LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al.

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

The Sacramento Superior Court has transitioned operations from the Gordon D. Schaber and Hall of Justice buildings to the new Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse through a phased move plan beginning on April 13, 2026. Visit the court’s website at www.saccourt.ca.gov for the most current and up to date information regarding the transition. The physical and mailing address of the new downtown courthouse is:

Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse 500 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814

Please take notice, effective April 13, 2026, Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse. The Honorable Christopher E. Krueger remains presiding over all Home Court proceedings, including Case Management and Law & Motion. All hearings currently scheduled or reserved after the effective date shall remain in place and will be heard in Department 16C.

Hon. Christopher E. Krueger Department 16C 916-874-7848

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of the Issues identified in the Notice of Motion and which of the Undisputed Material Facts offered by the moving defendant and/or the Additional Material Facts offered by plaintiff will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific evidence which it claims to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Defendants City of Sacramento (sued as City of Sacramento Fire Department), John Gibson, Mark Dunlap, Matthew Days, and Oleksandr Khomyak’s (“Defendants”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows.

Opposing counsel is admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court,

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

rule 3.1119(f)(4), which provides, “electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions.

Overview

This action arises out of the death of Christopher Bingham (“Bingham”). Plaintiff Lindsey Liebelt (“Liebelt”) is Bingham’s widow and sole remaining heir. (Second Amended Complaint [“2AC”], ¶ 2.) Liebelt sues in her individual capacity and as Bingham’s successor-in-interest.

Liebelt alleges that on or about June 28, 2022, Bingham requested emergent medical care due to experiencing severe symptoms of alcohol withdrawal, including shortness of breath and mental confusion. (2AC, ¶ 12.) According to Liebelt, Defendants failed to adequately evaluate, treat, and transport Bingham and effectively discouraged Liebelt and Bingham from seeking medical care. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Liebelt alleges that Bingham died from symptoms related to alcohol withdrawal on or about June 29, 2022, as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

The 2AC asserts causes of action for: (1) wrongful death due to medical negligence (Code Civ, Proc., § 377.60); (2) medical malpractice (survival action under Code Civ. Proc., § 377.20); (3) negligence per se; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Trial is currently scheduled for June 16, 2026.

Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims (the First, Second, Third, And Fourth) fail because the City’s paramedics were not medically negligent; 2. Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims (the First, Second, Third, And Fourth) fail because Plaintiffs cannot show that the City’s paramedics acted with gross negligence; 3. Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims (the First, Second, Third, And Fourth) fail because the City’s acts or omissions did not cause Plaintiff injuries; 4. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for negligence per se fails as a matter of law because it lacks a statutory basis;

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

5. Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff was not present for any alleged injury- causing conduct; 6. Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims (the First, Second, Third, And Fourth) fail against individual Defendant Dunlap because he did not cause any of the alleged harm; 7. Plaintiff’s negligence-based claims (the First, Second, Third, And Fourth) fail against individual Defendant Khomvak [sic] because he did not cause any of the alleged harm.

(Not. of Mot., at p. 2:10–23.)

Liebelt opposes, disputing some of Defendants’ asserted undisputed material facts (“UMFs”), providing additional material facts (“AMFs”), and arguing that “Defendants’ motion should be denied in its entirety.”[1] (Plf’s Opposition [“Opp.”], at p. 4:13.)

Liebelt filed both a “Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” and a “Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts.” Liebelt should have submitted a single separate statement including both her response to Defendant’s separate statement and her additional disputed facts. (Cal. Code Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3); CRC, rule 3.1350(f)(3).)

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v.

Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears a burden of production to make a prima facie case that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2)].)

If the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or affirmative defense claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851.) To do so, the party must produce evidence to controvert the asserted undisputed material facts or set forth additional disputed facts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)

While a motion for summary adjudication is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these is California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another is that summary adjudication can be granted only if the motion 'completely disposes' of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subdivision (f)(1).) In contrast, a motion for summary judgment can be granted only against an entire “action or proceeding.” (Id. § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence, and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party’s evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Lipson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.)

Evidentiary Objections

Defendants make 37 evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s two expert declarations. The objections can be grouped into two categories: (1) that the expert opinion states a legal conclusion on gross negligence and (2) that the expert opinion lacks foundation and is speculation.

Expert testimony may embrace ultimate factual issues but may not draw legal conclusions. (Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 472–473.) But “the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

determination of whether conduct constitutes gross negligence ordinarily is a question of fact.” (Mubanda v. City of Santa Barbara (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 256, 264.) Defendants’ objections on the ground of improper legal conclusions are overruled.

Defendants’ remaining objections are overruled on grounds that for purposes of this motion, they would go the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The Court does not weigh evidence on summary judgment.

Analysis

Issue 1: Medical Negligence

Liebelt’s causes of action for wrongful death and medical malpractice (survivor claim) are both forms of professional negligence. The elements of a wrongful death claim are the underlying tort (here, alleged medical negligence), a resulting death, and monetary damages to the heirs. (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) The elements of medical negligence are a duty to use the skill, prudence, and diligence in providing medical services as other members of the profession commonly exercise, a breach of this duty, and resulting harm. (Ibid.) Because the standard of care in medical practice is not a matter of lay knowledge, expert testimony is generally required to prove or disprove that a defendant performed in accordance with the standard of care. (Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.)

Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to professional negligence. (Reply, at p. 4:2–3.) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of Issue 1 is DENIED.

Issue 2: Gross Negligence

The parties agree that Health and Safety Code section 1799.107, subdivision (b), applies:

[N]either a public entity nor emergency rescue personnel shall be liable for any injury caused by an action taken by the emergency rescue personnel acting within the scope of their employment to provide emergency services, unless the action taken was performed in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner.[2]

(2AC, ¶ 17; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion, at p. 16:14–27.) Gross negligence is “the want of even scant care or an extreme departure

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

from the ordinary standard of conduct.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1185–1186.)

Defendants argue that these UMFs show no triable issue of material fact that their conduct was grossly negligent:

 On or about June 28, 2022, Christopher Bingham (“Decedent”) was experiencing symptoms related to alcohol withdrawal, including shortness of breath and mental confusion. (UMF 1.)  Decedent’s wife, Lindsey Liebelt (“Plaintiff”), called “911” for emergency medical assistance for Decedent to their home. (UMF 2.)  At approximately 7:07 p.m., a crew of four City of Sacramento Fire Department (“City”) paramedics were dispatched on an emergency call to Decedent’s home at 1900 North Avenue, Sacramento, California.

The crew consisted of Defendants Captain John Gibson, Matthew Days, Oleksandr Khomyak, and engineer Mark Dunlap, all of whom are licensed paramedics. (UMF 3.)  Days did a neurological assessment of Decedent. Decedent was alert, his mental status was normal and he was normal neurologically. (UMF 5.)  Decedent was given a Glasgow Coma Score of 15 because Decedent was able to answer questions, talk to the City emergency responders and was alert. (UMF 6.)  The City emergency responders took Decedent’s blood pressure, pulse rate, respirations, and oxygen saturation via a pulse oximeter. (UMF 7.)  Days made an assessment of Decedent’s airway, breathing and circulation.

Decedent’s breathing was normal, his lungs were clear, and he had a normal skin condition and color. (UMF 8.)  Decedent was speaking in full sentences, his pupils were normal, and he did not have any shortness of breath, chest pain, weakness, or dizziness. (UMF 9.)  The City emergency responders performed an EKG of Decedent; Days reviewed and medically interpreted the EKG. (UMF 10.)  Decedent was asked about his medication history. (UMF 11.)  Days assessed that Decedent’s vitals were elevated, including blood pressure, pulse and respiration, but these appeared to be related to Decedent’s complaint of anxiety and not to a problem with his heart. (UMF 12.)  Decedent was offered transport to a hospital and signed a document refusing transportation. (UMF 13 [in part].)  Days communicated to Decedent the risks of refusal of transport to the hospital

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

prior to leaving. (UMF 14.)  Before leaving, Days advised Decedent and Plaintiff that they were free to call them back and they would come back. (UMF 16.)  [Defendants’ expert Brian] Pedro evaluated the treatment of Decedent to determine if the City’s emergency responders complied with the City’s policies and procedures. He made this evaluation based upon the totality of his education and experience including nursing education and experience. (UMF 27.)  In his review of . . . [the evidence], Pedro reached the opinion that there was no violation in treatment or protocol by City emergency responders related to Decedent.

Based on the specific set of vitals presented by Decedent, the City emergency responders were not required to make contact with a base hospital for further consultation. Abnormal vital signs do no [sic] require consult. Decedent’s vital signs, while abnormal, were not unstable and did not require transport to the hospital. Further, the EKG tracing did not show any significant abnormalities. Finally, in reviewing the video, Pedro assessed whether Decedent had the capacity to make a decision as to whether or not to refuse medical care.

Pedro concluded that Decedent was alert and oriented enough to answer questions coherently. (UMF 28.)

Through these UMFs, including their expert’s testimony of compliance with the standard of care, Defendants have made out a prima facie case that their conduct was not grossly negligent. The burden now shifts to Liebelt to show a triable issue of material fact.

Liebelt presents two expert witnesses of her own, Daniel McDermott, M.D., and Cori Carlson, RN. (Plf’s Vol. of Evid., Exhs. 1 & 2.) Liebelt’s experts dispute that Bingham showed a normal mental status (UMF 5) or breathing (UMFs 8, 9). (Plf’s Response to Defs’ Separate Statement.) Both experts ultimately conclude, based on their review of deposition testimony, written records, and video recording, that several of Defendants’ actions or omissions were an extreme deviation from the standard of care and clear evidence of gross negligence:

 The Prehospital Care Report of 6.28.22 . . . statement and the deposition testimony of the responding paramedics that the patient’s vital signs were “within normal limits” was inaccurate and incorrect and medically unsupported in light of the recorded pulse, respiratory rate, and blood pressure. This mischaracterization was an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care for paramedics requiring recognition of abnormal adult vital signs and constitutes

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

clear evidence of gross negligence. (AMF 8.)  On June 28, 2022 the applicable standard of care required that the decedent be told that his alcohol withdrawal syndrome (AWS) and the observed abnormal vital signs represented a dangerous and life-threatening medical condition, that the patient could worsen and die, and that emergency department evaluation was recommended, not discouraged, as occurred in this case, which failure constituted an extreme departure from the standard of care. (AMF 10.)  The EMT/Paramedic crew did not carefully or accurately assess the patient’s level of consciousness and incorrectly documented the Glasgow Coma Scale (“GCS”) as “15”; [sic] and that it is more likely than not, that the patient’s true score was lower, most probably in the range of “13.” Assessment of level of consciousness and accurate GCS scoring are foundational EMS assessments.

This mis-assessment by the EMT/paramedics was an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care and constitutes clear evidence of gross negligence. (AMF 11.)  Policy 2101.17 required base hospital consultation for a potentially life- threatening condition, unstable vital signs, impaired capacity, altered level of consciousness, and unclear capacity, all of which conditions more likely than not existed given the clinical presentation, the charted abnormal vital signs and the decedent’s physical presentation on the surveillance video.

The applicable standard of care for EMT / paramedics in this case required that the crew contact the base hospital before allowing this patient to refuse transport, and their failure to do so constitutes a severe departure from the standard of care and constitutes gross negligence. (AMF 12.)  The paramedics fell far below the ordinary standard of care for prehospital assessment by attributing the patient’s tachycardia to “anxiety” in the PCR, rather than treating the elevated heart rate as an abnormal clinical sign requiring further evaluation.

The PCR recorded a pulse of 135 and stated that the patient’s “vitals [were] with in normal limits” with “elevated HR due to PT anxiety,” thereby converting an objective abnormal finding into a presumed benign diagnosis. In the prehospital setting, a paramedic’s role is to recognize abnormal vital signs, form an appropriate differential diagnosis, and direct the patient to higher-level care when potentially serious causes have not been excluded. Dismissing tachycardia of 135 as anxiety, rather than recognizing it as a warning sign of possible alcohol withdrawal, increased cardiac demand, electrolyte abnormality, dehydration, or other emergent pathology, constitutes an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care and thus constitutes gross negligence. (AMF 13.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

 The EMT / paramedic crew failed to appreciate or recognize the abnormalities on the 4-lead ECKG tracing, including but not limited to the T wave abnormalies [sic], a QTc prolongation,nas [sic] ST depression and ST-T wave abnormalities. In the clinical context of alcohol withdrawal, tachycardia, nausea, and rapid breathing, the standard of care required that the EMT/paramedic crew recognize the abnormalities and appreciate that these specific abnormalities are consistent with a repolarization abnormality, including possible ischemia and/or an electrolyte disturbance, both of which are cardiac conditions that required additional and advanced evaluation.

This required additional evaluation with a 12- lead ECG, continued cardiac monitoring, and transport for higher-level assessment, and the these [sic] failure of the EMT/Paramedics constituted extreme departures from the ordinary standard of care and were evidence of gross negligence. (AMF 14.)

The Court does not weigh evidence or determine issues on summary judgment. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 926.) Liebelt’s AMFs are sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact on whether Defendants’ conduct breached the standard of care. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 2 is DENIED.

Issue 3: Causation

Causation is an element of medical negligence. (Lattimore v. Dickey, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at 968.) To prove causation, a plaintiff must show that the allegedly negligent conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968–969.)

Defendants rely on many of the UMFs quoted above and the following (among others):

 Decedent and Plaintiff did not call any medical provider for advice the rest of the night and into the morning. (UMF 19.)  On June 29, 2022, Plaintiff woke up sometime after 8:00 a.m. and found Decedent apparently deceased in the bathroom. (UMF 23.)  The coroner found that Plaintiff died of a cardiovascular disease—specifically severe coronary artery disease. (UMF 25.)

Defendants contend that because Bingham refused transport to the hospital when the paramedics were on site (UMFs 13, 14) and failed to later call for assistance or seek other care (UMF 19) Defendants’ conduct did not cause his death.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

Liebelt does not directly dispute Defendants’ UMFs but argues that Defendants’ misdiagnosis or failure to appropriately treat and their discouraging Bingham and Liebelt from seeking care was a substantial factor in his death. Liebelt again offers additional facts based on her experts’ opinion. Among other things, Dr. McDermott opines that:

 The EMT/ Paramedics’ repeat failures to meet the minimum standard of care were a substantial factor in depriving Christopher Bingham of timely access and transport to higher-level medical care capable of identifying and treating his life- threatening AWS [alcohol withdrawal syndrome] condition and thus constitute an extreme departure from the applicable standard of care and evidence of gross negligence[.] (AMF 20.)  Had the decedent been expediently examined at an acute care hospital, it is more probable than not that his AWS, as well as his pre-existing coronary artery disease, would have been timely diagnosed and appropriately treated. (AMF 21.)  Had the decedent’s AWS as well as his pre-existing coronary artery disease been timely and appropriately diagnosed and treated at an acute care hospital, it is more likely than not that he would have survived these events and lived to a near full life expectancy. (AMF 22.)

Liebelt’s AMFs are sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact on whether Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Bingham’s death. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 3 is DENIED.

With summary adjudication of Issues 1, 2, and 3 being denied, Defendants cannot dispose completely of all causes of action. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is also DENIED.

Issue 4: Negligence Per Se

“[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534.) This presumption is codified at Evidence Code section 669, which is “virtually identical” to the test for an implied statutory duty of care for government liability at Government Code section 815.6. (Bologna v. City and County of SF (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 429, 434–435.)

Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

(Gov. Code, § 815.6.)

Liebelt alleges that Defendants’ violated Sacramento County Emergency Medical Services Policy 2101.18, “Patient Initiated Refusal of EMS Assessment, Treatment and/or Transport.”[3] (2AC, ¶ 29.) The Policy states, in relevant part, “No individual shall be encouraged to refuse EMS care.”

Defendants argue that the Policy was not in effect at the relevant time, the Policy does not set a standard of care for liability because it is not a statute, and that negligence per se simply does not apply to government actors.

Policy 2101.17 has an effective date of July 1, 2020. (Plf’s Vol. of Evid., Exh. 13.) Nothing in Evidence Code section 669 indicates that the negligence per se presumption does not apply to government agencies or is limited solely to statutes. Indeed, Evidence Code section 669.1 applies Section 669 directly to public employees and indicates that any “rule, policy, manual, or guideline of state or local government” can set a standard of care when properly adopted. Furthermore, reported caselaw applies the negligence per se analysis against public agencies and employees. (See, e.g., Bologna v.

City and County of SF, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 429.) In the event that Government Code section 815.6 may apply, it refers to “an enactment,” defined as “a constitutional provision, statue, charter provision, ordinance or regulation.” (Gov. Code, § 810.6.) Policy 2101.18 may be an “ordinance” or “regulation” within this meaning.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 4 is DENIED.

In her opposition and AMFs, Liebelt alleges violation of four Sacramento County Emergency Medical Services policies in addition to Policy 2101.18. (See AMFs 26–28; Plf’s Vol. of Evid., Exhs. 14–17.) These violations were not asserted in the Second Amended Complaint. Because the allegations are outside the pleadings, the Court does not consider them here. An opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1342.)

Issue 5: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)

Liebelt asserts a “bystander” theory to recover damages for her emotional distress. (2AC, ¶ 33.) A plaintiff may recover emotional-distress damages as a bystander only if

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

the plaintiff (1) is closely related to the victim; (2) was present at the scene of the injurycausing event and then aware the event was causing injury; and (3) suffers severe emotional distress. (Bird v. Saenz (2002) 28 Cal.4th 910, 915.) On this motion, Defendants challenge the second element.

A plaintiff need not know at the time that the injury-causing event was negligent but must know the event was harmful. (Bird v. Saenz, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 920–921.) An unperceived medical error cannot be the basis for a claim. (Ibid.) “[T]he plaintiff must experience a contemporaneous sensory awareness of the causal connection between the defendant’s infliction of harm and the injuries suffered by the close relative.” (Fortman v. Förvaltningsbolaget Insulan AB (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.)

Defendants contend their UMFs show Liebelt was not contemporaneously aware the allegedly negligent conduct was causing harm:

 Plaintiff did not appreciate that the medical advice Days was giving her and Decedent was incorrect or he could die from it at the time of her encounter with City’s emergency responders. (UMF 17.)  Plaintiff trusted what she thought was solid advice from medical professionals. (UMF 18.)

Liebelt does not dispute these UMFs but adds additional facts:

 Plaintiff witnessed and heard Defendants’ responses, including statements minimizing his condition as a “panic attack,” instructing him to “man up” and “tough it out,” and advising that he should wait until the following morning to seek care at urgent care rather than be transported to the hospital. (AMF 32.)  Ms. Liebelt and Mr. Bingham were advised that they would be wasting their time going to the hospital, that they would just be sitting in the waiting room for hours and that they had nothing to be worried about. (AMF 33.)  Ms.

Liebelt was concerned about the severity of Mr. Bingham’s symptoms with alcohol withdrawal, but she felt they were talked out of going to the hospital by professionals and told that his symptoms were not concerning, that she was worrying over nothing. (AMF 35.)  Ms. Liebelt testified that she and her husband intended to follow medical advice and that he expressly stated he would “do what [the paramedics] recommend.” (AMF 36.)

The UMFs and AMFs show that, at the time of Defendants’ conduct, Liebelt observed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

her husband’s distress, had concerns about treatment, and asked questions, but ultimately followed the advice of the paramedics.

Courts have denied NIED claims in similar circumstances. In Wright v. City of LA, decedent was handcuffed and lying on the ground. ((1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 318, 326– 327.) Decedent’s brother witnessed a paramedic’s cursory examination followed by decedent’s suffering, decline, and death. (Id. at p. 349.) His claim for NIED was denied because “he presented no evidence he was then aware” his brother was injured by the paramedic’s conduct. (Id. at 350.) In Meighan v. Shore, a wife accompanied her husband to the emergency room when he had chest pains. ((1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1030.)

She was a trained nurse, knew her husband’s history of heart problems, and understood the importance of quick treatment in case of heart attack. (Id. at 1031.) However, when medical tests showed inaccurately that her husband was not suffering a heart attack, she accepted the diagnosis and left the hospital. (Id. at 1045) The wife did not have a claim for NIED because she was not then aware of the mistake or that harm was occurring. (Ibid.)

The facts here are less similar to instances where plaintiffs have stated an NIED claim. In Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Center, for instance, plaintiffs witnessed their mother’s distress in post-operative care. ((2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 484, 486–487.) These plaintiffs showed contemporaneous awareness of harm occurring when they called for additional help and directed staff to perform procedures they believed were necessary. (Id. at 489.)

The evidence provided by the UMFs and AMFs here is more similar to Wright and Meighan than to Keys. Liebelt was not contemporaneously aware that the paramedics’ allegedly negligent conduct—misdiagnosis, failure to treat or discouraging them from seeking other care—was then causing harm. “Except in the most obvious cases, a misdiagnosis is beyond the awareness of lay bystanders.” (Bird v. Saenz, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 917.) Liebelt does not state a claim for NIED as a matter of law.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 5 is GRANTED.

Issue 6: Liability of Defendant Mark Dunlap

Defendants assert that Defendant Dunlap cannot be liable because he had no active role in any of the allegedly negligent conduct.

 Mark Dunlap did not participate in the medical evaluation of Decedent. After Gibson, Days, and Khomyak exited Truck 17 to assist Decedent, Dunlap stayed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

with the vehicle, which was his responsibility. (UMF 29.)  Dunlap did not go anywhere near the Decedent and Plaintiff, while the other firefighters met with the couple on the porch. He did not observe any of the interactions between Decedent, Plaintiff and the other firefighters. He also was not close enough to hear any of the words that were spoken between them. (UMF 30.)  As the Engineer on this call, Dunlap made no medical determination regarding the care and treatment of Decedent, nor did he enter any of the information onto the run report for this emergency call. (UMF 31.)

Liebelt does not dispute these UMFs and does not argue Issue 6 in her opposition. The Court construes Liebelt’s lack of opposition as a concession on the merits. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4.)

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 6 is GRANTED.

Issue 7: Liability of Defendant Oleksandr Khomyak

Defendants assert that Defendant Khomyak cannot be liable because he had no active role in any of the allegedly negligent conduct.

 Other than obtaining vitals from Decedent, Khomvak [sic] had no other interaction with Decedent and did not render any medical decision to the other paramedics or to Decedent. (UMF 32.)  Khomvak [sic] was not the lead paramedic at the scene and was essentially “manual labor” during the call; he did not communicate with Decedent at all. (UMF 33.)

Liebelt responds that Khomyak failed to use appropriate equipment and medical devices to obtain and assess vital signs, which contributed to the paramedic crew’s extreme departure from the standard of care and gross negligence. (AMFs 40, 41.) This is sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact on Khomyak’s liability. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 7 is DENIED.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issues 1, 2, 3, and 4 on negligence,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

gross negligence, causation, and negligence per se are DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 7 on all causes of action as against Defendant Oleksandr Khomyak is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 5 on negligent infliction of emotion distress is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issue 6 on all causes of action as against Defendant Mark Dunlap is GRANTED.

This minute order is effective immediately. Defendants shall prepare a formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 and Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] As discussed below, Liebelt does not actually oppose Defendants’ Issue Number 6. [2] Section 1799.107 goes on to state that “it shall be presumed that the action taken

when providing emergency services was performed in good faith and without gross negligence.” (Health & Saf, Code., § 1799.107, subd. (c).) But a presumption affecting the burden of proof does not change the evidentiary burdens on summary judgment. (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 642.) [3] The policy was apparently omitted in error as an exhibit to the second amended

complaint. The version of the policy attached as Exhibit C to the original and first amended complaints is numbered 2101.18. The version of the policy included as Exhibit 13 to Plaintiff’s Volume of Evidence is Policy 2101.17, “Patient Initiated Refusal of EMS Assessment, Treatment and/or Transport.” Regardless of the policy number, the parties appear to understand the substance of the policy at issue. If the Second Amended Complaint states the wrong policy number, the Court finds this to be an immaterial error that has not misled or prejudiced Defendants. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 469, 470.)

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003003: LINDSEY LIEBELT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST FOR DECEDENT CHRISTOPHER BINGHAM vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT, et al. 05/14/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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