DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY-DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. ***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION**** TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Rocklin Motorsports, Inc. dba Harley Davidson of Folsom (“HD Folsom”) and Guidera Family Properties, Inc. (“GFP”) (collectively “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows. *** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts, and/or which of opposing plaintiffs’ Additional Material Facts will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of a triable issue of material fact. ***

Moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including all declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Opposing counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(2), requiring the separate statement in opposition to, for each fact which is “disputed,” “describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted” and further requires that a “citation to the evidence” include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.”

I. Overview

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff Nicholas Des Rosier (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on or about May 26, 2022 he was seriously injured in a fall he suffered while on a property owned by defendants HD Folsom and GFP. (Complaint at 5:4-7.) Plaintiff more specifically alleges that, while he was legally on the property, he was injured when he fell “from a great height” while using a “negligently placed and designed ladder” which “did not have any cages, landing platforms, warning signs or barricades placed to protect against this type of occurrence.” (Id., at 5:10-13.)

Plaintiff alleges that his fall (and resulting injuries) were caused by the “unsafe, inadequately monitored, inadequately maintained, improperly designed, and/or otherwise improperly kept area” on Defendants’ premises. (Id., at 5:13-17.) Plaintiff further contends that “[b]asically, this was a hazardous, defective, dangerous, improperly designed, or otherwise unsafe area, and/or layout and/or maintenance approach to this area and no warning, or inadequate warning, of this hazardous, dangerous, or otherwise unsafe area and/or layout was provided to Plaintiff, causing or contributing to the fall.” (Id., at 5:21-25.)

Plaintiff and his spouse, Kayla Des Rosier (“Ms. Des Rosier”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their Complaint on May 17, 2024. The Complaint alleges three causes of action against Defendants: (1) general negligence, (2) premises liability, and (3) loss of consortium.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the three issues set forth in the notice of motion. Plaintiff opposes. No trial date is set yet.

Moving Papers. Defendants argue that they are not liable for Plaintiff’s injury as matter of law under Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 and its progeny. In this regard, Defendants argue that it is undisputed that HD Folsom hired All Pro Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. (“All Pro”) to replace two rooftop air conditioning units, that Plaintiff was an employee of All Pro and that Plaintiff’s injury at issue in this lawsuit arose when Plaintiff fell while descending down a fixed ladder on Defendants’ property in the course and scope of his employment with All Pro.

Thus, Defendants argue the Privette doctrine applies and as a result bars Plaintiff’s negligence and premises liability causes of action unless Plaintiff can prove that one of two exceptions applies (1) that Defendants concealed a hidden danger, or (2) that Defendants not only retained control but also exercised that control over the Plaintiff’s work in a way that affirmatively contributed to Plaintiff’s injury. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate either exception applies. Finally, Defendants contend that because Plaintiff does not have a valid cause of action against the Defendants for his injury, Ms.

Des Rosier’s third cause of action for loss of consortium also must fail.

Opposition. Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments in opposition, including various

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

arguments that the Privette doctrine does not apply to this case. Initially, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff as landowners and proprietors. Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that possessors of land are liable for their own negligence, that Plaintiff’s injury was the result of Defendants’ negligence, and thus the Privette doctrine has no applicability. Plaintiffs further argue that the Privette doctrine does not apply to this case because the Subject Ladder was “not in the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.”

In addition to arguing the general inapplicability of the Privette doctrine, Plaintiffs also argue that exceptions to the Privette doctrine prohibit Defendants’ effort to evade liability. In this regard, Plaintiffs, argue that the exception announced in Kinsman v. Unolocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659—that a hirer is liable for a contractor’s employees’ injury when the hirer fails to disclose a concealed hazard—is applicable as the subject ladder was a “concealed danger.”

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that under Privette and its progeny, Defendants are still liable for negligently providing unsafe or defective equipment (here the Subject Ladder) which contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.

Reply. In reply, Defendants reiterate the applicability of the Privette doctrine to this case and further argue that Plaintiffs failed to show that an exception to the Privette doctrine applies. Defendants also contend that “[d]espite there only being two clear and limited exceptions to the Privette doctrine, Plaintiff cites case law decided decades prior to the Privette Court’s ruling which has nothing to do with injuries sustained by an employee of an independent contractor in an attempt to invent a third exception to Privette unrecognized and unsupported by any California court to date.” (Reply at 2:18-21.)

Supplemental Briefing. This motion was originally set to be heard on March 16, 2026. On this Court’s own motion, the hearing was continued to April 29, 2026. The Court’s Order continuing the motion specifically stated that “[n]o further briefing shall be permitted unless leave of court is first obtained.” Nonetheless, on April 17, 2026, Defendants filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication” (“Notice of Supplemental Authority”). The Notice of Supplemental Authority notifies the Court of the decision of Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc. (CA1/1 A173024, filed 3/18/26, pub. 4/10/26) (“Cordero”) by the First District Court of Appeal.

Plaintiffs’ objected to the Notice of Supplemental Authority and asked the Court to either “strike and disregard this untimely submission” or, in the alternative, “to provide Plaintiff[s] an opportunity to respond.” Under the circumstances, the Court exercised its discretion to consider the new legal authority proffered by Defendants in support of their

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

motion. In doing so, the Court also continued the hearing so as to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to respond to the Codero decision. Accordingly, the Court allowed both Plaintiffs and Defendants to submit limited supplemental briefing relating to the application of the Codero decision.

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Opposition Brief Regarding Cordero. Plaintiffs maintain that Privette is not applicable to the case at hand and thus, because Cordero is a case that falls under Privette, it is inapplicable. Plaintiffs further argue that even if Privette applied, the “facts and issues” set forth in Cordero are different and thus the case is distinguishable. Finally, Plaintiffs argue in their supplemental briefing that Defendants’ failed to meet their initial burden on this motion because they did not present evidence any UMFs which demonstrate that Plaintiff has a worker’s compensation claim.

Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Opposition Brief Regarding Cordero. Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the inapplicability of the Privette doctrine, and take issue with Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Cordero from the facts at hand. Defendants emphasize that the Cordero court held “that statutory and regulatory duties regarding workplace safety are still delegable to an independent contractor” and further held that “in order for retained control exception of Privette to apply there must be some showing that the hirer directed the contractor to perform its work in a certain way or interfered with the means and methods by which the work was to be accomplished.” (Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Supp. Opp. at 3:1-5.)

II.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings &

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v. Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

III. Objections The Court does not rule on Defendants’ evidentiary objections filed in support of their reply since they concern evidence deemed immaterial to the decision on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

IV.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ “sur reply” and Defendants objection thereto. In this regard, on March 5, 2026, the same day that Defendants filed their reply papers, Plaintiffs filed and served a sur reply in support of their opposition to this motion. Plaintiffs sur reply indicates that their attorney failed to attach the CV of Zachary M. Moore, P.E., to the filed Declaration of Zachary Moore when they originally filed Mr. Moore’s declaration on February 24, 2026.

In response, on March 6, 2026, Defendants objected to Plaintiffs’ sur reply on the grounds that the sur reply is procedurally improper and should be disregarded.

First, Defendants are correct that the Code of Civil procedure section 437c does not allow for the filing of any “sur reply.” Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiffs cite to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) in its sur reply, the Court must note that a request for discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) is improper as no such affirmative relief is available through a sur reply as a properly noticed motion is required to seek such relief.

However, Plaintiffs’ sur reply is more akin to a notice of errata as it seeks to make a technical correction which does not alter the substance of legal arguments—i.e., the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

inclusion of the CV of Zachary Moore. Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants’ objections and considers Plaintiffs’ sur reply.

A. Negligence and Premises Liability Causes of Action

Defendants’ first issue and second issue for summary adjudication assert that Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for negligence and premises liability (respectively) have “no merit as Plaintiffs cannot establish that the alleged defects in the ladder from which Plaintiff Nicholas Des Rosier fell were not open and obvious and as claims against the hirer of Plaintiffs employer are barred by the doctrine set forth in Privette v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689.” (Notice of Motion at 2:12-23.)

1. The Privette Doctrine and It’s Applicability

California law recognizes that “[g]enerally, when employees of independent contractors are injured in the workplace, they cannot sue the party that hired the contractor to do the work.” (SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 594, citing Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689.) Under Privette and Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, the California Supreme Court previously “held that an employee of a contractor may not sue the hirer of the contractor under either of the alternative versions of the peculiar risk doctrine set forth in sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts . . ., but is restricted instead to a claim against the contractor under the workers’ compensation insurance system.” (McKown v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219, 222.) The Privette doctrine applies when the independent contractor’s employee is performing the work that was the subject of the contract. (Seabright Ins. Co., supra, 52 Cal.4th at 594.)

“When a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely. [Citations.] This presumption is grounded in two major principles: first, that independent contractors by definition ordinarily control the manner of their own work; and second, that hirers typically hire independent contractors precisely for their greater ability to perform the contracted work safely and successfully.” (Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 269.) “A presumptive delegation of tort duties occurs when the hirer turns over control of the worksite to the contractor so that the contractor can perform the contracted work.

Our premise is ordinarily that when the hirer delegates control, the hirer simultaneously delegates all tort duties the hirer might otherwise owe the contract workers. [Citations.] Whatever reasonable care would otherwise have demanded of the hirer, that demand lies now only with the contractor. If a contract worker becomes injured after that delegation takes place, we presume that the contractor alone—and not the hirer—was responsible for any failure to take reasonable

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

precautions.” (Id. at 271.)

There are exceptions, however, to this rule of non-liability. The first is where the hirer “retains control over the safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee’s injuries.” (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 213; Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th 256, 264.) In Hooker, the Court found the contracting party not liable because they had not directed a crane operator to retract his outriggers to permit traffic to pass and “[t]here was, at most, evidence that [the contracting party’s] safety personnel were aware of an unsafe practice and failed to exercise the authority they retained to correct it.” (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198, 215.)

The second exception was set forth in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., surpa, 37 Cal.4th 659. In Kinsman, the Court held that where a hirer, as landowner, does not retain control over the safety conditions, s/he may be independently liable if s/he “knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on the property, the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition, and the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 664.)

“In the context of summary judgment, the Privette doctrine gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that affects the burden of producing evidence.” (Degala v. John Stewart Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 158, 166.) “If the moving party establishes that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the plaintiff is an employee of the contractor who was injured in the course of the work, the burden shifts to the opposing party to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies.” (Id., at 167.) However, the burden of persuasion remains with the party moving for summary judgment. (Ibid.)

Here, the Undisputed Material Facts (“UMFs”) demonstrate that HD Folsom is a motorcycle dealership located at 115 Woodmere Road, Folsom, California (the “Property”). GFP currently owns the real property located at the Property and leases the Property to HD Folsom. (UMFs 5, 6.) On or about May 5, 2022, HD Folsom entered into an agreement with All Pro for repairs to the HVAC system at the Property including the replacement of two rooftop units. (UMF 11.) Plaintiff was an employee of All Pro in May 2022, and on May 26, 2022 Plaintiff was working for All Pro in installing two rooftop units for HD Folsom at the Property. (UMF 22, 24.)

A fixed ladder (the “Ladder”) is located on the Property inside the electrical/fire riser room on the south side of the building. (UMF 3.) All Pro installed a rope near the Ladder on the morning of May 26, 2022 to use to hoist up materials. (UMF 31.) That same day,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

on May 26, 2022, Plaintiff descended the Ladder for a smoke break. (UMF 32.) While descending the Ladder, Plaintiff held the rope installed by All Pro, and the rope either rolled off or broke and Plaintiff fell to the floor and suffered injuries. (UMF 33.)

The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their initial burden that the Privette doctrine applies. Specifically, the undisputed facts[1] demonstrate that HD Folsom hired Plaintiff’s employer, All Pro, to perform work on the Property owned by GFP (but leased to HD Folsom), and Plaintiff was injured while working at the site. In short, Defendants, as the moving party, have established that they hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the injured plaintiff was an employee of that independent contractor. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs, as the opposing parties, to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies. (Degala v. John Stewart Co., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.)

In this regard, the Court agrees with Defendants that the authority cited by Plaintiffs which predates the Privette doctrine or otherwise does not concern the application of the Privette doctrine are inapplicable here given that Defendants have satisfied their initial burden that the Privette doctrine applies.[2]

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the Privette doctrine does not apply because the subject Ladder is not in the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract. Plaintiffs more specifically argue that Privette and its progeny limit the delegation of responsibility to the independent contractor for its own employees’ safety to the specified work which is the subject of the contract, and thus, the property owner retains its duty to inspect, maintain, repair and warn regarding areas of its premises outside the scope of the contract. (Opposition at 11:27-12:9.)

Plaintiffs further argue that in SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., supra, 52 Cal. 4th 590, 594 (“Seabright”), the Court held that the airline carrier could not be liable for the injury suffered by an employee of an independent contractor when the employee was inspecting a luggage conveyer because the airline had hired the contractor to perform the specific work of repairing and maintaining the conveyor. (Id., at 12:10-19.) Plaintiffs contend that the “key language of Seabright is the requirement that the specific workplace be the ‘the subject of the contract’ and here the subject of the contract was the HVAC units, not the Ladder. (Id., at 13:6-8.)

Plaintiffs are correct that in SeaBright the California Supreme Court held that “[b]y hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the contractor any tort law duty it owes to the contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.” (SeaBright, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 594.) However, this Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that SeaBright requires such a limited delegation of responsibility for its own employee’s safety.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

The California Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29 (“Gonzalez”) is illustrative in this regard. In Gonzalez, the plaintiff, a professional window washer, brought suit against the defendant homeowner after he fell from defendant’s roof while cleaning a skylight. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 29.) The plaintiff contended that his fall was caused by dangerous conditions on the roof, including (among other things) that the path between the parapet wall and the roof’s edge was unreasonably narrow and plaintiff could not fit between the parapet wall and the skylight due to obstructing fixtures. (Id., at 40.)

However, it was undisputed that the plaintiff was aware of the roof’s dangerous conditions, and as a result, plaintiff had a duty to determine whether he and his workers would be able to clean the skylight safely despite the known dangerous conditions. (Id., at 54-55.) Moreover, the High Court explained that it does not address “whether and under what circumstances a landowner might be liable to an independent contractor or its workers who are injured as a result of a known hazard on the premises that is not located on or near the worksite.” (Id., at 55.)

However, the High Court nonetheless rejected plaintiff’s argument that the path between the parapet wall and the edge of the roof “was just a means to access the worksite, as opposed to being a part of the worksite.” (Ibid.) In this regard, not only did the undisputed evidence indicate that the plaintiff utilized this path while cleaning the skylight (as the path ran parallel to the skylight), the High Court also explained that “even if it were true that [plaintiff] was required to traverse the path just to get to the skylight, it still would have constituted an inherent risk in the job for which he was hired.” (Ibid.)

Similarly in Acosta v. MAS Realty, LLC (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 635, the court held that the plaintiff, an electrical technician who worked for an independent contractor, could not recover for injuries he suffered when a defective roof hatch slamming shut on his back while accessing the roof of a commercial building. The Court explained that although the injured plaintiff’s employer was not hired to inspect or repair the roof hatch, the electrical work for which it was hired required roof access and because the employer elected to access the roof by means of the roof hatch and the fixed ladder, “the roof hatch and ladder necessarily were part of the worksite and were within [plaintiff’s employer’s] duty to inspect.” (Acosta v. MAS Realty, LLC, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at 662.)

Here to Plaintiff elected to access the roof on the Property by way of the subject Ladder, and thus the Ladder was necessarily part of the worksite and were within Plaintiff’s employer’s duty to inspect. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the subject Ladder is not in the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.[3]

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their initial burden that the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Privette doctrine applies.[4] Thus, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that a triable issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies.[5]

2. Application of the Kinsman Exception

In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to Kinsman v. Unolocal Corp., supra, 37 Cal.4th 659 (“Kinsman”) and argue that “Privette does not apply because a landowner cannot escape liability when it fails to disclose a concealed hazard to a contractor.” (Opposition at 13:15-16.) Plaintiffs argue that the “dangerous hazards on the ladder were concealed.” (Opposition at 16:23-24.)

Under Kinsman, the hiring defendant is liable only if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” (Kinsman, supa, 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.)

Here, assuming, without deciding, that the Ladder constituted a hazardous condition on the Property, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the applicability of the Kinsman exception. Specifically, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff and/or All Pro did not know, and could not reasonably have discovered, the hazardous condition. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute the Ladder was clearly visible and the fact that it didn’t have cages or other fall protection was open and apparent. (UMF 21.)

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that “the NEED for fall protection was concealed as there were no warnings to let Plaintiff know that the ladder was not compliant with all safety and building codes.” (See Plaintiffs’ Response to Separate Statement, at 7:10-14.) However, Plaintiffs provide no case law, or other authority, that establishes that a concealed hazard exists even when the condition of the contended hazard is apparent and obvious, solely because there is no written warning or notice of the applicable statutory or regulatory safety requirements that may be applicable.

Moreover, there is no evidence that neither Plaintiff nor his employer could have reasonably discovered that the Ladder does not meet all applicable regulations, especially given, as stated earlier, there is no dispute that the condition of the Ladder was apparent and obvious. As the Court explained in Acosta v. MAS Realty, LLC, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th, the relevant inquiry is not what an injured plaintiff actually knew, but rather what a reasonable inspection would have revealed. (Acosta v. MAS Realty, LLC, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 664.)

Stated differently, “the distinction between knowledge of a condition and knowledge of a hazard is not relevant to [the] analysis.” (Ibid.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ contention that neither Plaintiff nor All Pro had a duty to inspect the Ladder is rejected for the same reasons as discussed above. Specifically, because All Pro and Plaintiff elected to access the roof by means of the Ladder, it was part of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

worksite and were within All Pro’s duty to inspect. (Id., at 662.)

In short, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether the Kinsman exception to the Privette doctrine applies.

3. Application of the Hooker/McKown Exception

Citing to McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra, 27 Cal.4th 219 (“McKown ”), Plaintiffs next argue that “Privette does not apply as a hirer has liability for negligently providing a contractor with unsafe or defective equipment that contributed to Plaintiffs [sic] injuries.” (Opposition at 19:5-8.)

At the outset, the Court first clarifies that McKown did not establish a separate and distinct exception to the Privette doctrine based on a hirer’s provision of unsafe equipment to an independent contractor; but rather was a “companion case” to Hooker insofar as it also dealt with the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine. (Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 759; see also Gonzalez v. Mathis, supra,12 Cal.5th at p. 42.)

In McKown, plaintiff, an employee of a sound-system installation contractor, brought an action against Wal-Mart after he was injured while installing a sound-system in a Wal- Mart store. (Mckown, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 219, 223.) Plaintiff contended that he was injured while driving a defective forklift provided by Wal-Mart for the installation of said sound system. (Ibid.) After trial, a jury found that Wal-Mart was negligent in providing unsafe equipment. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court granted review to answer the question of whether, under Privette, an employee of an independent contractor is barred from pursuing a lawsuit against the hirer of the independent contractor on the theory that the hirer negligently provided unsafe equipment. (Ibid.)

The High Court answered that question in the negative. (Id., at 225.) In so ruling, the High Court addressed Wal- Mart’s contention that it should not be held liable for the provision of the defective forklift because it merely requested, and did not insist, the contractor use the defective forklift. (Id., at 225.) In this regard, the High Court emphasized that the evidence demonstrated that Wal-Mart did more than merely request that the contractor use the defective forklift. Rather, Wal-Mart, as one of the world’s largest retailers, was a customer that the contractor “was presumably loathe to displease” and that “plaintiff may well have believed that refusal to use [the forklift] would have generated ill will,” that the additional expense of renting a forklift would have been chargeable to Wal-Mart, and that renting a forklift would have entailed delaying the installation project for at least 24 hours.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants provided All Pro with “a key to the room that granted access to the subject ladder” and thus Defendants provided “unsafe or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

defective equipment” as the subject Ladder “was not building-code compliant.” (See Opposition at 19:17-23.)

First, it is unclear if Defendants provided any “equipment” to Plaintiff or All Pro for the purpose of the exception articulated in McKown. In this regard, Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ UMF 16 which asserts that “[n]either Guidera Family Properties, Inc. nor HD Folsom provided any materials or equipment to All Pro for its work at the Property.” In disputing this UMF Plaintiffs argue that HD Folsom provided two pieces of equipment: (1) a key, and (2) the subject Ladder. (See Plaintiffs’ Response to Separate Statement at 5:8-11.)

In reply, Defendants argue that a key distinction from the McKown case is that the Ladder is a fixture permanently attached to Defendants’ building. (Reply at 8:17-19.) Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Ladder was affixed to the Property at all times. (See UMFs 3, 9.) However, even assuming, without deciding, that the Ladder or key to the room in which the Ladder was housed, could constitute “equipment” for the purpose of this analysis, the Court nonetheless finds that the facts at hand differ markedly from those presented in McKown.

In particular, Plaintiffs present no evidence that Defendants asked or directed Plaintiff or All Pro to use the Ladder. Rather, the evidence demonstrates the contrary. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not dispute that All Pro could have provided a different ladder for Plaintiff to use to access the rooftop of the Property. (UMF 28.) Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the Defendants did not direct, or interfere with, Plaintiff’s work while he was working for All Pro at the property, nor did the Defendants tell Plaintiff how to perform his work his work while he was working at the Property. (UMFs 35-37, 40-44.) Plaintiffs further do not dispute that at All Pro has performed work at the Property in the past, and that All Pro has in the past used its own ladders to access the rooftop. (UMF 8.)

The facts at hand are more similar to those presented in Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., Inc., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 759 (“Bowen ”). In Bowen, the plaintiff was employed by Team Industrial Services, Inc. (“Team”), a sub-tier independent contractor which was hired by a subcontractor, HMT, LLC (“HMT”) to inspect the HMT’s welding inside a jet fuel tank. (Bowen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 759 at p. 761.) The plaintiff was injured when fell from a ladder while inspecting the welding. (Ibid.)

The plaintiff sued both the general contractor, Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company (“Burns”) and HMT, alleging a premises liability cause of action based on defendants’ negligence and negligent supervision. (Ibid.) The trial court granted defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine. (Ibid.) Plaintiff appealed arguing, inter alia, that “HMT failed to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of fact concerning HMT’s negligent provision of unsafe equipment.” (Id., at 768.)

Plaintiff more specifically contended that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether HMT “effectively” requested or required him to use HMT’s ladder and scaffolding when it

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

hired him to inspect the welds in the jet fuel tank. (Id., at 768.)

On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals first clarified the applicable legal standard. Specifically, Court explained that since defendants demonstrated the application of the Privette doctrine, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact triggering a Privette doctrine exception. (Id., at 769.) The Court found that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden to do so. (Ibid.) In this regard, the Court emphasized that Plaintiff presented no evidence that HMT “asked or directed him to use the ladder and scaffold that HMT set up in the jet fuel tank for its own work” and that the contract between the parties’ evidence that Team was required to furnish its own equipment. (Ibid.)

Moreover, the Court clarified that “even if Team felt it may have needed to use the scaffold to perform its own work, this would not amount to an exercise of retained control where HMT did not instruct Team to use the scaffold.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine applies. (Id., at 770.)

Again, here to there is no evidence that Defendants asked or directed All Pro or Plaintiff to use the subject Ladder. The mere fact that Defendants provided All Pro and Plaintiff with access to the room in which the subject Ladder was located is insufficient to find that Defendants “requested” that the subject Ladder be used. Moreover, as explained in Bowen, even if All Pro and Plaintiff felt that it “needed” to use the subject Ladder to perform its work, this still would not amount to an exercise of retained control where there was no instruction to use the subject Ladder. Indeed, any argument that All Pro and Plaintiff felt they “needed” to use the subject Ladder to perform their work would be faulty given that, as discussed above, the undisputed facts demonstrate that All Pro had utilized its own ladders in the past to access the roof on the Property.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether or not the Mckown iteration of the Hooker exception to the Privette doctrine applies.

In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact triggering a Privette doctrine exception. As a result, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issues 1 and 2 is GRANTED.

4. The Cordero Decision

Finally, the Court has reviewed the Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Company, Inc. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1105 as well as the parties supplemental briefing regarding the same and concludes that the decision supports the analysis provided above.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Specifically, the Plaintiff in Cordero was injured while working for Cambin Steel Service Inc. (“Cambin”) on a pedestrian bridge project. (Cordero, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.) Plaintiff sued Ghilotti Construction Company Inc. (“Ghilotti”), the “turnkey” contractor on the job. (Ibid.) The trial court granted Ghilotti’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of the Privette doctrine. (Ibid.) The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id., at 1111.)

In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Cordero court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Ghilotti owed him a nondelegable regulatory duty under Cal-OSHA regulations and thus, the evidentiary burden on a summary judgment motion never shifted to him. (See Id., at 1118-1123.) The Cordero court also held that the “retained control” exception does not apply as there was no evidence that Ghilotti directed Camblin to (plaintiff’s employer) perform its work in a certain way or interfered with the means and methods by which the work was to be accomplished. (Id., at 1124.) Indeed, the Cordero court explained:

Simply put, “a hirer does not exercise retained control over the contractor’s work in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the contractor’s [employee’s] injury by merely permitting or failing to correct an unsafe work condition.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 55, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 493 P.3d 212; see Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 214– 215, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081.) But that is the most that can be said about the showing Cordero made here and, as many cases have now held, such a limited showing does not suffice for purposes of the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine. Because this deficit in Cordero’s showing is dispositive, we need not, and do not, consider any other arguments advanced by the parties pertaining to the “retained control” exception.

(Id., at 1126.)

Here, as discussed above, the Court also concludes that there is no evidence that Defendants directed All Pro to perform its work in a certain way or interfered with the means and methods by which the work was to be accomplished.

B. Loss of Consortium Cause of Action

Having found that the Privette doctrine bars Plaintiff’s causes of action against

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

Defendants, Ms. Des Rosier’s cause of action for loss of consortium also must fail.

Thus, summary adjudication as to Issue 3 is GRANTED.

V.

Disposition

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Issues 1, 2, and 3 is GRANTED. Because Defendants prevailed on all causes of action stated in the Compliant, its motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as well.

Defendants’ counsel shall prepare for this Court’s signature an order and a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

[1] The Court observes that Plaintiffs attempts to dispute UMF 6 which states “Guidera Family Properties, Inc. leases the Property to Rocklin Motorsports, Inc. to operate Harley Davidson of Folsom (collectively, ‘HD Folsom’).” To dispute this UMF, Plaintiffs argue that “Rocklin Motorsports, Inc. leased the property from ‘the previous owner of the Property…’” However, Plaintiffs do not directly cite any evidence to substantiate this dispute, but rather cite to UMF 7 as supporting evidence. UMF 7 provides, in relevant part, that “Rocklin Motorsports, Inc. entered into a lease on May 1, 2004 with the previous owner of the Property (Guidera Family Properties, Inc.) to lease the building located on the Property.” In support of both UMF 6 and UMF 7, Defendants provide the declaration of Len Guidera in which Guidera avers that “Rocklin Motorsports, Inc. entered into a lease on May 1, 2004 with the previous owner of the Property (now Guidera Family Properties, Inc.) to lease the building located on the Property.” Thus, given the Guidera Declaration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did raise a substantive dispute as to UMF 6.

[3] Plaintiffs also attempt to distinguish the Cordero case on the basis that Plaintiff’s injury did not occur at the actual worksite. (See Supplemental Opposition at 3:13-4:6.) However, the Court rejects this argument for the same reasons as discussed in this section. [4] As previously mentioned, Plaintiffs dedicate a portion of their Supplemental Opposition brief to arguing that the Privette doctrine does not apply. The Court is unpersuaded by these arguments. [5] The Court notes that Defendants have also presented evidence and argument in its moving papers that neither exception to the Privette doctrine applies. The Court need not address these arguments as part of Defendants’ initial burden as the burden is now on Plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 24CV009767: DES ROSIER, et al. vs ROCKLIN MOTORSPORTS, INC. DBA HARLEY- DAVIDSON OF FOLSOM, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 8D

[6] Plaintiffs attempt to dispute UMF 8, which asserts, in full, that “At various times during the last twenty (20) years, All Pro Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. (“All Pro”) has performed repairs and maintenance at the Property, including work performed on two HVAC rooftop units. During those times, All Pro has alternatively used the Ladder for access to the rooftop and has also used its own ladders.” In disputing UMF 8, Plaintiffs contend that All Pro’s “only work for Defendants at any time was solely limited to work on the HVAC units.

They never performed any other “repairs or maintenance on the property.” The Court finds that while Plaintiffs attempt to raise a dispute in response to this UMF 8, their asserted contention does not raise a substantive dispute to the overall UMF and, importantly, does not dispute the UMF’s assertion that All Pro has alternatively used its own ladders to access the rooftop.