RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al.

1. “Cunt”

In approximately 2015-2016, Wang and Alvir were having a one-on-one conversation regarding Wang’s complaints about working with McKinnon. Wang’s team supported McKinnon’s business. (Id. at 13:10-11, 82:15-17.) Wang characterized McKinnon as having “a strong personality” and added that she “was challenging to work with and [that her] team felt the brunt of that for sure.” (D. Wang Decl. Ex. 7 (J. Wang Depo.) at 13:10-14.) During the course of their conversation, Alvir referred to McKinnon as a “cunt.” (Id. at 6:17-9:1.)

Wang said she never heard Ashwin use the word “cunt.” (Id. at 67:4-6.)

2. “Bitch”

With regard to McKinnon, Wang again explained that she had complained about how McKinnon was treating her employees. (Wang Depo. at 69:17-24.) Wang testified that she had tried “multiple things in terms of switching up support,” had “connected with her manager and nothing has been done about her behavior.” (Id. at 73:11-25.) She ultimately went to “the brothers,” i.e., Ashwin and Alvir, to tell them she had “tried everything and nothing has been moving the needle” and expressed concern that she was going to “lose people.” (Ibid.)

It was in the context of those escalating complaints that Wang heard Ashwin and Alvir use the term “bitch” to describe McKinnon on multiple occasions. (Id. at 69:17-24, 73:3-25, 76:1-4.) As to McCullough, she was hired as office manager in the New York office after McKinnon departed. Wang heard Alvir use the term “bitch” to describe McCullough approximately five times around 2019. The context was McCullough pushing back on directives from leadership. (Id. at 74:4-76:1.)

Wang never heard Ashwin use the term “bitch” in reference to McCullough (Id. at 75:21-23.)

3. Ruling

The Court excluded Wang’s testimony on two independent grounds. (8/17/2025 MIL Order at 4- 6.) First, the Court found the testimony was not probative of discriminatory animus toward women generally, because the record showed that Ashwin and Alvir used one or both of the subject terms solely in response to the specific workplace conduct of McKinnon and McCullough, and that Wang herself confirmed the terms were used only “in the workplace

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 capacity.” The Court distinguished Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, where “stupid bitch” was accompanied by physical touching and other overtly discriminatory conduct.

Second, and in the alternative, the Court excluded the testimony under Evidence Code section 352, finding that the extremely offensive nature of the language created a substantial risk the jury would penalize Samba based on the language alone rather than on the merits, particularly given that the utterances predated Plaintiff’s arrival at Samba and were directed at two specific individuals for reasons wholly unrelated to gender. The Court further found that admission would require a mini-trial on McKinnon and McCullough’s employment histories, constituting undue consumption of trial time.

C. Trial and the Instant Motion

The case proceeded to jury trial beginning March 16, 2026. On March 30, 2026, the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The jury found that Samba discharged Ranson but answered “No” to the question whether Ranson’s gender and/or pregnancy was a substantial motivating reason for her discharge (by a 9-3 vote) and “No” to the wrongful termination question. Judgment was entered for Defendant on April 10, 2026.

Plaintiff has now filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657. She argues that the Court erred in excluding testimony that the Ashwin and Alvir used derogatory terms in discussing two other female employees, years prior to Plaintiff’s hiring. Plaintiff further contends the Court applied an asymmetric evidentiary standard by simultaneously admitting four defense “not me too” witnesses whose testimony lacked personal knowledge of Plaintiff's treatment, skewing the record in a manner those same cases held prejudicial as a matter of law. The resulting defense verdict on a 9-3 special verdict split, combined with the forced dismissal of the harassment claim, demonstrates a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent the error.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, a new trial may be granted on the grounds of, among others: (1) “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial”; and (7) “[e]rror in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(1), (7).).

Where the claimed error is, as here, an evidentiary ruling, the moving party must establish both error and prejudice. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the moving party would have been reached absent the error. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800-802.)

The thirteenth juror doctrine governs how the trial court evaluates the above showing. On a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 motion for new trial, the trial court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and independently weighs the evidence. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250.) Critically, this role is not constrained by the abuse-of-discretion standard that governs appellate review of evidentiary rulings. (Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405, 412.)

That standard measures whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it made the original ruling. (Hernandez v. Amcord, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 659, 678.) The thirteenth juror doctrine is a different and broader authority: it permits the trial court to reconsider its pretrial rulings in light of how the trial actually unfolded; assess whether those rulings produced a structurally incomplete evidentiary record; and grant relief in the interest of justice even without finding that the original ruling was arbitrary or capricious. (Lane v.

Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405, 412.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Exclusion of Testimony Regarding the Subject Terms Was a Proper Exercise of Discretion

Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the Court erred in excluding Wang’s testimony that Samba executives Ashwin and Alvir used slurs (specifically, “bitch” and “cunt”) when referring to two specific employees, McKinnon and McCullough. Plaintiff contends this evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) to prove discriminatory intent, and that the Court’s section 352 analysis was flawed.[1]

1. Plaintiff’s Cases are Inapt

In support of her motion for new trial, Plaintiff relies primarily on Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87 and Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, to argue the Court applied the wrong analytical framework when excluding the subject evidence. As discussed in more detail below, those cases are distinguishable and Plaintiff’s reliance on and analysis of them is misplaced.

In Johnson, the plaintiff, a former employee, alleged she was terminated on account of her pregnancy in violation of FEHA. In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted declarations from former employees who stated they were also fired after disclosing their pregnancies to the same supervisors at the same facility. (Johnson, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 759-760.) The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, implicitly finding that the declarations were insufficient to avoid summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the declarations presented factual scenarios “sufficiently similar to the one presented by the plaintiff concerning her own discharge,” and their probative value “clearly outweigh[ed] any prejudice,” the evidence was “per se admissible under both relevance and Evidence Code section 352 standards.” (Id. at p. 767.) Here, Plaintiff seizes upon the “per se admissible” language as establishing a categorical rule that me-too evidence can never be excluded under section 352, and that this Court therefore erred as a matter of law in excluding

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 Wang’s testimony about the subject terms. That reading of Johnson is mistaken for two independent reasons.

First, the “per se admissible” language in Johnson is tied to the specific facts presented in that case, and is not a general rule that forecloses section 352 balancing at trial. The Johnson court reached that conclusion because it deemed the me-too declarations presented factual scenarios “sufficiently similar to the one presented by the plaintiff concerning her own discharge,” and their probative value “clearly outweigh[ed] any prejudice that would be suffered by defendant by [their] admission.” (Ibid.)

In other words, the court’s “per se” conclusion was based on a section 352 balancing on those particular facts, not a holding that such balancing is foreclosed in me-too cases generally. Moreover, Johnson also arose in the summary judgment context, where all reasonable inferences run in the nonmoving party’s favor, which is a materially different standard than the one governing evidentiary rulings at trial. (Id. at p. 746.) A trial court that conducts the same section 352 balancing and reaches a different result on different facts has not violated Johnson.

To the contrary, the Court has followed its teaching.

Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the factual predicate that made the Johnson evidence per se admissible is entirely absent here. In Johnson, the excluded declarations came from employees who were fired after disclosing their pregnancies to the same supervisors, at the same facility, during the same period. (Id. at pp. 759-760.) Importantly, the court emphasized the scenarios presented in the declarations were direct and virtually identical to the discrimination experienced by the plaintiff.

Here, by contrast, the excluded evidence involved derogatory terms directed at two specific employees for reasons specific to their individual workplace conduct in a different office, none of which bore any resemblance to Plaintiff's termination. Wang herself confirmed the terms were used solely “in the workplace capacity” and in response to the conduct of McKinnon and McCullough specifically. The utterances preceded Plaintiff's arrival at Samba entirely, were made to a single third-party witness, and required a significantly attenuated inferential chain to connect them to Plaintiff’s termination.

The Court's section 352 balancing appropriately accounted for those differences.

Plaintiff’s reading of Johnson also cannot be reconciled with Meeks, decided nine years later. In Meeks, a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment sought to introduce testimony from other female employees that the same alleged harasser had subjected them to similar misconduct outside the plaintiff's presence. (Meeks, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 869-871.) The trial court excluded the evidence, and the Court of Appeal reversed, reaffirming in the process that me-too evidence “is ‘neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible,’ and instead ‘requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry.’” (Id. at p. 871, quoting Sprint/United Mgmt.

Co. v. Mendelsohn (2008) 552 U.S. 379, 381.) If Johnson had established the categorical rule Plaintiff ascribes to it, Meeks would have had no occasion to engage in an extended section 352 analysis at all. Plaintiff cannot simultaneously invoke Johnson for a per se admissibility rule and cite Meeks, which recites precisely the opposite.

Equally misguided is Plaintiff’s reliance on Pantoja for the proposition that a trial court’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 exclusion of Wang’s testimony regarding use of the subject terms directed at other employees is prejudicial error requiring a new trial. In Pantoja, the plaintiff alleged that her employer, attorney Thomas Anton, repeatedly called her a “stupid bitch,” a “fucking bitch,” and a “cunt” in the workplace; slapped and touched her buttocks on multiple occasions; rubbed her thigh while offering her $200 during a car trip; asked her for a shoulder massage; and ultimately fired her. (Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100-102.)

The plaintiff sought to introduce me-too evidence consisting of testimony from multiple former employees that Anton engaged in the same type of conduct toward other women. Specifically, the proffered witnesses would have testified that Anton repeatedly touched female employees on their buttocks, thighs, and underwear; leered at female employees; made comments about female employees’ breast sizes; called female employees “bitch” and “fucking bitch” both in person and in voicemails; and grabbed a departing employee by the arm. (Id. at pp. 97-99.) The trial court excluded this evidence, reasoning that the evidence was admissible only if Pantoja “personally witnessed such acts” or it otherwise affected her work environment. (Id. at pp. 93-94.) Because the trial court excluded the evidence on that categorical ground, it never engaged in any factspecific balancing under section 352.

The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds that the trial court erred in concluding that me-too evidence is admissible only if it occurred in the plaintiff’s presence or otherwise affected her working environment. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that the trial court had misread Beyda v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511 as establishing a categorical rule of exclusion. Beyda addressed only whether me-too evidence was relevant to prove that the plaintiff herself experienced a hostile environment, a theory under which the plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the conduct is necessarily required.

Beyda did not address admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101(b) to prove the defendant’s discriminatory intent or bias. Under that theory, the court explained, me-too evidence is admissible regardless of whether the plaintiff was present or aware of it, because its relevance goes to the defendant’s state of mind, not to the plaintiff's subjective experience. (Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 110-112.) The Pantoja court conducted its own section 352 balancing, and concluded that the probative value of the proffered evidence was unquestionable given how closely it mirrored the plaintiff’s own allegations, and that any risk of prejudice could be cured with a limiting instruction. (Id. at p. 118.)

Pantoja does not help Plaintiff. The trial court in Pantoja never reached section 352 balancing at all. Rather, it categorically excluded the evidence based on an incorrect legal ground, which is what compelled reversal. That is not this case. This Court applied the correct legal framework; conducted the fact-specific section 352 analysis that Pantoja contemplates; and exercised its discretion to exclude evidence whose connection to Plaintiff’s claims was attenuated at best. Moreover, the me-too evidence in Pantoja bore a close and direct resemblance to the conduct the plaintiff herself alleged, consisting of the same pattern of physical touching and gender-directed verbal abuse aimed at women generally.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 In sharp contrast, the limited exclusion of Wang testimony involved isolated uses of derogatory terms directed at two specific employees in response to their specific workplace conduct, which Wang herself confirmed occurred solely in a workplace context and for reasons having nothing to do with gender bias generally.

Where the Pantoja appellate panel found probative value to be unquestionable, this Court found the opposite on materially different facts. Pantoja does not show that this Court erred; it shows that this Court did exactly what the law requires. Following the framework set forth in Johnson and Pantoja, the Court admitted substantial me-too evidence from Wang, Leah Whitehill, and Amie Anderson. The Court separately excluded Wang’s testimony regarding the subject terms after conducting an individualized section 352 analysis.

The Court is aware that the Pantoja court conducted its own section 352 analysis and affirmatively found the probative value of the slur evidence “unquestionable,” observing that “bitch” is “not a neutral word” and is inherently probative of gender bias. (Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 117-120.) That assessment, however, was based on the specific facts presented. There, the evidence involved the same terms used as part of a pervasive pattern that included physical groping, leering, and sexually charged physical contact directed at women as a class.

As such, the appellate court concluded that such conduct was the type from which discriminatory intent could be directly inferred.

Here, the terms were used in isolated workplace disputes about specific employees, years before Plaintiff’s hire, without any accompanying physical conduct or broader pattern of gender-based mistreatment directed at women generally. Indeed, as the California Supreme Court has observed, while the term “bitch” especially stings when directed at a woman, “it has been cautioned the term ‘bitch’ is not so sex-specific and derogatory that its mere use necessarily constitutes harassment because of sex.” (Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 282.) The contextual differences consist of isolated uses, temporal remoteness, workplace-specific provocation, and the absence of any physical component. Accordingly, the probative value that was “unquestionable” in Pantoja is undeniably absent from the facts of this case.

The common thread in Johnson, Pantoja, and Meeks is that each trial court failed to engage in the individualized, context-specific analysis that section 352 requires, either by applying a categorical exclusion rule or by failing to conduct any meaningful balancing at all. This Court did precisely what those cases require. Specifically, the Court acknowledged that me-too evidence may be admissible; assessed the particular evidence offered; and made a reasoned determination that Wang’s testimony regarding the subject terms had limited probative value that was substantially outweighed by the risks of prejudice and confusion. Plaintiff’s contention that the Court should construe those decisions as establishing that the subject terms are always admissible, irrespective of context, remoteness, or the risk of prejudice, is untenable and unsupported by any controlling authority.

Moreover, despite Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, the case law does not support the notion that there is a presumption in favor of admitting me-too evidence. In Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, the Court of Appeal reversed a plaintiff’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 verdict because the trial court improperly admitted overly broad me-too evidence. The court held that admissibility of such evidence “is ‘fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.’ ” (Pinter- Brown, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 97.)

Me-too evidence must present “factual scenarios ... sufficiently similar” to the plaintiff’s claims and “is never admissible to prove an employer’s propensity to harass.” (Id. at pp. 96-98.) In Pinter-Brown, the improperly admitted evidence consisted of a report on racial discrimination across the UCLA campus, which was outside the plaintiff’s protected class, and 198 DFEH complaints filed against the entire University of California system, with no evidence connecting those complaints to the plaintiff’s circumstances. (Id. at pp. 96-98.)

The court found this evidence “served only to convince the jury that the medical school had a propensity to harass.” (Id. at p. 97.)

Pinter-Brown illustrates the gatekeeping function a trial court must perform before admitting metoo evidence. The reversal in that case was compelled not because the trial court admitted me-too evidence, but because it admitted me-too evidence without ensuring the required factual nexus to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case. The evidence at issue in this case consisted of terms directed at specific individuals in specific workplace disputes, years before Ranson’s hiring, by executives whose comments about those particular employees reflected specific workplace issues in the New York office rather than a pattern of conduct directed at women as a class. The evidence did not present the kind of “sufficiently similar” factual scenario Pinter- Brown requires. The Court’s section 352 exclusion reflected precisely that gatekeeping function, and the exclusion was correct.

2. The Court Properly Applied Evidence Code section 352

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Court misapplied Evidence Code section 352. A trial court’s ruling under section 352 “will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) That standard is not met here. The Court considered the nature of the terms, the context in which they were used, their temporal remoteness, and their limited probative value as to Ranson’s specific claims, and balanced those factors against the risks of undue prejudice and confusion. This was a reasonable exercise of discretion.

Plaintiff argues the Court should not have excluded the disputed evidence entirely and instead should have considered less drastic alternatives available, such as a limiting instruction, restrictions on cross-examination, or testimony in summary form. The Court considered the nature of the evidence and concluded that the risks of prejudice and jury confusion could not be adequately mitigated by less restrictive measures. The terms “bitch” and “cunt” are inherently inflammatory. A limiting instruction directing jurors to consider them only for the purpose of showing intent, while disregarding their emotional impact, would have asked the jury to do something that is, as a practical matter, exceedingly difficult. The Court’s assessment that admission of this evidence would result in a 'trial within a trial' on the circumstances surrounding

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 the use of these terms, such as the employment histories and workplace disputes involving Mckinnon and Mccullough, was well-founded. Weighing these considerations, the Court was well within its discretion to exclude the evidence.

Plaintiff relies on Pantoja for the proposition that “a limiting instruction could have mitigated this risk sufficiently.” (Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 120.) But that observation was made in the context of evidence the Pantoja court found had “unquestionable” probative value. In that case, the defendant attorney had physically groped women, leered at employees, pulled underwear elastic to read labels, and used slurs as part of a pervasive pattern of both verbal and physical conduct directed at women as a class. (Id. at pp. 93-95, 117-120.)

Where, as here, the Court found the evidence had extremely limited probative value as to Ranson’s specific claims, the calculus is fundamentally different. A limiting instruction is not a panacea and is simply a factor the Court may consider in the section 352 analysis. The Court did so and reasonably concluded that a limiting instruction alone would have been inappropriate under the circumstances presented.

Plaintiff’s contention that the Court confused probative value with “undue prejudice” under section 352 is not persuasive. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the section 352 analysis. The Court’s analysis correctly assessed the limited probative value of terms directed at specific individuals in specific contexts as evidence of generalized discriminatory intent, and weighed that limited probative value against the substantial risk that the jury would use inflammatory language for an improper purpose. This is precisely the analysis section 352 requires.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s reliance on Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 is unavailing. In Reid, the California Supreme Court held that courts should not adopt the federal “stray remarks doctrine,” under which discriminatory statements by non-decision-makers or by decision-makers outside the decisional process are categorically deemed irrelevant at summary judgment. (Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 538-542.) The Court rejected such categorical exclusion, holding that discriminatory remarks “may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination” and must be considered along with all other evidence in the record. (Id. at p. 539.)

Reid is inapposite for at least two reasons. First, Reid was decided under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, which governs summary judgment motions and is not germane to the determination of the admission of evidence at trial under Evidence Code section 352. Summary judgment motions require the court to draw reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, while section 352 requires an individualized balancing of probative value against the danger of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time.

Second, this Court did not exclude the subject terms by applying any categorical rule of the kind Reid forbids. Rather, the Court engaged in an individualized section 352 analysis, weighing the specific probative value of specific evidence against the specific dangers of undue prejudice and confusion. That is precisely the evidencespecific inquiry that Reid contemplates when it rejects categorical rules in favor of case-by-case assessment.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517

Plaintiff attempts to frame the issue as what “vocabulary the decision-makers reached for when frustrated with female employees,” pointing out that because Wang never heard equivalent terms used for men, the allegedly gendered nature of the subject terms is itself compelling circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus. The Court considered the nature of the subject terms. The fact remains that they were used in specific workplace disputes about specific individuals. Alvir used “cunt” once regarding McKinnon in approximately 2015 or 2016, which is five to six years before Plaintiff was hired.

The utterance was made during a discussion about McKinnon’s workplace conduct. Wang did not hear Alvir use that term. Similarly, the “bitch” references made about McKinnon and McCullough arose during conversations with Wang about the work culture in the New York office. The subject terms were not used as a matter of course to describe female employees generally. That the terms could be associated with gender does not, without more, transform them into evidence of generalized gender animus sufficient to overcome a section 352 objection, particularly when they are temporally remote from Plaintiff’s claims and directed at individuals unrelated to her employment.

In her reply, Plaintiff argues that the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply when a court reconsiders its own rulings under section 657. The argument overstates the point. As stated above, on a motion for new trial, the Court exercises independent judgment broader than appellate review, sitting as a thirteenth juror. (Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1260-1261.) But that broader authority does not relieve the moving party of the obligation to demonstrate both error and prejudice. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 800-802.) In any event, the Court has now reconsidered its ruling in light of the full trial record. Having done so, the Court reaffirms its ruling. The evidentiary exclusion was sound when made and remains sound in light of how the trial unfolded.

B. Admission of “Not Me Too” Defense Witnesses Was Proper

Plaintiff argues the Court inconsistently applied section 352 by admitting testimony from four defense witnesses (Jaya Aswani, Saira Syed Janesek, Alyson Sprague, and Sanghita Majumder). Each of these women either were mothers or were pregnant at some point during their employment with Samba, worked with or reported to Ashwin and Alvir, and found the company to be supportive of their desire to have a family. Plaintiff contends such testimony created an asymmetry that unfairly advantaged the defense.

The MIL Order addressed this evidence and found it probative to rebut Plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory intent. (8/17/25 MIL Order.) The Court conducted a section 352 analysis and found the probative value was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. (Ibid.) Evidence that a defendant treated other employees fairly is relevant under section 1101, subdivision (b) to rebut a plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory motive. (See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 767-768.) The admission of this evidence was within the Court’s discretion.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 Plaintiff’s contention that the Court should have excluded this evidence because it excluded the subject terms does not establish error. The two categories of evidence presented different probative values and different risks of prejudice. The “not me too” evidence showing that certain employees were treated fairly carried minimal risk of inflaming the jury or causing confusion. The subject terms, by contrast, presented substantial risks of undue prejudice and jury confusion. The section 352 balancing necessarily differs for evidence with different characteristics.

In her reply, Plaintiff contends that the Court’s me-too evidence (which she characterizes as “decision-maker intent evidence”) and Samba’s “not me too” evidence (which she characterizes as “character evidence”) are “categorically different” and that applying the same section 352 analysis to both “does not produce balance” but “produces distortion.” The characterization is inapt. The “not me too” witnesses did not testify to Samba’s general corporate character. They testified about their own experiences, as mothers and pregnant employees, working with the same decision-makers Ranson accuses of discrimination, which is precisely the type of evidence Johnson itself recognized as relevant under section 1101(b) to rebut allegations of discriminatory motive. (Johnson, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767-768.)

The section 352 analysis necessarily differs for evidence that carries different risks of prejudice. Evidence that employees were treated fairly does not inflame or confuse a jury. Evidence containing the words “bitch” and “cunt” carries a substantial risk of both. That the Court applied the same legal standard and reached different results for different evidence is not “distortion.” It is what section 352 requires.

C. The Juror Declarations Do Not Establish Grounds for a New Trial

Plaintiff submitted declarations from jurors Hugh Bartlett and James Bulman, both of whom state that the initial vote on whether Ranson’s gender or pregnancy was a substantial motivating reason for her discharge was 7-4-1 (seven for the defense, four for the plaintiff, and one undecided). (Bartlett Decl. ¶ 4; Bulman Decl. ¶ 4.) Ranson contends this shows the case was “close” and supports a finding of prejudice.

Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides that evidence may be received as to “statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.” However, “[n]o evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.” (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)

To the extent the declarations establish an initial vote count of 7-4-1, they describe overt conduct within the jury room and are admissible under section 1150. (See Bell v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124-1125.) The Court accepts that fact.

However, the initial vote count does not establish prejudice from the evidentiary ruling. That four jurors initially favored the plaintiff does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the excluded evidence would have changed the outcome. The jury deliberated and reached a 9-3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 verdict for the defense--the minimum required under Code of Civil Procedure section 618. The progression from an initial 7-4-1 to a final 9-3 verdict reflects that deliberation moved votes toward the defense, not away from it. If the excluded evidence was as powerful as Plaintiff contends, one would expect deliberation to move votes toward the plaintiff, not away from her.

Moreover, the juror declarations do not and cannot speak to the jurors’ reasoning or what evidence they found persuasive. (Evid. Code, § 1150(a); Bell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1124-1125 [“juror declarations are inadmissible to the extent that they purport to describe the jurors’ understanding of the instructions or how they arrived at their verdict”].) The declarations provide no basis to conclude that the excluded subject terms would have altered the verdict.

The 9-3 split on Question 2 does not reveal whether the three dissenting jurors would have found gender discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, or both. The verdict form asked whether “gender and/or pregnancy” was a substantial motivating reason. The split may reflect disagreement about the pregnancy claim rather than any issue related to the excluded testimony regarding the subject terms. That ambiguity further undermines any inference that the excluded evidence would have altered the outcome.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s speculation about the 9-3 verdict undermines its own position: to wit, if the three dissenting jurors voted on the pregnancy theory rather than the broader gender discrimination theory, Defendant implicitly concedes the gender prong was weakly supported, and the excluded testimony would have informed that very prong. The argument is clever but ultimately uncompelling.

Indeed, the inference cuts the other way. If the three dissenting jurors were focused on pregnancy discrimination, that means the evidence already before the jury, without Wang’s testimony regarding the subject terms, was sufficient to generate meaningful dissent. Plaintiff’s theory requires the Court to take a further speculative step in that jurors who may have been persuaded by the pregnancy evidence would have been additionally persuaded by evidence of the subject terms directed at other employees years before Plaintiff was hired. One speculation does not build a bridge to another. That chain of conjecture falls short of demonstrating a “reasonable probability” of a more favorable outcome. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.)

D. Ranson Has Not Demonstrated Prejudice

Even assuming error in any of the Court’s evidentiary rulings, Plaintiff has not demonstrated prejudice. Under the Watson standard applicable to state evidentiary error, the moving party must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached absent the error. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800.)

As a threshold matter, the Court reiterates that Plaintiff has not demonstrated error in the Court’s evidentiary rulings, as discussed in Sections A and B above. The prejudice analysis that follows

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 is addressed in the alternative.

The excluded evidence consisted of testimony by a single witness (Wang) about terms used by the Navin brothers regarding two specific employees (McKinnon and McCullough) in the context of workplace frustrations, years before Ranson was hired. Even had this testimony been admitted, the jury still would have heard—and did hear—other evidence bearing on discriminatory intent, including Wang’s me-too testimony about her termination after maternity leave, testimony from Whitehill and Anderson, and the full factual record regarding Ranson’s placement on the MiQ ship list. The jury nonetheless found that gender and pregnancy were not substantial motivating reasons for Ranson’s discharge.

Moreover, acting as the “thirteenth juror,” the Court independently assesses witness credibility. The Court found Wang’s testimony to lack credibility in critically material respects. Wang claimed she could not recall whether she received a severance payment from Samba, despite the payment being substantial in amount. The Court finds it not credible that Wang would have no recollection of receiving a significant severance. Beyond this specific discrepancy, the Court observed Wang’s demeanor and bearing throughout her testimony.

Wang’s presentation reflected personal animus toward her former employer stemming from having been ranked the worst performer and from her own separation from the company. Her testimony was tainted by her resentment over her own termination rather than a disinterested reporter of events. Under Evidence Code section 780(f), a witness’s bias, interest, or other motive is a proper consideration in evaluating credibility. The Court finds that Wang’s evident bitterness about her departure from Samba colored her testimony and diminished the weight the Court assigns to her account of the subject terms.

This credibility finding further undermines any claim of prejudice. Thus, even had the excluded testimony been admitted, it would have come from a witness whose credibility the Court finds to be underwhelming and problematic.

More broadly, having independently reweighed the evidence, the Court finds that the evidence that gender or pregnancy (as opposed to business reasons attendant to the MiQ acquisition of Defendant’s business unit) motivated Plaintiff’s placement on the ship list was objectively uncompelling. The record at trial established that Defendant was negotiating the sale of its Managed Business Services unit. In that transaction, 47 male and female employees were identified for transfer to MiQ. Indeed, MiQ itself requested Plaintiff’s inclusion on the ship list because MiQ valued her skills. Against this record, Plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory motive, even with the admitted me-too testimony from Wang, Whitehill, and Anderson, did not persuasively establish that her pregnancy or gender played a substantial motivating role in the decision to include her on the ship list.

The jury heard Wang testify about her own termination after maternity leave; Whitehill testify about being placed on the ship list during maternity leave and a “broey” culture; and Anderson testify about being placed on the ship list during her maternity leave. This testimony was before the jury and it did not persuade nine of twelve jurors. The additional testimony that Ashwin and Alvir used one or both the subject terms about two other employees in isolated workplace

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 disputes, years before Plaintiff’s employment, would not, in the Court’s independent assessment, have altered this outcome.

Ranson’s reliance on Pantoja and Johnson for the prejudice analysis is misplaced. Johnson reversed a summary judgment, not a trial verdict. The prejudice analysis at summary judgment is qualitatively different because the question is whether evidence raises a triable issue, not whether a verdict was affected by its exclusion. In both Pantoja and Meeks, the appellate courts found prejudice in the context of wholesale evidentiary exclusions based on categorical legal errors in the form of per se rules employed by the trial court that excluded entire categories of evidence under an incorrect legal standard. (Meeks, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 878–879; Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 114–115.)

Those courts found the resulting evidentiary picture was “skewed” precisely because the trial courts’ categorical approach prevented the jury from hearing any of the plaintiff’s me-too evidence of the harasser’s conduct.

E. The Exclusion Did Not Improperly Force Dismissal of the Harassment Claim

Plaintiff argues that the exclusion of the subject terms “forced” dismissal of her harassment cause of action. This contention lacks merit. Even accepting that the exclusion narrowed the evidence available for the harassment claim, the claim required that Ranson herself was subjected to or personally witnessed the harassing conduct. (See Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608-609.) Wang’s testimony concerned subject terms made years before Ranson’s employment, outside Ranson’s presence, and directed at other employees. As to the hostile-environment element, the exclusion of this evidence did not deprive Plaintiff of the ability to present a harassment claim based on conduct she personally experienced or witnessed.

Relying on Pantoja, Plaintiff argues in her reply that the Court’s analysis “confuses elements with evidence.” (Pl.’s Reply at 5.) She contends that even if the testimony regarding the subject terms could not satisfy the hostile-environment element (because it occurred outside her presence), it was independently admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) to prove the decision-makers’ discriminatory intent, which is a separate element of the harassment claim. Pantoja distinguished Beyda on this ground, holding that Beyda addressed only the hostileenvironment theory and did not foreclose admissibility of me-too evidence under section 1101(b) to prove intent. That distinction, however, does not advance Plaintiff’s position.

The theory of admissibility under which evidence is offered does not insulate it from Evidence Code section 352 balancing. Whether the subject terms are characterized as relevant to the hostile-environment element or to discriminatory intent under section 1101(b), the Court’s section 352 analysis applies with equal force. The same factors that warranted exclusion (namely, the temporal remoteness of the subject terms, their occurrence in isolated workplace disputes directed at specific employees, their attenuated connection to Plaintiff’s claims, and the substantial risk of undue prejudice) are not diminished by attempted recasting of the evidence as intent evidence rather than environment evidence. The Court’s section 352 analysis, discussed at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 length in Section III.A above, governs regardless of the admissibility theory invoked. Moreover, the harassment claim required Plaintiff to prove not only discriminatory intent but also that she was subjected to conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. (Gov. Code § 12940; CACI No. 2521A.)

Even had Wang’s testimony regarding the subject terms been admitted for the limited purpose of proving intent, Plaintiff still would have needed to establish that she personally experienced or witnessed harassing conduct of sufficient severity or pervasiveness. Plaintiff identified no such evidence independent of the excluded subject terms. The dismissal of the harassment claim was not the product of an evidentiary ruling that deprived Plaintiff of her only viable theory. Rather, it reflected the absence of evidence on an independent and essential element of the claim that the excluded evidence could not have supplied.

F. The Interest of Justice Does Not Warrant a New Trial

Plaintiff’s invocation of the interest of justice does not warrant a different result. Having independently reweighed the evidence as the “thirteenth juror,” the Court is satisfied that the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence. The jury heard substantial evidence from both sides on the question of discriminatory intent, including me-too testimony from Wang, Whitehill, and Anderson, and concluded that gender and pregnancy were not substantial motivating reasons for Ranson’s discharge. The Court finds no basis to disturb that verdict in the interest of justice.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Kenna Ranson’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

The Court has reconsidered its evidentiary rulings and finds no error in law or irregularity in the proceedings. The exclusion of the subject evidence under Evidence Code section 352 was a proper exercise of discretion, supported by the specific factual context of the evidence. The admission of the defense “not me too” witnesses was likewise proper. The juror declarations do not establish prejudice. Ranson has not carried her burden of demonstrating that a different result was reasonably probable absent any claimed error.

[1] Plaintiff frames the subject terms evidence as “me too” evidence throughout her motion. That characterization is imprecise. As the Court noted in the MIL Order, Wang’s testimony regarding the subject terms is not “me too” evidence in the classic sense. (8/17/2025 MIL Order at p. 4.) “Me too” evidence is evidence that an employer subjected other employees to the same discrimination the plaintiff experienced. (Pinter-Brown v. Regents of Univ. of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 89.) Plaintiff does not contend she was called a “bitch” or “cunt.” Rather, she argues the subject terms reflect generalized gender animus by the decision-makers. That is a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 discriminatory intent argument under Evidence Code section 1101(b), not a “me too” argument. The distinction matters because Plaintiff’s principal authorities (i.e., Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87 and Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855) are “me too” cases and their holdings and analysis are not germane to the evidence at issue.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV034811: RANSON vs FREE STREAM MEDIA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for New Trial filed by Kenna Ranson (Plaintiff) CRS# 934681972051 in Department 517 +1 646 828 7666 US (New York) 833 568 8864 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 161 8198 9812 Find your local number: https://www.zoomgov.com/u/ad6x1ZH23d

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