REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT

24CV073780: REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 752227967641 in Department 19

Tentative Ruling - 06/15/2026 Joscelyn Jones

The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District on 12/03/2025 is Granted.

The Court rules as follows on the Motion for Summary Adjudication by Defendant Alameda- Contra Costa Transit District:

Factual Background

Plaintiff was formerly employed by Defendant as a Senior Transportation Supervisor. (See Defendant’s Separate Statement Facts (“SSF”) No. 1.)

In September 2023, it was discovered that some of Defendant’s dispatchers had falsified documents related to overtime assignments, resulting in the termination of three employees. (SSF Nos. 13-19.) A few weeks later, the son of one of the disciplined employees made threats against other employees that the son held responsible for his mother’s discipline. (SSF No. 20.) Plaintiff reported these threats to management. (SSF Nos. 21-34.) Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 29 and 32, but he doesn't cite any evidence creating any dispute to SSF Nos. 29 and 32 as stated.

In response to the reported threats, Defendant’s management scheduled a Threat Assessment Meeting (“the Meeting”) on November 16, 2023, to be held remotely via Teams conferencing software. (SSF Nos. 36-37 and 41.) Plaintiff asked his supervisor Dwain Crawley if the Meeting could be attended by one of Plaintiff’s staff members, Ken Green, and Crawley agreed. (SSF No. 42.) However, Defendant’s leadership had concerns that lower level managers, including Green, may have disclosed confidential information discussed in prior meetings.

Because of these concerns, Defendant’s leadership decided that the meeting would be limited to only those people whose attendance was absolutely necessary, and that lower level managers would not be included. (SSF Nos. 43-45) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 43-45, the evidence he cites, if credited, establishes only that Green had not in fact previously disclosed any confidential information; Plaintiff’s evidence does not dispute that Defendant’s management were concerned about the possibility of such disclosures.

At the start of the meeting, Plaintiff’s supervisor Crawley told Plaintiff that his staff, including Green, should leave the meeting. (SSF Nos. 47-49.) Despite these instructions, Plaintiff went to Green’s office and told Green to come to Plaintiff’s office and listen to the meeting out of camera range. (SSF No. 50.) Plaintiff did not tell his supervisors or anyone else in attendance at the Meeting that he has asked Green to silently observe the Meeting. (Id.) Green was not a designated member of the Threat Assessment Team that convened the Meeting. (SSF No. 52.)

Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF No. 52, he cites no evidence disputing SSF No. 52 as stated. Instead, Plaintiff’s evidence, if credited, establishes only that Green has extensive 24CV073780: REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 752227967641 in Department 19 experience in transit safety issues, and that Defendant’s regulations do not expressly prohibit participation in Threat Assessment Team meetings by people who are not designated members of the Team.

At some point during the Meeting, Crawley noticed a reflection in the window between Plaintiff’s screen. (SSF No. 53.) After the Meeting, Defendant’s Manager of Labor Relations Leonard Bellow asked Plaintiff if anyone was in his office during the Meeting. Plaintiff first said no, but after being shown a screenshot of a reflection of Green in Plaintiff’s office, Plaintiff admitted that Green had been in Plaintiff’s office the entire time. (SSF Nos. 54-56.) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF No. 56, the evidence he cites does not create any dispute to SSF No. 56 as stated. Instead, Plaintiff’s evidence suggests only that, despite his direct instructions that Green not attend the Meeting, Plaintiff believed that Green’s attendance would be beneficial.

Because Plaintiff had failed to follow a direct order from his supervisor that Green not attend the meeting and then lied about it until shown proof (the reflection screenshot) that Green had attended the meeting, Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation of the incident. (SSF Nos. 57-62.) Again, although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 57 and 59-62, the evidence he cites, if credited, consists of an argument that he reasonably believed Green’s attendance at the Meeting was beneficial and he doesn’t believe he did anything wrong.

During the investigation, Plaintiff admitted he asked Green to attend the Meeting from Plaintiff’s office despite clear instructions from his supervisor that no one else should be present at the meeting. (SSF No. 64.) Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in January 2024. (SSF No. 68.)

As to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Labor Code § 1102.5 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for sharing information that the employee reasonably believes discloses a violation of a federal, state, or local statute, rule, or regulation with government agency, a person with authority over the employee, or with another employee who has the authority to investigate or correct the violation. (Id.; see also Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709.) A plaintiff bringing this claim must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected conduct was a contributing factor to an adverse employment action. (Id. at 712.)

If the plaintiff does so, the employer bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the alleged adverse employment action would have occurred for a legitimate, independent reason even if the employee had not engaged in the protected conduct. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence establishing that he engaged in conduct protected by Labor Code § 1102.5. The First Cause of Action, as pled, identifies Plaintiff’s protected activity as (1) attending the Meeting, and (2) complaining to Defendant’s executives management team about executives “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously and instead using the Teams Conference as a ‘safe space’ to ridicule and mock other employees.” (See First Amended

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV073780: REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 752227967641 in Department 19 Complaint, paragraphs 28-29.) Plaintiff’s attendance at the Meeting was not a disclosure of a violation of a federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or rule to a government agency or employee with the authority to investigate or correct the (non-existent) violation. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to identify any federal, state, or local statute, regulation or rule that he reasonably believed Defendant violated by “failing to take [the Meeting] seriously”.

Nor, for that matter, does Plaintiff submit any evidence that he made that complaint to government agency or to an employee with the authority to investigate or correct it. (See SSF No. 66.) Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF No. 66, the evidence he cites in his response to SSF No. 66 does not address whether, or suggest that, he complained about that issue to his supervisor Crawley.

In his opposition brief, Plaintiff identifies his protected activity as a series of emails in 2023 that he characterizes as regarding various safety concerns. (See Plaintiff’s Additional Facts Nos. 86- 95.) But Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he reasonably believed any of those emails disclosed a violation of a federal, state, or local statute, regulation, or rule. The Court also observes that Plaintiff cites three cases (on page 17 of his opposition brief) in support of his contention that he engaged in protected activity under Labor Code § 1102.5, but two of those cases (Franklin and Cabesuela) did not involve a claim for violation of § 1102.5, and the third case (St. Myers) did not address whether plaintiff had engaged in protected activity within the meaning of § 1102.5.

Because Plaintiff has not submitted evidence creating a triable issue of material fact as to whether he engaged in protected activity within the scope of Labor Code § 1102.5, he necessarily has not demonstrated that his (non-existent) protected conduct was a contributing factor in his termination. But even if Plaintiff had submitted any such evidence, Defendant’s evidence establishes that it would have taken the same action for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons whether or not Plaintiff engaged in that conduct. (See SSF Nos. 60-71; see also Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 712.)

Although Plaintiff purports to dispute SSF Nos. 60-62, 66, and 69-71, the evidence he cites does not create any dispute to those SSF as stated. Instead, Plaintiff offers evidence that (1) he thought Green’s attendance at the Meeting would be beneficial; (2) Green denies having disclosed any confidential information; and (3) Plaintiff doesn’t believe he did anything wrong in asking Green to attend the Meeting, despite direct instructions from his supervisor that Green was prohibited from attending the Meeting. Plaintiff’s evidence does not conflict with Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s termination, i.e., that he ignored a direct order from his supervisor by allowing Green to secretly attend the Meeting at which confidential information was to be discussed, and then lied about it afterwards. (SSF Nos. 69-71.)

Plaintiff also cites the deposition testimony by Defendant’s former Human Resources Director Janis Picket-Lacy that, in retrospect, she has conflicting thoughts about whether Plaintiff should have been terminated for his actions at the Meeting, but that if the individuals who had been fired for falsified overtime documents were later reinstated, Plaintiff should have been as well. (See Picket-Lacy’s deposition at pages 50-52.) Picket-Lacy’s retrospective opinion on whether Plaintiff should have been reinstated to his position if other employees were reinstated does not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV073780: REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 752227967641 in Department 19 call into question Defendant’s evidence that its decision makers would have terminated Plaintiff’s employment for his actions at the Meeting regardless of any protected conduct in which he allegedly engaged.

As to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of Labor Code § 6310, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Labor Code § 6310 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has made a bona fide complaint to a government agency having statutory responsibility for employee safety or health, or to the employer or its representative, or who has participated in an occupational health and safety committee established pursuant to Labor Code § 6401.7.

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action fails for the same reason as his First Cause of Action. The Second Cause of Action, as pled, alleges that Defendant violated Labor Code § 6310 by retaliating against Plaintiff for (1) attending the Meeting, and (2) complaining to Defendant’s executive management team about executives “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously and instead using the Teams Conference as a ‘safe space’ to ridicule and mock other employees.” (First Amended Complaint, paragraphs 36-37.)

The undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff was not terminated for attending the Meeting himself; he was terminated for asking Green to secretly attend the Meeting, after being explicitly told that Green was not to attend the Meeting, and then lying about it afterwards. (SSF Nos. 60- 71.)

Plaintiff fails to present any legal authority supporting a contention that instructing a subordinate employee to attend a safety meeting after being expressly told the employee was not permitted to attend, and then lying about it afterwards, is conduct that implicates Labor Code § 6310. In addition, Plaintiff fails to present any legal authority that an alleged complaint that Defendant’s executives were “not taking the threat assessment meeting seriously” is conduct implicated by Labor Code § 6310, if indeed Plaintiff made any such complaint. (See SSF No. 66, that Plaintiff did not make any such complaint to Defendant; Plaintiff’s response to SSF No. 66 does not cite any evidence supporting his purported dispute.)

To the extent that Plaintiff now contends that his Second Cause of Action is based on the series of emails in 2023 that he characterizes as regarding various safety and security concerns (see Plaintiff’s Additional Facts Nos. 86-95), Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence that he was terminated for sending those emails. To the contrary, as discussed above, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff was terminated for instructing Green to attend the Meeting after being expressly told Green was not permitted to attend, and then lying about it afterwards. That does not constitute protected conduct under § 6310.

As to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is based on the same

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV073780: REYES vs ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (Defendant) CRS# 752227967641 in Department 19 conduct as his First and Second Causes of Action and fails for the same reason. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is based on Defendant’s personnel management decision to terminate him for asking Green to secretly attend the Meeting, despite an express instruction from his supervisor that Green not attend the Meeting, and then lying about it afterwards. As a matter of law, personnel management decisions cannot support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if undertaken for an improper motive. (See, e.g., Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 946.)

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for the reasons above.

In reviewing this motion, the Court did not read or consider Defendant’s (1) evidence submitted with reply papers or (2) response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement. Those filings are prohibited by Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4). The cases Defendant cites in its uninvited “Response to Plaintiff Robert Reyes’ Objections to Evidence Filed in Support of Defendant’s Reply” predate the 2024 amendment to § 437c(b)(4).

In addition, the Court did not read or consider Defendant’s 12 page “Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to Documentary Evidence”. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure or the California Rules of Court authorizes that filing.

The Court rules as follows on Defendant’s Objections to Evidence:

Objections Nos. 1, 3-11, 13, 15, 17-18, and 21 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. Defendant fails to adequately explain why the difference between “paid administrative leave” and “suspension” has any significant effect on the import of this testimony.

Objection No. 2 is SUSTAINED as contradicting the declarant’s prior deposition testimony.

Objections Nos. 12 and 14 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

Objections Nos. 16, 19-20, and 22-27 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

The Court rules as follows on Plaintiff’s Objections to Evidence:

Objection No. 1 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. The testimony does not appear to be offered to prove whether Green disclosed confidential information, but rather to show Defendant’s motivation of Defendant’s managers in deciding that Green should not attend the November 16, 2023 meeting.

Objections Nos. 2-6 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted.

This entire action is DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.