The court has reviewed the case file, including any timely filed case management statement, and hereby issues this case management order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.722(d) and 3.728.) County says 3-5 day jury. Plaintiff says jury trial, but does not provide a time estimate.

The court sets a 4-6 day jury trial this motor vehicle action for Monday, January 31, 2028, at 8:45 am in Dept. W8. All parties are ordered to comply with the Department’s Policies & Procedures and Trial Standing Orders, which are available on the court’s public website (www.occourts.org) and inside the department.

Any outstanding jury fees are due within 10 court days of this order or will be deemed waived. (See Civ. Proc. Code, § 631.)

The court VACATES the Case Management Conference set for August 17, 2026.

Plaintiff to give notice.

4 Hernandez vs. Motions for Attorney Fees (x2) Kocsis

1. Motion for Attorney Fees

The court GRANTS Plaintiffs MARCO HERNANDEZ and ROSIE HERNANDEZ MORENO’s Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $143,465.00. To the extent Plaintiffs request costs, the court notes that the costs award was determined in connection with Defendant/Cross-Complainant SUSAN DOROTHY KOCSIS’s (hereinafter “Defendant”) Motion to Tax Costs. (See ROA 286.)

Under the American rule, which California follows, each party to civil litigation must ordinarily pay its own attorney fees absent a statutory exception or contractual agreement. (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278-279; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Civil Code section 1717, however, requires the courts to award fees to the prevailing party in actions on contracts which contain clauses entitling the prevailing party in any proceeding relating to the contract to recover attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717

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(a).) Here, the Court of Appeal found Plaintiffs prevailed in an “action on a contract” that would have provided fees to Defendant had she prevailed. (ROA 335 at p. 7 [Hernandez Appeal (G064238) Remittitur].) Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to their fees under section 1717. (Id.)

“Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129.) “Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Id. at pp. 129-130; Bell v.

Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687 [“Apportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable units.”]; Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493 [“Attorneys fees need not be apportioned between distinct causes of action where plaintiff’s various claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories”].)

The Court of Appeal determined this was an action on a contract. Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint alleging five causes of action for indemnification, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, negligence, and breach of contract. (ROA 13; see also ROA 335.) The breach of contract claim alleged Plaintiffs violated a written lease agreement by allowing Plaintiff Moreno’s adult son, Andrew "Junior" Calderon (“Junior”), to reside at the property without written permission and by "failing to keep the premises

safe" by allowing Junior to smoke on the premises. (Id.) Defendant alleged these breaches of contract were the cause of the fire and her resulting damages. (Id.) Pursuant to her breach of contract cause of action, Defendant prayed for attorney fees. (Id.) The Court of Appeal further found that Defendant’s “other claims, such as negligence, were factually intertwined with and predicated on alleged duties arising from the lease—namely, the purported duty to not allow Junior to live on the premises without the landlord’s consent and without paying an additional $50 per month.” (ROA 335.)

The Cross-Complaint’s allegations that Plaintiff Moreno breached agreement by “failing to keep the premises safe” and that the premises would not have caught fire but for Plaintiff Moreno’s breach of contract in allowing Junior to reside at the premises and to smoke on the patio necessarily implicate a determination of the fire’s cause. Accordingly, apportioning fees would be impracticable. The Cross-Complaint’s contract claims and the defenses thereto involved common or inextricably intertwined facts and legal theories from across the action.

When determining a reasonable attorney fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community who conduct noncontingent litigation of the same type. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248.) The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The court finds Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rate of $400/hr for Michael Kim and Anthony Silvia, $500/hr for Alexander Papaefthimiou, $600/hr for Gregory Garrison, and $150/hr for Terri Van Havermaat and Claudia Sternin reasonable. Having reviewed and considered Plaintiffs’ evidence, and having presided over personal injury and contract cases, the court finds this hourly rate reasonable for attorneys in

the community who conduct litigation of the same type as in this case.

The court has read and considered the parties’ moving and opposition papers, counsel’s invoices, and other submitted evidence. Based on that review, the court finds that certain entries were excessive, duplicative, or vague, and does not award fees for that work. Applying the above hourly rates and eliminating entries for work that is not reasonable or necessary, the court awards Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $143,465.00.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

2. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

The court GRANTS Plaintiffs MARCO HERNANDEZ and ROSIE HERNANDEZ MORENO’s Motion for Attorney Fees on Appeal. Plaintiffs are awarded additional attorneys’ fees in the amount of $76,006.50, for the successful appeal.

The court finds Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rate of $495/hr, $550/hr, and $600/hr for Michael Kim and Anthony Silvia; $550/hr and $600/hr for Alexander Papaefthimiou; and $200/hr and $250/hr for paralegals reasonable. Having reviewed and considered Plaintiffs’ evidence, and having presided over personal injury and contract cases, the court finds this hourly rate reasonable for attorneys in the community who conduct litigation of the same type as in this case.

The court finds that certain entries were excessive, duplicative, or vague, and does not award fees for that work. Applying the above hourly rates and eliminating entries for work that is not reasonable or necessary, the court awards Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $76,006.50.

Plaintiffs’ request for a multiplier is denied. Although an enhancement for a significant delay in the payment of fees may be appropriate under some circumstances (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 584, as modified (Jan. 12, 2005)), a multiplier is not required. As

noted in Graham, the enhancement may be eliminated if, as here, the lodestar rate is based on the present hourly rate rather than the lesser rate applicable when services were rendered. (Id.)

Plaintiffs to give notice.

5 Romero vs. South Motion for Leave (re First Amended Complaint) Coast Villas Homeowners The court GRANTS Plaintiffs JESUS ROMERO and Association JACQUELINE ROMERO’s unopposed motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).) The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).)

California courts generally allow great liberality, at all stages of the proceeding, in permitting the amendment of pleadings in order to resolve cases on their merits. (IMO Development Corp. v. Dow Corning (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 451, 461.) Thus, leave to amend to more clearly state a plaintiff’s theories of liability should be liberally allowed. (Rainer v. Buena Community Memorial Hospital (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 253-254.) This liberality only applies so long as there is no prejudice to the opposing party. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564.) Denial of leave to amend is appropriate where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. (Estate of Murphy v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 304, 311.)