County of Santa Clara v. Kelly Ranger

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2210

DATE: June 30, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 21CV389607 County of Santa Clara Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. v. Kelly Ranger

Line 2 21CV389607 County of Santa Clara Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. v. Kelly Ranger

Calendar Lines 1 and 2 Case Name: County of Santa Clara v. Kelly Ranger Case No.: 21CV389607

This is a limited civil action brought by plaintiff County of Santa Clara (County) against self-represented defendant Kelly Ranger (doing business as Los Gatos Massage and Cryotherapy), for violations of public health orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The County filed its complaint on October 8, 2021, asserting two causes of action: (1) recovery of administrative fines under Santa Clara County Urgency Ordinance No. NS- 9.291, and (2) enforcement of Government Code section 25132, which allows for the bringing of civil actions to prosecute violations of county ordinances. The County sought administrative fines and late fees totaling $13,200.00. (See Complaint, ¶ 37.)

According to the allegations and cross-allegations in this case, Ranger is a Chiropractic Assistant who, after an initial period of sheltering in place during the COVID-19 pandemic, began seeing clients again in May 2020. Ranger did not require her clients to wear a face covering, and she did not wear a face covering herself while working. The County learned of Ranger’s policy and practice regarding masking, leading it to issue a Notice of Violation by a County enforcement officer in October 2020.

The County moved for summary judgment, which the court granted after a hearing. Judgment was entered in the County’s favor in July 2025. The judgment was filed on September 9, 2025. Ranger then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was denied by the court on November 4, 2025. A notice of entry of the judgment entered in the County’s favor was filed on November 17, 2025. Ranger appealed. That appeal was dismissed by the court’s Appellate Division as untimely on April 22, 2026.

At issue are two matters: (1) the County’s motion for attorney fees, filed in January 2026; and (2) Ranger’s motion to strike “Plaintiff’s Declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,” filed in March 2026 and opposed by the County. Other than the motion to strike, Ranger did not file an opposition to the fee motion.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, a court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted into any pleading, or strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court reads the challenged pleading as a whole, all parts in their context, and assumes the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a motion to strike.

California Rule of Court 3.1322(a) requires that “[a] notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).) 7

Ranger apparently failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, because her motion to strike is not accompanied by the required declaration describing what meet and confer efforts were made before the motion was filed. But the court will consider the motion because Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a)(4), states that insufficient meet-and-confer efforts “shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.”

Ranger seeks to strike all or portions of paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 20-25 in the declaration of Deputy County Counsel Willie Nguyen in support of the County’s motion. The motion is expressly brought “pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436.” (See Ranger’s Notice of Motion and Motion at p. 3:6.)

The fatal defect in Ranger’s motion to strike is that it is not directed at a filing to which Code of Civil Procedure section 436 applies. A party, “within the time to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) “As used in this section: (1) The term ‘complaint’ includes a cross-complaint. (2) The term ‘pleading’ means a demurrer, answer, complaint or crosscomplaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms that it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

A declaration in support of a motion for attorneys’ fees (and a motion for attorneys’ fees itself) is not a “demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint.” It is therefore not a “pleading” under the foregoing code sections. A party cannot bring a motion to strike a nonpleading under Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436.

Because no motion to strike a declaration can be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 435 and 436, Ranger’s motion to strike is denied.

ATTORNEY FEE MOTION

The County seeks attorney fees as the prevailing party in this litigation. County Urgency Ordinance NS-9.291, section 6.i, provides: “In addition to the administrative fee and late fee, the County is entitled to recover all costs, expenses, fees, and attorneys’ fees associated with collecting upon any administrative fines, fees, or costs authorized by this Ordinance.” (See also id. at section 4.f.2 [“The County Counsel is hereby authorized to file a civil action on behalf of the County to enjoin any violation(s) of this Ordinance and to obtain other appropriate relief needed to cease and abate such violations, as well as to recover all associated County costs, attorneys’ fees, and any fines or penalties imposed.”]; Code Civ.

Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10) [attorney fees recoverable when authorized by law or statute].) The County’s request for judicial notice of that ordinance is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b).)

The attorney fee award should cover “all the hours reasonably spent” by the prevailing party’s attorneys. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, italics omitted; Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 624, 639.) Fees are calculated using the lodestar method, i.e., 8

“the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

The hourly rates sought by the County’s attorneys, ranging between $265/hour to $303/hour, are well within (and, indeed, below) the range of attorney fees charged for similar work in this region. The County seeks compensation for 325.5 hours of attorney time and 3.2 hours of paralegal time. That is a substantial number of hours, but the court observes that this case was heavily litigated. And Ranger’s repeated unsuccessful motions required responses by the County. The court concludes the number of hours claimed by the County is reasonable. The County is therefore awarded its full attorney fee request of $92,558.40.

Even if the court construed Ranger’s motion to strike as an opposition to the attorney fee motion, those arguments are unpersuasive. The County is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for its employees’ work using the lodestar method despite its attorneys being salaried employees. (City of Santa Rosa v. Patel (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 65, 71 [“The lodestar approach affords predictability to the process and avoids protracted litigation concerning the question of salaries, costs, and the internal economics of a law office.”].)

Ranger also argues the declaration supporting the fee motion is insufficiently detailed. But the court finds the declaration provided adequate detail to support the fee request. (United Grand Corp. v. Stollof (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 62, 70 [“ ‘ “trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” ’ ”].)

CONCLUSION

Ranger’s motion to strike portions of the declaration of Deputy County Counsel Willie Nguyen in support of the County’s motion for attorney fees is denied.

The County’s motion for attorney fees is granted. Ranger is ordered to pay the County $92,558.40 in attorney fees.

The court will prepare the order.

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