim, the facts showing a loss within the meaning of the parties' indemnification agreement, and the amount of damages sustained." (Four Star Electric, Inc. v.
F & H Construction (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1380.) Liability under express indemnity turns on the parties' contractual arrangement. (Ibid.) The notice, as framed, does not present a basis for summary judgment as to contractual indemnity. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(2).)
(5) Evidentiary Objections "[T]he court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) The court overrules the evidentiary objections asserted by Torro as to the testimony on pages 45 and 46 of the Glaeser deposition transcript as to her estimate that the apron appears to exceed 1/2 inch. The court overrules Torro's objections as to the Borjon Declaration as to paragraph 4, exhibit 1. The court has reviewed the other evidentiary objections submitted and does not find they are material to the disposition of this motion. Accordingly, for all these reasons, the court will deny Toro's motion.
Tentative Ruling: C Norman Borgatello vs Nadia Bernardi Tentative Ruling: C Norman Borgatello vs Nadia Bernardi Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/29/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion: Judgment on the Pleadings Tentative Ruling Plaintiff C. Norman Borgatello's motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
Background: This action commenced on January 14, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff C. Norman Borgatello against defendant Nadia Bernardi for Declaratory Relief on Written Contract. As alleged in the complaint: On August 7, 2018, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract regarding real property located at 920 Flora Vista Drive, Santa Barbara (the "agreement"). (Compl., P. 2 & Exh. A.) Plaintiff has performed all required obligations under the agreement including the transfer of $600,000.00 in cash to defendant. (Compl., P. 3.)
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Defendant agreed to maintain title to the property free of liens, but on November 9, 2018, defendant obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust against the property for $70,000.00 and has refinanced said "Mortgage" multiple times since that date and now has an outstanding balance of approximately $600,000.00. (Compl., P.P. 4, 5.) The agreement provides that, at any time, plaintiff can request that defendant record a grant deed in favor of plaintiff as to 50 percent of the property. (Compl., P. 6.)
The agreement further provides that after three years from the date of the agreement, either party may demand the sale of the property, and all parties must cooperate in the sale. (Compl., P. 7.) More than three years have elapsed since the signing of the agreement. (Ibid.) On November 20, 2024, plaintiff sent defendant a letter asking defendant to promptly record a grant deed in his plaintiff's favor and to cooperate in listing the property for sale. (Compl., P. 8.) Defendant has not responded to the letter. (Compl., P. 9.)
On March 19, 2025, defendant answered the complaint with a general denial and 16 affirmative defenses. Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the pleadings. Defendant has not filed opposition or any other response to the motion.
Analysis: A plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings if "[t]he complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against a defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) "The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit." (Code Civ.
Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (d).) "Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed." (Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1174.)
Plaintiff's four paragraph "grounds for the motion to be granted" essentially argues that defendant's answer is uncertain because it lacks sufficient factual details. In support, plaintiff cites to Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076 and Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1. Neither of those cases involved a motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff misapplies the holdings of the cases. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a special demurrer based on uncertainty and ambiguity. "A motion by a plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a general demurrer to the answer, and the motion must be denied if the answer raises a material issue or sets up affirmative matter constituting a defense.
Such a motion does not operate as a special demurrer. Uncertainty and ambiguities must be specifically raised by proper procedure. [Citations.] Where the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted. [Citation.] The moving party admits the untruth of his own allegations insofar as they have been controverted, and all such averments must be disregarded whether there is a direct and specific denial or an indirect denial by virtue of affirmative allegations of a contrary state of facts. [Citation.]
Every allegation affirmatively pleaded in the answer must be deemed true. [Citation.]" (Barasch v. Epstein (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 439, 442-443.) "The filing of a general denial denies in one sentence all the allegations of the complaint." (Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community College Dist. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1545.)
Defendant's general denial alone puts all material allegations of the complaint in dispute, and, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings against a defendant, the court must treat defendant's denials as true. In addition to the general denial, defendant asserts 16 affirmative defenses that effectively challenge plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Tentative Ruling: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA vs James V Sperlin Tentative Ruling: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA vs James V Sperlin Case Number