Motion for attorneys’ fees
sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them.” (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.)
Here, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden identifying any harm threatened by disclosure. The specific information sought to be sealed is already publicly available. Exhibits D, E and G have been filed in federal court, and Plaintiff concedes the information has also been disclosed in pleadings filed in this court, including in the declaration of Ann Sanz and OSI’s evidentiary objections to the Ann Sanz declaration. (ROA 46, 52; see Motion, p. 6.) There is no evidence Plaintiff ever filed a motion to seal those documents. As such, the Court finds no prejudice to Plaintiff if the records are not sealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) The motion is therefore DENIED.
Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide notice of this ruling. 6 Rojas v. Plaintiff Elizabeth Rojas’ unopposed motion to strike the answer of Alamirad defendant Alamarid Dental Corp. is GRANTED, with 30 days’ leave Dental Corp to amend.
Defendant Farzan Alamarid (Alamarid) filed the answer “individually and on behalf of Alamarid Dental Corp.” (ROA 51.) However, “a corporation must be represented in court by an attorney.” (Gutierrez v. G & M Oil Co., Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 551, 564.) A corporate officer, shareholder, or employee who is not a licensed attorney may not file pleadings or otherwise appear for the corporation. (Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729-731.) Alamirad did not file the answer as counsel of record for Alamirad Dental Corp. and instead filed the pleading in pro per. The motion to strike is therefore granted. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435.) Defendant shall have 30 days’ leave to amend. (CLD Construction, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152 [pleading filed by self-represented corporation is a curable defect].)
Counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling. 7 Salemi v. The motion for attorneys’ fees filed by defendants Kemp Ipsen and Pappas Maria Elena Ipsen (collectively, Ipsen Defendants) is GRANTED.
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In an action to enforce a contract authorizing an award of fees and costs to one party, the party “prevailing on the contract” is entitled to reasonable fees in accordance with Civil Code section 1717. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615–617; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 706– 707.) “[T]he party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract.” (Civ. Code § 1717(b)(1).)
“If a contractual attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough...it may support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action alleging both contract and tort claims[.]” (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 608; see also, Thompson v. Miller (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 327, 336.)
Courts apply a lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Meister v. U.C. Regents (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-49.) The court determines a lodestar figure based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49.)
Here, Ipsen Defendants are clearly the prevailing party as the Court entered judgment for Defendants and against plaintiff Jay Arrash Salemi (Plaintiff) on each and every cause of action. (See ROA 229.) The contract upon which Plaintiff’s claims are based contains a broad attorneys’ fees clause which encompasses all causes of action asserted against Ipsen Defendants in this matter. (See Complaint, Ex. A [California Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions, ¶ 25].) As such, Ipsen Defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees based on the above provision of the contract for both the contract and tort claims. (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 608.)
The Court finds the claimed hourly rates reasonable and adequately supported by counsels’ declarations. (See Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6; Morasse Decl., ¶ 4; see also, Baer v. Tedder (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1160-1161—prevailing attorneys’ declarations attesting based on their years of experience practicing law in the area, their standard billing rates were reasonable, were sufficient to support a finding that hourly rates were reasonable.)
The Court has reviewed counsels’ declarations and the billing records for Fox Rothschild LLP and Morasse Collins & Clark and determines the time expended by both firms to be generally reasonable with no obvious duplication or padding. While the total amount of fees sought is substantial, the amount of time incurred is supported by counsels’ declarations and the detailed billing records. Plaintiff filed no opposition and thus has raised no argument to dispute the reasonableness of the fees claimed.
Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.
Ipsen Defendants are awarded attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff in the requested sum of $80,173.59, which is comprised of $20,385.84 for Fox Rothschild LLP and $59,787.75 for Morasse Collins & Clark.
Counsel for Ipsen Defendants shall submit a proposed order and shall give notice of this ruling. 8 Freeman v. O/C Primoris Services Corp. 9 Ahmadi v. TI Before the Court is the Demurrer to First Amended Complaint filed Properties, on 4/3/26 by Defendant Tulio Illiano (“Illiano”), as to the First Inc. et al Amended Complaint filed on 3/23/26 by Plaintiff Zaki Ahmadi (“Plaintiff”). This Demurrer, which is directed to the First, Second, Third and Fourth causes of action (each a “COA”) in the FAC, is SUSTAINED as to each of those COAs.