Motion to Vacate Judgment
9:00 24CV452118 Jane Doe Order on Defendant’s Motion to 6 v. Compel Plaintiff to Answer Vivek Paul Gundotra, et al. Deposition Questions
See Line 6 below for complete tentative ruling.
After the hearing, the Court will prepare and file the formal Order.
9:00 25CV457216 Jayanthi Rangarajan Order on Defendant’s Demurrer to 7 v. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Sutter Law Firm PC, et al.
See Line 7 below for complete tentative ruling.
After the hearing, the Court will prepare and file the formal Order.
9:00 26CV490000 Kevin Ortega Order on Defendant’s 8 v. Motion to Compel Arbitration Kelly Services Global, LLC, et al. and Stay Civil Action
See Line 8 below for complete tentative ruling.
After the hearing, the Court will prepare and file the formal Order.
9:00 2000-7-CV- National Credit Acceptance, Inc. Order on Defendant’s 9 401591 v. Motion to Vacate Judgment Philip Parlan Anima, et al. See Line 9 below for complete tentative ruling.
After the hearing, the Court will prepare and file the formal Order.
9:00 10
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Case Name: National Credit Acceptance, Inc. v. Philip Parlan Anima, et al. Case No.: 2000-7-CV-401591 Defendant Philip Parlan Anima (“Defendant”) in this Motion invokes the equitable power of the Court under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(d) to set aside a 25-year-old Judgment that was entered on July 9, 2001.9 Defendant says this Judgment should be set aside now as void by making these merits-based arguments 25 years later:
(1) Defendant never opened or signed for the alleged account; (2) The credit application contains a forged signature and incorrect personal information; (3) Plaintiff National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) failed to obtain a valid contract with Defendant; and (4) Identify theft renders any Judgment void as a matter of law.
Notice of Motion (the “Motion”) at pp. 1-2 (filed: Dec. 5, 2025).10
The Motion came on for hearing on July 8, 2026, at 9:00 AM in Department 16. After reviewing all the papers and the record, and giving counsel for all parties the full and fair opportunity to be heard, the Court finds and rules as follows.
The Motion fails for multiple reasons.
First, while the 6-month time limit to set aside a Judgment under Section 473(b)11 does not apply to this Motion where Defendant invokes the equitable powers of the Court
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9 On the July 9, 2001 date of the Judgment that Defendant now seeks to set aside, (1) the
official case docket of this old case filed in the 2000 shows that this Judgment was entered on July 9, 2001, and (2) an Exhibit that Plaintiff himself attached to this Motion confirms this “Judgment entered 07/09/2001.” See Verification of Debt Letter from attorney Aimee R. Morris, Esq., attorney for Assignee of Record Sacor Financial, Inc., to Defendant Anima at p. 2 (letter dated: March 19, 2025) (attached to Motion). 10 As Defendant did not file this Motion on pleading paper, and the paper that
Defendant did file this Motion on contains no line numbers, the Court is unable to cite any line numbers in this Order. 11 For a Judgment to be set aside under Section 473(b), the motion “shall be made within
a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment . . . was taken.” C.C.P. § 473(b).
to set aside a void judgment based on extrinsic fraud under Section 473(d), the California Supreme Court instructs that there is still “a strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments and only in exceptional circumstances should be relief be granted” in equity. Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 982 (emphasis added). Here, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances whatever in this case that warrant the grant of equitable relief to set aside a 25-year-old Judgment.
Second, since the equitable power of the court is being invoked, the relief sought is subject to equitable defenses, including laches. For instance, in McCreadie v. Arques (1967) 248 Cal. App. 39, the court there declined to grant equitable relief to set aside a judgment that was five years old because plaintiff would be prejudiced by having to prove matters five years old if that judgment were set aside. Id. at 46-47 (1967). Here, as the Judgment that Defendant Anima seeks to set aside is 25 years old, the prejudice that would be suffered by Plaintiff is (quite literally) exponentially greater than in McCreadie.
In light of the great prejudice that Plaintiff would suffer if this 25-year-old Judgment were set aside, it is patently unreasonable for Defendant to seek to set aside the July 9, 2001 Judgment at this July 8, 2026 hearing—a 25-year delay. Hence, the equitable defense of laches militates strongly against the Court granting Defendant equitable relief now.
Third, equitable relief under Section 473(d) “is available only where the fraud . . . was ‘extrinsic’—meaning the party was denied the opportunity to be heard. If the fraud . . . goes to the merits of the action . . . it is deemed ‘intrinsic’ and not ground for relief. Examples of ‘intrinsic’ fraud: forgery, bribery, perjury.” California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial at ¶ 5:439 (Weil & Brown, Eds., The Rutter Group, 2025) The reason is because intrinsic fraud like forgery “can be guarded against through diligence during the proceedings”—not 25 years later.
Id. (emphasis added). Here, each and every one of the grounds that Defendant raises to argue that the Judgment is void is intrinsic, going to the merits of the action: (1) he never signed the account, (2) the credit application was forged, (3) Plaintiff never got a contract from him, and (4) there was identify theft here. Motion at p. 2, supra. Such intrinsic fraud is “not a ground for relief” under Section 473(d). California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial at ¶ 5:439 (emphasis in original).
And Defendant was never denied the opportunity to be heard on the merits on any of those grounds.
Fourth, even if the grounds for relief asserted by Defendant here could be reconceptualized or reimagined as being extrinsic fraud or mistake (and they are not), and thus eligible for equitable relief under Section 473(d), Defendant has failed to carry his burden of showing that any of those grounds are true. After carefully reviewing all the evidence submitted by Defendant and after giving Defendant the full and fair opportunity to be heard at the July 8, 2026 hearing, the Court finds that that none of them are true. They are false excuses invented decades after the fact to try to unwind, avoid, and evade a valid, long-settled Judgment.
For all these reasons, there would be nothing equitable whatever about setting aside this long-settled 25-year-old Judgment. So, in the broad exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to do so now.
Conclusion & Order
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED in all respects, with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 8, 2026 Hon. Vincent I. Parrett Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara
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