TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

This hearing was set by stipulation of the parties to continue a previously reserved hearing date. Petitioner never served a notice of hearing, and thus Petitioner did not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Petitioner is directed to contact Respondent and advise it of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact Respondent prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person or by telephone.

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court herein summarizes the findings of fact as presented in the Proposed Decision, which was adopted as the Decision by the Department of Social Services. To the extent Petitioner disputes any of these factual determinations, the Court shall discuss such arguments in the “Discussion” section of this ruling.

Beginning in November 2022, Petitioner was employed by Seg Ed Inc., doing business as Merryhill School – Harbour Point, a child day care and infant center in Elk Grove. Petitioner served as co-teacher for the beginner II class, serving children aged two to three years old. Shayla Willburn co-taught with Petitioner until January 2024, after which Selena Soohoo became Petitioner’s co-teacher. The beginner II class shared a bathroom with an adjacent classroom, with each classroom having its own bathroom door. The bathroom doors had locks on the outside until March or April 2024.

Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1506.8897, Respondent may prohibit a licensed facility from continuing the employment of an employee who violates any provisions of the California Child Day Care Act, engages in conduct that is “inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of either an individual in or receiving services from the facility, or the people of the State of California” or otherwise engages in conduct that would constitute a basis for disciplining a licensee. In November 2023, Respondent received an anonymous complaint that the day care staff were rough with children and did not use appropriate forms of discipline. Licensing Program Analyst Nola Velasquez investigated the complaint. Velasquez visited the day care numerous times to conduct interviews and review records.

On August 22, 2024, Respondent issued an accusation against Petitioner alleging that she “engaged in conduct inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of either an individual in or receiving services from the day care, or the people of the State of California.” Specifically, Respondent alleged the following actions:

 Around August 2023, [Petitioner] yanked Child No. 2[1] off of a table. Additionally, [Petitioner] picked up Child No. 5 by his arm, carried him around a table, and threw him onto a nap cot. Other Facility children were present and witnessed [Petitioner’s] conduct.  From approximately November 2022 through March 2024, [Petitioner] pinched and/or hit, grabbed, yanked, and pulled Facility children; made Facility children run in circles; yelled at Facility children; and put Facility children in the bathroom for time-outs.  On multiple occasions in 2023, [Petitioner] put and/or left Facility children in the bathroom alone and unsupervised, including Child No. 3 and Child No. 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

The matter was heard by administrative law judge Wim van Rooyen in August and September 2024.

Jasmine Luckey, the day care office administrator, testified at the hearing. At the time of the events at issue Luckey was a beginner teacher and her son, Child No. 3 (three years old at the time) was in Petitioner’s class. Luckey testified that in 2023, while at home, Child No. 3 told his older sister: “Vianette put me in the bathroom alone. I could not get out until she opened the door.” Child No. 3’s sister reported this information to Luckey. Luckey asked Child No. 3 about the incident, and Child No. 3 reported the same story to Luckey. Luckey reported this information to day care director Stephanie Gill. Luckey did not further pursue the incident because she feared that she may lose her job if she was too vocal about what happened.

Sanjana Devi, a daycare teacher who worked in the adjacent classroom, testified at the hearing. On multiple occasions she discovered children from Petitioner’s classroom unsupervised in the bathroom, with the bathroom door from Petitioner’s classroom closed and no teacher standing in the doorway. On one occasion in 2023, she found Child No. 4 (three years old) alone and crying in the bathroom. Devi told her co-teacher, who called an administrator to come get Child No 4. Devi testified that teachers were not allowed to leave children alone in the bathroom.

Holly Allen, the office administrator, testified at the hearing. Allen recalled being summoned to the bathroom in 2023 by a teacher who shared the bathroom with Petitioner’s classroom. Upon arrival, Allen found Child No. 4, a child from Petitioner’s classroom, alone and crying. The door from Petitioner’s classroom was locked. Allen took Child No 4 to Gill. Allen recalled other incidents of walking in on children from Petitioner’s classroom alone, crying in the bathroom, with both bathroom doors closed. Allen resigned from the daycare in August 2023, feeling that management minimized problematic incidents and only cared about maintaining the facility’s image.

Velasquez testified at the hearing regarding her interview with Child No. 4 (four years old at the time of the interview). Based on her training and experience and the questions she posed to Child No. 4, Velasquez determined that Child No. 4 could recognize the difference between the truth and a lie. Child No. 4 stated that he did not like Petitioner, and when asked where he would go for “thinking time,” Child No. 4 said “the bathroom.”[2]

Velasquez testified that “100 percent” supervision of children is required in the bathroom to ensure safety. Velasquez testified that most licensed facilities do not have locks on bathroom doors, and many do not even have bathroom doors. According to Velasquez, putting a child in the bathroom alone in response to behavior is an inappropriate form of discipline that presents a health and safety risk to the child.

The ALJ noted that witnesses testified that Petitioner pinched, grabbed, yanked, pulled,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

and/or threw children, including Child No. 2 and Child No 5. Witnesses also testified that Petitioner made children run in circles and yelled at them. However, the ALJ found that these statements were conflicting and too vague to find that the alleged misconduct occurred.

Petitioner testified that she never left Child No. 3 or Child No. 4 alone in the bathroom. Petitioner testified that Willburn once told her that Willburn had put Child No. 4 in the bathroom as a time-out. Petitioner further denied engaging in any of the other alleged misconduct.

Erika Jane Adams testified that her daughter was in Petitioner’s classroom from November 2023 until March 2024. Adams stated that she was happy having Petitioner as her daughter’s teacher as she was, “engaged, caring, expressive, and not afraid to run, laugh, and play with the children on the playground.” Adams believes Petitioner cared about each child and Adams was not concerned about Petitioner caring for children.

The ALJ determined that Respondent established by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner put and/or left Child No. 3 and Child No. 4 in the bathroom alone and unsupervised. The ALJ further determined that leaving a child in the bathroom alone in response to a child’s behavior is an inappropriate form of discipline that presents a health and safety risk to that child. The ALJ concluded that Respondent appropriately issued an exclusion order against Petitioner prohibiting her, for the remainder of her life, from “employment in, presence in, and contact with clients of, any facility licensed by [Respondent] or certified by a licensed foster family agency, or any resource family home, and from holding the position of member of the board of directors, executive director, or officer of the licensee of any facility licensed by [Respondent], unless and until [Petitioner] successfully petitions for reinstatement pursuant to Government Code section 11522.”

Respondent adopted the Proposed Decision as the Final Decision on October 30, 2024, with an effective date of October 31, 2024.

II. Standard of Review

The implication of a fundamental vested right, such as a person's employment, implicates the independent judgment standard of review. (Anserv. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Kelso (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 197, 204.) The independent judgment test mandates that the court review the entire record and weigh the evidence to determine whether the decision of the administrative agency is supported by the weight of the evidence. (Interstate Brands v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1980) 26 Cal.3d 770, 775, n.2.) The administrative findings are to be given a strong presumption of correctness, which may be overcome by the party challenging the administrative decision. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805.) After giving this presumption to the agency’s findings, the court is free to substitute its own findings of both law and fact. (Id. at 818.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

Respondent argues that the independent judgment standard does not apply, as Petitioner “neither alleges nor argues the loss of a professional license” and does not show that “she has a right to continued employment.” (Oppo., p. 16.) This argument is without merit. Petitioner was working at a licensed daycare facility at the time Respondent issued its exclusion order and accusation, and the final decision prohibits Petitioner from continued employment in her chosen profession. While Respondent did not issue Petitioner a license, and thus did not revoke any such license, Petitioner was employed by a licensed facility, and the fundamental nature of the right must be considered “from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its effect in human terms and the importance to the individual in the life situation. [Citation.]” (Mann v.

Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 312, 321.)[3] The exclusion order implicates Petitioner’s ability to continue engagement in her chosen profession, and thus the Court finds that it must apply its independent judgment.

III.

Discussion

Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1596.8872, subdivision (a):

(1) An out-of-court statement made by a minor under 12 years of age who is the subject or victim of an allegation at issue is admissible evidence at an administrative hearing conducted pursuant to this article. The out-of-court statement may be used to support a finding of fact unless an objection is timely made and the objecting party establishes that the statement is unreliable because it was the product of fraud, deceit, or undue influence. However, the out-of- court statement may not be the sole basis for the finding of fact, unless the adjudicator finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.

(2) The proponent of the statement shall give reasonable notice to all parties of the intended introduction of the statement at the hearing.

(3) For purposes of this subdivision, an objection is timely if it identifies with reasonable specificity the disputed out-of-court statement and it gives the proponent of the evidence a reasonable period of time to prepare a response to the objection prior to the hearing.

Petitioner argues that the ALJ’s decision was based solely on two instances of child hearsay, and that the determination that these statements had “sufficient indicia of reliability” is unsupported by the administrative record.

Respondent argues that the ALJ did not use Child No. 3 and Child No. 4’s hearsay statements as the “sole basis for the finding” that Petitioner put and/or left them in the bathroom

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

alone and unsupervised. Respondent

The legislative history of section 1596.8872 refers to the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Lucero (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, and states that the “author has crafted the bill to incorporate the exception as it is defined in [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 355.” (AB 2470, Senate Rules Committee, Aug. 13, 2002.) In In re Lucero, our Supreme Court noted that “special indicia of reliability” may include the spontaneity of a statement, the lack of motivation to lie, repetition of the statement, the mental state of the declarant, and use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age. (In re Lucero, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1239.)

As our Supreme Court later emphasized, also relevant is the “child’s ability to understand the duty to tell the truth and to distinguish between truth and falsity.” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 891.) Further, a court’s determination is not limited to these factors, as “any factor bearing on reliability may be considered” as the court should consider all factors that “relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The Court has reviewed the testimony regarding the child hearsay statements, including the following excerpts. Child No. 3’s mother testified:

A. “I told her that my son had come to be [sic] and told me that Vianette had locked him in the bathroom.”

Q. Okay. And at this time he told you this, he was in Miss Taylor's class. Is that correct?

A. No.

Q. Okay. He had already been removed from Ms. Taylor's class?

A. Yes.

Q. And did -- so can you give me more context as to when your son made this disclosure to you?

A. It was after he was removed from the classroom. I'm not sure exactly when, but I know it was after he left the classroom.

Q. Okay. And, I mean, were you inquiring into anything as to his experience in Ms. Taylor's classroom, or what prompted him to tell you this?

A. So he was at home with my daughter and my aunt and my daughter said that they were just sitting at the table and in that moment, he just said Miss Vianette locked me in the bathroom. And so my daughter, after he said that to her, she

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

called me. And I spoke with him and he said the exact same thing again.

Q. Did he give any more details as to what bathroom, you know, if the lights were on. If they were off. If he could get in. If he could get out.

A. He just said Miss Vianette locked me in the bathroom, and it was dark.

Q. Okay. And -- I'm sorry -- and he repeated the same thing that he told your daughter to you. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Did you believe him when he made this disclosure to you?

A. Yes.

(AR 802-804)

Velasquez testified regarding her conversation with Child No. 4:

A. . And I said, well, what teachers do you like? He named a couple. I said, are there any teachers you don't like? He said, Ms. Taylor. I said, really, okay, why –- why –- what –- you know, I actually started with what do you like about Ms. Taylor. He didn't say anything. I said what do you not like about Ms. Taylor? And he disclosed to me, timeouts. And I said, well, tell me about timeout, what happens when you have a timeout at school? And he said, bathroom. I said, okay, thank you for sharing that with me.

Q. Did you hear of any other children besides (inaudible) being put in the bathroom?

A. I had interview disclosures that the teachers that had a conjoined bathroom with her had heard on multiple circumstances children crying alone in there, because they could hear the teachers' voices in the classroom and the children crying alone in the bathroom, so to me there was no discrepancy in different children's names. I think there was multiple instances, so again for me, that fell into a pattern of behavior that that was the go-to spot for the timeouts.

(AR 1292-1293)

The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in admitting these statements, as there is no

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

evidence to support a finding that they were made as the result of fraud, deceit, or undue influence. Further, as detailed below, the Court finds that the hearsay statements of the children contain a “sufficient indicia of reliability” such that they could form the sole basis for the ALJ’s findings. Petitioner began her employment at the facility in November 2022, Respondent received an anonymous complaint in 2023, and Velasquez made numerous visits to the facility between November 2023 and February 2024.

While the testimony does not establish exactly when Child No. 3 made the statement to his mother, it certainly was made prior to the conclusion of the investigation, and some time after Petitioner began her employment at the facility. Thus, both statements were likely made within a year of the conduct, and certainly within 1.5 years. Both statements were made without coaching or other conduct to suggest that they were not spontaneous responses, and both statements were made independently of each other while corroborating the contention that Petitioner placed children in the bathroom without supervision for timeouts.

Petitioner repeatedly argues that the use of “Ms. Taylor” in speaking to Child No. 4 suggests that Child No. 4 could have been referring to another teacher, as the students did not normally refer to teachers by their last names. The Court has reviewed the testimony and the record does not contain a clarifying question as to whether Velasquez actually referred to Petitioner as “Ms. Taylor” when interviewing Child No. 4, or whether Velasquez simply used that referenced when testifying as the ALJ frequently referred to Petitioner as Ms. Taylor during the administrative process. Even if Velasquez referred to Petitioner as “Ms. Taylor,” there is no evidence to support Petitioner’s contention that Child No. 4 misunderstood Velasquez’s questions and was referring to a different teacher.

The Court finds that the statements of Child No. 3 and Child No. 4 are sufficient to establish that Petitioner placed these children in the bathroom without supervision. Further, this conclusion is supported by a preponderance of evidence when considering the entire administrative record. Multiple staff members reported concerns regarding Child No. 4 being found alone in the bathroom, with no evidence presented to contradict Child No. 3 and Child No. 4’s assertions that Petitioner placed them in the bathroom for “thinking time.”[4]

IV.

Conclusion

Giving the administrative findings a strong presumption of correctness, the Court applies its independent judgment and concludes that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the administrative decision was not supported by the weight of the evidence. The petition for writ of mandate is DENIED.

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In the event that this tentative ruling becomes the final ruling of the Court, in accordance with Local Rule 1.06, Respondent’s counsel is directed to prepare an order denying the petition,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000013: TAYLOR vs DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 05/29/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate in Department 16B

incorporating this ruling as an exhibit to the order, and a judgment; submit them to opposing counsel for approval as to form in accordance with CRC 3.1312(a); and thereafter submit them to the Court for signature and entry in accordance with CRC 3.1312(b).

[1] The Decision refers to individual children by numerical designation to protect their identities. Petitioner and

Respondent repeatedly refers to children by first name, however the Court adopts the ALJ’s identification process, and will refer solely to the children by numerical designation. [2] “Thinking time” is the phrase the daycare used for a time-out after unwanted behavior. [3] Petitioner’s citation to People v. Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1374 is unavailing as Roberto V.

involved criminal proceedings, and the admission of out-of-court statements pursuant to Evidence Code section 1360. Roberto V. did not address the standard of review following an administrative proceeding. [4] Petitioner was the only witness to argue that her co-teacher, Shayla Willburn, placed children in the bathroom

alone. The ALJ found this testimony was not credible, and the Court finds no basis to disagree with the ALJ’s determination.