JUAN MANUEL GOMEZ vs WESTCOAST PARATRANSIT INC, et al.

Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 693 [“[C]ourts performing their statutory review function have a duty to ‘ensur[e] that [the] negotiated resolution [of a PAGA claim] is fair to those affected.” (quoting Williams)].) The purpose of the process is to prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class. (Dunk, supra, at p. 1800.)

“If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval hearing must be given to the class members in the manner specified by the court. The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subd. (f).)

1. Adequacy of Notice of Final Approval Hearing

“The principal purpose of notice to the class is the protection of the integrity of the class action process, one of the functions of which is to prevent burdening the courts with multiple claims where one will do.” (Cho v. Seagate Technology Holdings, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 734, 745–746 [quoting Cartt v. Superior Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 970].) “The notice must fairly apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to the dissenting class members.” (Cho, supra, at p. 746.)

Here, the notice and forms were provided in English and Spanish in plain language, using appropriate font, and clear headings. The notice contains explanations of the proposed settlement, the procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to the settlement, the procedures for arranging to appear at the hearing, and the procedures for stating objections to the proposed settlement. (Toscano Decl., Exh. 1.; Molina Decl., Exh. A; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subd. (f); Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 266 [quoting subd. (f)].

The notice meets the requirements of Rule of Court 3.769, subdivision (f), especially when considered with the low percentage of undeliverable packets and lack of objections, as described below. The Court finds that notice is therefore adequate.

2024CUOE020092: JUAN MANUEL GOMEZ vs WESTCOAST PARATRANSIT INC, et al.

2. Evaluation of Settlement

The Court reviewed the settlement in connection with the preliminary approval motion, finding in its July 8, 2025, and August 27, 2025, Minute Orders that the settlement amount was fair and reasonable after considering the Dunk factors. It preliminarily approved the settlement, subject to final approval of the attorney fees, litigation costs, administrator expenses, and service award at the final approval hearing, which resulted in the following preliminarily approved settlement distribution:

Gross Settlement Amount $575,000.00 Less: Attorney Fees (up to one-third of Gross Settlement Amount) 191,666.67 Less: Litigation Costs (not to exceed) 30,000.00 Less: Administrator’s Costs (maximum) 7.900.00 Less: PAGA Penalties 25,000.00 Less: Service Award 5,000.00 Net Settlement Before PAGA Add-Back 315,433.33 Net Settlement After PAGA Add-Back (25% of $25,000) $321,683.33

Accordingly, in light of its previous analysis of the settlement under Dunk, the Court need not reconsider the Dunk factors here.

3. Reaction of Class Members

The Court has discretion to find a favorable reaction to the settlement among class members when the number of objections to the settlement is a small percentage. (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 967 [district court did not abuse discretion where notice sent to 376,301 putative class members generated 52,000 claim forms and 54 objections]; see also Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric (9th Cir. 2004) 361 F.3d 566, 577 [notice to 90,000 class members generated 45 objections and 500 opt-outs; no abuse of discretion in finding favorable reaction].)

Here, the administrator was provided with a list of 353 class members. (Molina Supp. Decl., ¶ 6.) Notice was sent to all class members by first-class mail. Twenty-two notice packets were returned without a forwarding address. Skip traces were performed, which resulted in updated addresses for 14 class members. Notice packets were then re-mailed. (Id., ¶ 7-10.) A total of 8 notice packets were deemed undeliverable. (Id., ¶ 11.)

No class members requested to be excluded or have submitted written objections. The deadline for objecting and opting out was April 2, 2026. (Id., ¶¶ .)

The Court finds that the high participation rate and lack of objections weigh in favor of approving the settlement.

4. Attorney Fees and Costs

2024CUOE020092: JUAN MANUEL GOMEZ vs WESTCOAST PARATRANSIT INC, et al.

“Because of the potential for fraud, collusion or unfairness, thorough judicial review of fee applications is required in all class action settlements and the fairness of the fees must be assessed independently of determining the fairness of the substantive settlement terms.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 555.) “The court has a duty, independent of any objection, to assure that the amount and mode of payment of attorneys' fees are fair and proper, and may not simply act as a rubber stamp for the parties' agreement.” (Id.)

“While the percentage method has been generally approved in common fund cases, courts have sought to ensure the percentage fee is reasonable by refining the choice of a percentage or by checking the percentage result against a lodestar-multiplier calculation.” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 494-495.) “Some courts have employed a benchmark percentage, with upward or downward adjustments justified by a multifactor analysis. The Ninth Circuit has approved a 25 percent benchmark.” (Id.; see also Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers (9th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2d 1301, 1311.)

“[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The choice of a fee calculation method is generally one within the discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the percentage or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to compensate counsel for their efforts.” (Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 504.) Further, the Supreme Court in Laffitte noted that some courts have not only used a benchmark percentage, but, once employed, have adjusted it both upward and downward depending on the circumstances of a particular case. (Id. at pp. 494-495.)

Here, class counsel requests approval of a fee of up to one-third of the gross settlement amount, or $191,666.67. In support of the requested fee, class counsel offered the firm’s and attorneys’ experience; a link to the Laffey Matrix; and three cases in other counties in which comparable hourly rates have been approved. (Toscano Decl., ¶¶ 24-38.)

The Court finds the Laffey Matrix to be speculative and to lack foundation and therefore disregards it. The Court also finds that other courts’ rulings are irrelevant because the facts of those cases are not before the Court for purposes of comparison and, being cases from other counties, are not determinative of the reasonable of hourly rates and/or total fees in Ventura County.

A lodestar of $208,370, based on 287.7 hours at hourly rates ranging from $600 to $950 is also provided. (Id., ¶ 39.) Although each attorney’s hours are set forth, billing records are not provided. Nor is a chart of any kind that specifies by category the total amount of time spent on each category of task, such “Intake/Investigation,” “Pleadings,” “Discovery,” “Depositions and Deposition Preparation,” “Law and Motion,” “Settlement/Mediation,” “Communications with Opposing Counsel,” “Internal Communications,” “Trial Preparation/Trial,” “Preliminary Approval Motion,” and “Final Approval Motion.”

For these reasons, the Court finds that there is insufficient information to determine the reasonableness of the claimed rates and hours claimed, as a result of which a lodestar crosscheck cannot be conducted.

2024CUOE020092: JUAN MANUEL GOMEZ vs WESTCOAST PARATRANSIT INC, et al.

In any event, the procedural posture of a settled case is indicative of whether the best possible result was obtained for not only class representatives and their counsel, but, most importantly, for the absent plaintiffs, who are giving up their individual rights by not opting out of a settlement and who do so based only on the information provided in the class notice, which is far less information than that available to class representatives and their counsel. When plaintiffs and their counsel have faced real risk in the form of dispositive motions and challenges to class certification, and when they have successfully survived those challenges, that is when higher fees are justified. The facts of Laffitte v. Robert Half International, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, support the Court’s position.

In Laffitte, the case settled for $19 million before trial. The settlement agreement provided that no more than a third of the recovery would go to class counsel as attorney fees. Class counsel then sought the full third, or $6,333,333.33. The trial court approved the fee after considering the hours worked on the case, the course of the pretrial litigation, and the potential recovery and litigation risks. (Id. at p. 485.)

The issue on appeal in Laffitte was not whether a one-third contingency fee was reasonable, but rather whether a fee based on a percentage of the common fund was permissible at all in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Serrano III. (Id. at pp. 485-486; see also id. at p. 488 [“[W]hether Serrano III permits a trial court to calculate an attorney fee award from a class action common fund as a percentage of the fund, while using the lodestar-multiplier method as a cross-check of the selected percentage.”) The court held that it was. (Id. at p. 506.) Although class counsel sometimes rely on Laffitte to argue that a settlement of one-third is a benchmark, or is within the range of reasonableness, it is reinforced here that Laffitte did not hold either of those things.

The facts of Laffitte show when a premium percentage-of-the-fund fee is warranted. In Laffitte, class counsel’s declaration in support of the fee request indicated that the “litigation included extensive written discovery, extensive law and motion practice, 68 depositions, three Motions for Summary Judgment, a Class Certification Motion, subsequent Reconsideration motion and then another Motion to Decertify, numerous experts, consultation with an economist regarding potential damage exposure and two full day mediations.” Further, litigation had lasted eight and a half years before settlement was achieved. (Id. at p. 487.)

Here, the case resolved following mediation after informal discovery. (Toscano Decl., ¶¶ 5.) Thus, the merits and class-wide issues were not tested through class certification or dispositive motions, such as a demurrer, motion to strike, or motion for summary judgment. The settlement reflects the parties’ assessment of litigation risks at that stage of the proceedings.

After consideration of relevant factors, including the risks assumed by counsel and actually confronted, the complexity of the litigation, the amount of work reasonably and actually performed, the stage at which the case resolved, and the results achieved, the Court finds that a fee of twenty-five percent of the gross settlement amount, or $143,750, is reasonable, which the Court finds, in the exercise of its discretion, ensures that the fee awarded bears a reasonable and

2024CUOE020092: JUAN MANUEL GOMEZ vs WESTCOAST PARATRANSIT INC, et al.

proportionate relationship to counsel’s contribution to the outcome and avoids both under- and over-compensation.

Finally, class counsel submits an itemized list of costs incurred in support of a final costs claim of $20,566.06. Invoices are not provided. (Toscano Decl., ¶ 41, Exh. 2.) Upon review, the costs appear to be of the type reasonably and necessarily incurred in a case like this, except for two CourtCall fees totaling $144, which are for counsel’s convenience and are disallowed. Additionally, no invoice or detailed time records were submitted to justify the Berger Consulting fee of $2,160 or the Evidentia Consulting fee of $3,173.50. Nor are the hours claimed and hourly rates sought specified in the itemized cost sheet. Thus, the reasonableness of these costs cannot be evaluated, and they are therefore disallowed.

In sum, the Court approves final costs in the amount of $15,078.56.

5. Service Award

The Court preliminarily approved a $5,000 service award. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration in support of the request in connection with this motion. An estimated 100 hours were spent on the case, comprised of tasks such as gathering documents and communicating with counsel. (Gomez Decl., ¶¶ 13.) The number of “estimated” hours asserted is high. The hourly rate, assuming 100 hours to be accurate, is $50, which is high given the nature of the tasks performed. Plaintiff was not deposed and appears not to have had to respond to formal written discovery. That being said, Plaintiff’s release is broader and Plaintiff is waiving rights under Civil Code section 1542. (Toscano Decl., Exh. 1 [SA, ¶¶ 5.1 and 5.1.1].)

Considering all the factors, the Court finds a service award of $5,000 to be fair, adequate, and reasonable, and approves such an award.

6. Proposed Order and Judgment

“The judgment in an action maintained as a class action must include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.771, subd. (a).) “Notice of the judgment must be given to the class in the manner specified by the court.” (Id., subd. (b).)

An amended proposed order and judgment will need to be submitted in light of the modifications of the settlement approved.

Counsel for Plaintiff is to give notice of the Court’s ruling.

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