Sotto vs. Rhyan

from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”]; see also Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233 [requiring “very slight evidence” and resolving “all doubts ... in favor of the party seeking relief from default”]; see also Ron Burns Constructions Co., Inc. v. Moore (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413 [“policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits.”])

Defendants are ordered to file the answer attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of E. Jennie Barkinskaya within 10 days.

The CMC is continued from 7/6/26 to 9/8/26 at 8:45am in Dept. C24.

Defendant shall give notice.

205 Sotto vs. Rhyan The demurrer filed by defendant Stephen M. Rhyan, individually and as trustee of the Seymore and Joan Rhyan Family Trust (Rhyan) to the first amended complaint (FAC) of plaintiff Roberto Sotto (Plaintiff) is SUSTAINED IN PART with 20 days leave to amend and OVERRULED IN PART, as set forth below.

Rhyan’s request for judicial notice of the FAC is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).)

Second Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction

Plaintiff alleges he occupied the property located at 26832 Via La Mirada, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675 (Subject Property) pursuant to an oral lease agreement with defendant Christine T. Trabucco (Trabucco). (FAC ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges after Trabucco’s master lease was terminated, the Seymore and Joan Rhyan Family Trust (Trust) assumed the lease. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges he

performed all obligations under the lease agreement. (FAC ¶ 35.)

The FAC adequately pleads a landlord-tenant relationship as to Rhyan, as trustee, based on the foregoing allegations. Rhyan argues these allegations are insufficient, but he cites no authority showing such allegations are inadequate to plead a landlord-tenant relationship.

The FAC, however, fails to plead any facts showing a landlord-tenant relationship between Plaintiff and Rhyan, individually. As noted, the FAC specifically pleads the lease agreement was assumed by the Trust. No facts are pled showing Rhyan, individually, also assumed the lease agreement, such that Rhyan, individually, could be deemed a landlord of Plaintiff. In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues the claim is properly pled, citing to California Civil Code section 789.3, subdivision (b). However, by its own language, this statute applies to landlords.

The demurrer to the second cause of action on this ground is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend as to Rhyan, individually, and OVERRULED as to Rhyan, as trustee.

Rhyan also argues the pleading is uncertain because Plaintiff admits in the FAC he does not know when exactly Trabucco’s master lease was terminated, leaving the basis for Plaintiff’s legal right to continued possession unclear. “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Here, the FAC pleads a basis for Plaintiff’s legal right to continued possession. The FAC alleges the Trust assumed the lease and Plaintiff performed all obligations under

the lease. Any ambiguity as to when Trabucco’s master lease was terminated can be clarified during discovery. The demurrer for uncertainty is not welltaken.

Third Cause of Action for Conversion and Fourth Cause of Action for Trespass to Chattels

“A cause of action for conversion requires allegations of plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of property; defendant's wrongful act toward or disposition of the property, interfering with plaintiff's possession; and damage to plaintiff.” (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395) A claim for trespass to chattels lies where an intentional interference with possession of personal property has proximately caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiff’s right in it. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1350.)

The FAC sufficiently pleads wrongful acts toward or disposition of Plaintiff’s property by Rhyan, individually and as trustee. (See FAC ¶¶ 37, 53-54.) These allegations also demonstrate intentional interference with Plaintiff’s personal property. Moreover, contrary to Rhyan’s argument, the FAC adequately pleads the nature of the personal property interfered with. (See FAC ¶ 49 and Ex. A.)

Rhyan also contends Plaintiff attributes the lock change and subsequent control over Plaintiff’s personal property to “Defendants” collectively, which Rhyan argues is uncertain and insufficient. Rhyan cites authority concerning pleading requirements for fraud and conspiracy in which group pleading is disfavored. Plaintiff, however, does not allege a cause of action for fraud or conspiracy. These authorities are therefore

inapposite. The group pleading here does not render the pleading uncertain as the only two individuals alleged to be involved in the interference are Rhyan and Trabucco.

The demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence

The negligence claim and the duties alleged therein are based on the alleged landlord-tenant relationship with Plaintiff. (See FAC ¶ 67.) As discussed above, the FAC pleads a landlord-tenant relationship as to Rhyan, as trustee (see FAC ¶¶ 10, 34-35), but fails to plead any facts showing a landlord-tenant relationship as to Rhyan, individually.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend as to Rhyan, individually, and OVERRULED as to Rhyan, as trustee.

Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.)

“A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the

defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Ibid.)

Rhyan is correct the allegations pertaining to this cause of action are conclusory and insufficient to show extreme and outrageous conduct by Rhyan, individually or as trustee, or severe emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

Seventh Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment

“The elements of unjust enrichment are the ‘receipt of a benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.’ [Citation.]” (Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593.)

Rhyan contends there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment and the FAC alleges no benefit conferred on Rhyan. Regarding the first argument, there is a split in authority as to whether “unjust enrichment” is a separate cause of action. (Compare Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793; McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387; and Castillo v. Toll Bros., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1209-1210 with Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th 39, 43-44 and Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593.) Due to this split in authority, the court finds this argument not welltaken.

Regarding the second argument, the FAC sufficiently alleges a benefit conferred on Rhyan, individually and as trustee. (See FAC ¶¶ 37, 53-54, 78, 80-81.)

The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is OVERRULED.

Eighth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices

The UCL does not proscribe specific activities, but broadly prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” (Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 638, 643-44.) It governs anti- competitive business practices as well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose the preservation of fair business competition. (Ibid.) “A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” (Khoury v.

Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.) Rhyan is correct the FAC fails to adequately allege facts showing unlawful or unfair business practices by Rhyan, individually or as trustee. The allegations pertaining to Rhyan’s alleged unfair business practices are vague and conclusory. (See FAC ¶¶ 83, 85.)

The demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

In light of this ruling the court vacates the 7/6/26 OSC.

Rhyan shall give notice.

206 Negron vs. The Demurrer filed on 1/22/26 by Defendant Amy Negron Burchett Negron (Defendant), as to the Complaint filed on 10/3/25 by Plaintiff John Negron (Plaintiff) is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.