Jasso v. Santa Rosaidence Opco, LLC

2. Settlement On November 8, 2024, the parties participated in private mediation before Jill Sperber, Esq., a respected and highly experienced mediator in wage and hour class actions. (Manus decl., ¶4.) The mediation was successful, and the parties agreed to a resolution. (Ibid.) The mediation resulted in a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of $395,000.00 on a class wide and PAGA representative basis. (Manus decl., ¶¶5, 6.) The Class Period is defined as February 29, 2020, through November 8, 2024. (Ibid.)

Aggrieved Employees means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly, non-exempt employee, who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period. (Ibid.) The Class consists of the named Plaintiff and all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked in the state of California at any time during the Class Period and who did not sign an arbitration agreement. (Id., ¶6.) On October 15, 2025, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of this settlement, approved the Notice of Class Action and related forms, appointed Plaintiff Daniel Jasso as the Class Representative, appointed Class Counsel, approved Apex Class Action Administration (“Apex”) as the Administrator, and set timelines for the settlement administration process, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. (Manus Decl., ¶ 9.)

3. Final Fairness Hearing Standards After preliminary approval, the court determines whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in a final hearing. (CRC 3.769(g); Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801; see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com. (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F. 2d 615, 625; Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc., Rule 23(e).) The trial court has broad powers to determine whether the settlement is fair. (Dunk v. Ford, supra, at 1801; Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.

App. 3d 434.) The purpose of this requirement is “the protection of those class members, including the named plaintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties.” (Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., supra, 688 F. 2d at 624.) At this hearing, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of Plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status through trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

However, the list is not fixed and the factors which the court considers must be tailored to each case. (Dunk v. Ford, supra, at 1801.) Ultimately, “the inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The determination is in the end ‘“an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” (Officers for Justice v.

Civil Service Com. (9th Cir.1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625; see also Dunk v. Ford, supra, at 1801, quoting Officers for Justice, supra.) However, while the party seeking settlement approval has the burden of showing the settlement is “fair and reasonable,” nevertheless “there is a presumption of fairness when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) 2

investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the trial court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337; see also Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43; Dunk v. Ford, supra, at 1801.)

4. Notice to Class Apex served as the Settlement Administrator. (Tran decl., ¶1.) It reviewed the data provided by Class Counsel and determined the class consisted of 371 individuals. (Id., ¶5.) On March 20, 2026, the Class Notice was sent to all 371 individuals listed in the Class Data via U.S First Class Mail. (Id., ¶7.) After skip tracing returned mailing, seven Class Notices were considered undeliverable. (Id., ¶¶8, 9.) The Response Deadline was May 19, 2026. (Tran decl., ¶10.) An extended Response Deadline for Class Members who received a re-mailed notice was June 2, 2026. (Ibid.) As of the date of this declaration, Apex has received one Request for Exclusion from Reyna Alcala-Sanchez and as not received any objections or disputes. (Tran decl., ¶¶11, 12.)

5. Settlement The total number of work weeks worked by Participating Class Members during the Class Period is 12,740. (Tran, ¶15.) The Net Settlement Amount available to Participating Class Members is estimated to be $211,295.64 and was calculated by subtracting the requested Class Counsel Fees Payment ($131,666.67), the amount requested for Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment ($20,357.69), the requested Class Representative Service Payment ($5,000.00), the requested Administration Expenses Payment ($6,680.00), and the PAGA Penalties ($20,000.00) from the Gross Settlement Amount of $395,000.00. (Ibid.)

The highest Individual Class Payment to a Participating Class Member is approximately $4,063.38, the average Individual Class Payment is approximately $1,235.65, and the lowest Individual Class Payment is approximately $16.59. (Tran decl., ¶16.) These amounts are subject to employee-side tax and withholdings. (Ibid.) Pursuant to the Agreement, 25% of the PAGA Payment ($5,000.00) will be allocated to Aggrieved Employees regardless of whether they opt out of the Class settlement. (Tran decl., ¶17.)

The highest Individual PAGA Payment to an Aggrieved Employee is approximately $37.55 the average Individual PAGA Payment is approximately $15.58, and the lowest Individual PAGA Payment is approximately $0.59. (Id., ¶18.)

6. Presumption of Fairness As detailed in this court’s preliminary approval of the settlement, a presumption of fairness exists in this case as the settlement was reached through arm's-length bargaining with the help of an experienced mediator; investigation and discovery were sufficient to allow counsel and the trial court to act intelligently; and counsel is experienced in similar litigation. In addition, none of the class members have objected to the settlement.

7. Attorney Costs and Fees Class Counsel requests $131,666.67 in attorney fees and $20,357.69 in expenses. (Manus decl., ¶¶7, 19.) The attorney fee request is one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount. A finding that the settlement is fair is not dispositive of the attorney fees issue. This court assumes a fiduciary role for the class members in evaluating a request for an award of attorney's fees from the common fund. (In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Securities Litigation (9th Cir. 2010) 618 F.3d 988, 994.) The distribution of fees must bear some relationship to the services rendered. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1142.)

Courts recognize two methods for calculating attorney fees in civil class actions: the lodestar/multiplier method and the percentage of recovery method. (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254.) The latter method is most commonly used in statutory feeshifting schemes to reward attorneys for engaging in socially useful litigation. It is also applied when the type of recovery does not allow easy calculation of the settlement's value. Class Counsel are seeking a percentage of the settlement fund.

In determining what percentage is reasonable, courts commonly consider: the percentage likely to have been negotiated between private parties in a similar case (e.g., 30-40% in tort cases); percentages applied in other class actions (usually around 25%); the quality of class counsel; and the size of the award. (See Weil, et al, Civil Procedure Before Trial, (TRG 2024) § 14:145.3, citing In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Secur. Litig. (ED PA 2000) 194 FRD 166, 193.) Use of the percentage method is particularly appropriate in “common fund” cases such as this one, as it simply awards counsel some percentage of the settlement fund. (In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.

Secur. Litig, supra, at p. 193.) This method theoretically aligns the interests of counsel and class more closely than does the lodestar method: a larger recovery with fewer hours expended benefits all parties. (Ibid.) The question is whether thirty-three percent is an appropriate percentage for Class Counsel in this action. This determination is somewhat elastic and depends largely on the facts of a given case, but certain factors are commonly considered. Specifically, the court may address the percentage likely to have been negotiated between private parties in a similar case, percentages applied in other class actions, the quality of class counsel, and the size of the award. (See In re Ikon Office Solutions, supra, at p. 193.)

The Ninth Circuit has consistently approved a “benchmark” award of 25 percent of the common fund. (Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Company (N.D. Cal. 2015) 306 F.R.D. 245, 260.) However, that percentage is often higher for smaller cases where recovery is under $10 million. (Haro v. Walmart, Inc. (E.D. Cal., Jan. 10, 2025, No. 1:21-CV-00239-KES-SKO) 2025 WL 73109, at *13.) With respect to the contingent nature of litigation, courts tend to find above-market-value fee awards more appropriate in this context given the need to encourage counsel to take on contingency-fee cases for plaintiffs who otherwise could not afford to pay hourly fees. (Bellinghausen v.

Tractor Supply Company (N.D. Cal. 2015) 306 F.R.D. 245, 260.) Moreover, when counsel takes cases on a contingency fee basis, and litigation is protracted, the risk of nonpayment after years of litigation justifies a significant fee award. (Ibid.) In cross-checking the attorney fee request, “the ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours ... reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” (Id. at p. 261.) In determining the reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. (Ibid.) “Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” (Ibid.)

Here, the attorney’s hourly rates are excessive for this area. The benchmark 25% of the net amount is $98,750, which is still significantly larger than Class Counsel’s lodestar calculation. The lower percentage is appropriate in this case. Counsel’s declaration indicates that Class Counsel spent approximately 90 hours on this case, which was filed over two years ago. In addition, large expenses were made for the mediator and a consultant. Attorney fees of 25% of the net settlement amount, calculated as $98,750, are granted.

8. Administrative Fees 4

Apex fees amount to $6,680.00. (Tran decl., ¶19.)

9. Representative Fee Plaintiff seeks $5,000 as a representative service payment. Plaintiff’s declaration supports the requested fee award based upon Plaintiff’s assistance to counsel and the risk associated with litigating the action.

10.

Conclusion

Based on this court’s review of the motion and the terms of the settlement, the settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable” and the rights of the class members have been protected such that there is no sign of fraud, collusion, or unfairness. Accordingly, the motion for final approval of the class action settlement is granted with a modification of the requested amount of attorney fees. This court will enter final judgment in this case in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the order of preliminary approval and this order. Class counsel is directed to submit a revised order and judgment consistent with this ruling.

2. 24CV02971, Maverick Excavating, Inc. v. Dalk

(TENTATIVE ISSUED BY HON. OSCAR A. PARDO)

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

19. PLEASE USE DEPT. 19’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION.

Defendant Jason Dalk (“Defendant”) moves pursuant to CCP section 425.16 for an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $41,257.50, plus amounts incurred on this motion, against Plaintiffs Maverick Excavating, Inc., and Herring and Sons Construction, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”).

1. Issue of Fees - Not Moot A party who is voluntarily dismissed, with or without prejudice, after he or she files a Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, motion to strike, is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the party's motion for attorney fees and costs under Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c). (Moore v. Liu (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 747-748.) “If indeed respondents' cross-complaint against appellant is a SLAPP suit, then the court's decision to not hear the merits of appellant's motion to strike deprives appellant of the monetary relief which the Legislature intended to give her, while at the same time it relieves respondents of the punishment which section 425.16 imposes on persons who use the courts to chill others' exercise of their constitutional rights.

We therefore reverse the trial court's order denying appellant attorney's fees and costs, and remand the case for further proceedings on the issue of the merits of appellant's motion to strike and, depending on the ruling thereon, her request for fees and costs.” (Id., at p. 748; See also Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055 ["Nor is the issue of attorney fees and costs rendered moot even by an involuntary dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.”]) The same reasoning applies here.

Despite that Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was rendered moot by the ruling on his motion to strike, the issue of attorney fees remains.

2. Objections Defendant’s objections are overruled.

3. Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP motion

5