Demurrer to FAC
The Court will not consider any allegations made in Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint, as they are irrelevant to whether the FAC properly states a claim.
“ ‘The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.)
The FAC alleges that Clubspeed and defendant K1 Speed, Inc. (“K1”) entered into software license agreements and a referral agreement pursuant to which K1 agreed that Clubspeed would be the exclusive partner for K1 and its software used at 29 current locations as well as all new locations. Plaintiff alleges that K1 breached the agreements by developing its own software. Plaintiff alleges that it had valid contracts with K1 franchisees, defendants knew of the existence of those contracts, and defendants, with the intent to interfere, caused a disruption of those contracts by directing the franchisees to switch to new software. As a result, Plaintiff alleges it has suffered damages in an amount not less than $300,000. These allegations are sufficient to establish each element of a cause of action for intentional interference.
The FAC understandably does not allege any specific facts against the Outlier Defendants, as they were added as Doe defendants after the FAC was filed. However, as Doe defendants, the Outlier Defendants are alleged to be legally responsible for the events and damages alleged in the FAC. (FAC ¶ 10.) Outlier Defendants offer no authority showing that these allegations against them as Doe defendants are insufficient as a matter of law.
Further, while Outlier Defendants are correct that allegations made on information and belief must be accompanied by information that leads the plaintiff to believe that the allegations are true, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the FAC taken as a whole provide such information.
Trade Libel Outlier Defendants argue that this cause of action fails to allege any publication for purposes of a trade libel or alleged false statements.
Plaintiff concedes the fifth cause of action is technically mislabeled and instead should be one for defamation. Thus, so long as a cause of action for defamation is properly alleged, the Demurrer must be overruled. (
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
The elements of a defamation claim are “(1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendants made false statements about Plaintiff to persons with whom Plaintiff is contracted, including statements that Plaintiff lies about its customer count and is a shell that does not make any money, steals money in processing credit cards, and engaged in wrongful conduct harming a former owner. Plaintiff alleges these statements had a defamatory meaning because they would tend to lower Plaintiff’s reputation in the industry and, to the extent they accuse Plaintiff of engaging in criminal conduct, they are defamatory per se. These allegations set forth facts establishing all of the elements of a defamation cause of action.
Based on the above, the Demurrer is OVERRULED. As Outlier Defendants already filed their Answer on November 15, 2025, no further responsive pleading is required.
Moving party to give notice. 104 Holl vs. ADK Bancorp, Inc., 22-01257212 Defendant 5 Star Housing, LLC’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Defendant, 5 Star Housing, LLC (“5 Star Housing”), moves for an order awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $35,400 against Plaintiff Mai Tran Holl.
5 Star Housing contends that this motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032, 1033.5, and 1717; that the Residential Purchase Agreement (“RPA”) in this action includes a broad provision entitling the prevailing buyer to seller to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from the nonprevailing or seller in any action between the buyer and seller arising out of the RPA; that 5 Star Housing assigned its RPA buyer’s rights to Defendant My Groups Inc. which Plaintiff accepted and signed; and that the Assignment did not release 5 Star Housing from the obligations and covenants under the RPA and preserved “all rights and remedies under the Agreement,” including the RPA’s attorney’s fees provision. 5 Star Housing asserts that Plaintiff asserted causes of action for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and financial elder abuse against 5 Star Housing and that because Plaintiff’s causes of action against 5 Star Housing sound in tort, 5 Star Housing remains entitled to seek recovery of attorney’s despite the fact that Plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of 5 Star Housing on the day of trial.
Timeliness of Motion When “prevailing party” status or the “reasonableness” of attorney fees requested must be determined by the trial court, a notice of motion claiming fees for services up to and including rendition of the trial court judgment [including attorney fees on an interim appeal before rendition of the judgment] must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal [CRC, rules 8.104, 8.108]. (CRC, rule 3.1702(b)(1); see P R Burke Corp. v. Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Auth. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052 [motion “almost always” filed after entry of judgment because until then “there is technically no prevailing party” and “parties may still incur additional fees.”].)
The normal time limit for filing a notice of appeal [and hence for an attorney fees motion] is 60 days after the superior court clerk’s service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment showing the date either was served, or any party’s service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service, or 180 days after the date of entry, whichever is the earliest. (CRC, rule 8.104(a).)
The 60-day time limit commences to run at notice of entry of judgment or dismissal.” (Sanabria v. Embrey (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 422, 429 [voluntary dismissal]; Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 698, 706 [dictum suggesting CRC, rule 3.1702 does not establish any deadline for filing motion for attorney fees where the cross-complaint was resolved by way of settlement and dismissal].)
On September 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal of 5 Star Housing, and served only a nonconformed copy. (Declaration of Daniel I. Halimi, ¶ 3.) Nor does it appear that the superior court clerk served a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of dismissal or a filed-endorsed copy of the dismissal, or that any party served a document entitled, “Notice of Entry” of dismissal. Therefore, it appears that 5 Star Housing had 180 days after the date of entry of the dismissal, i.e., September 22, 2025, to serve and file the instant motion for attorney’s fees. As the instant motion was filed on