Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation

34-2023-00333705-CU-BC-GDS: Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation 02/29/2024 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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34-2023-00333705-CU-BC-GDS: Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation 02/29/2024 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration in Department 53

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki’s (“Zamani”) motion for reconsideration is denied.

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Seyedmohammad Caranizadeh’s (“Caranizadeh”) unopposed request for judicial notice of various Court filings is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice.

On October 31, 2023, this Court granted Caranizadeh’s motion for summary adjudication of his partition cause of action. In opposing that motion, Zamani argued that the Court should employ the procedures set forth in CCP § 874.317 and allow him to purchase the Property. The Court rejected that argument because the expressly undisputed evidence established that the parties held title to the subject property as joint tenants. The Court stated that CCP § 874.317 is located in the Partition of Real Property Act (the “Act”) which became effective January 1, 2023, and that the Act only applies to “real property held in tenancy in common where there is no agreement in a record binding all the cotenants which governs the partition of the property.” (CCP § 874.311(b).)

Given that the undisputed evidence established that the parties were joint tenants and not tenants in common, the Act, including CCP § 874.317 did not apply. The Court concluded Zamani’s discussion of CCP § 874.317 and his willingness to purchase the Property pursuant to the procedures in the Act, were misplaced. Zamani initially requested oral argument in connection with the Court’s tentative ruling on Caranizadeh’s motion but withdrew the request and the tentative ruling became final. Caranizadeh served notice of entry of the order granting summary adjudication on December 4, 2023.

Zamani now moves for reconsideration on the basis that he recorded a grant deed severing the joint tenancy on October 27, 2023, and thus that the procedures in CCP § 874.317 now apply.

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (CCP § 1008(a).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00333705-CU-BC-GDS: Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation 02/29/2024 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration in Department 53

Here, the Court finds Zamani failed to demonstrate that there are any new or different facts, circumstances, or law. To that end, Zamani makes clear that the purported new fact is the act of recording a grant deed purporting to sever the joint tenancy on October 27, 2023. This fact, therefore, was in existence prior to the October 31, 2023, hearing. “Courts have construed section 1008 to require a party filing an application for reconsideration or a renewed application to show diligence with a satisfactory explanation for not having presented the new or different information earlier.” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v.

Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) Where a moving party “easily could have obtained” the proffered “new” evidence previously, or had the “new” evidence in its possession since the outset of litigation, the evidence is not “new” for purposes of section 1008. (New York Times, 135 Cal.App.4th at 213- 14.) “The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (Id.; see also Foothills Townhome Assn. v.

Christiansen (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 688, 692 disapproved on another ground in Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 [plaintiff's belief that certain evidence was not necessary at hearing on summary judgment motion insufficient to justify reconsideration].)

Here, the purported new fact was in existence prior to the October 31, 2023, hearing and could have been presented to this Court. Yet as mentioned above, Zamani withdrew his request for oral argument and did not appear and bring this purported new fact to the Court’s attention either before or at the hearing despite his ability to do so. Zamani attempts to argue that he could not have presented the fact to the Court because he did not yet have a copy of the recorded deed by October 31, 2023. As noted in Caranizadeh’s opposition, it is not even necessary to record a grant deed to sever a joint tenancy.

A joint tenant can be severed by in multiple ways, including by “[e]xecution of a written instrument that evidences the intent to sever the joint tenancy, including a deed that names the joint tenant as transferee, or of a written declaration that, as to the interest of the joint tenant, the joint tenancy is severed.” (Civ. Code § 683.2(a)(2).) The statute discusses recording a grant deed severing the joint tenancy, but in the context of terminating the non-severing joint tenants’ right of survivorship, not in the context of whether recording is necessary to sever the joint tenancy. (Civ.

Code § 683.2(c).) But even if a recorded deed was required, Zamani admittedly recorded the deed on October 27, 2023, and Zamani could have easily brought the fact to the Court’s attention prior to the hearing regardless of whether he had a copy of the recorded grant deed. Zamani could have appeared at the October 31, 2023, hearing and informed the Court of the purported new fact and could have even requested a continuance of the hearing in order to properly brief the matter. He did not so. To the extent that Zamani was mistaken regarding his need for a copy of a recorded grant deed, or even the need for recording at all, and failed to bring the matter to the Court’s attention based on his mistaken belief, this is not basis for reconsideration. (Pazderka v.

Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658, 670.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00333705-CU-BC-GDS: Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation 02/29/2024 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration in Department 53

Further, the burden is on the moving party is to provide “a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier, which can only be described as a strict requirement of diligence.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.) The court in Garcia held that “section 1008’s reference to ‘new or different’ facts [does] not make the section’s prerequisites less restrictive. [Section 1008 requires a] threshold showing of diligence which has long required an ‘explanation’ of why the ‘newly discovered’ matter was not presented earlier.

Garcia would have us say this requirement is met by anything not previously ‘presented’ to the court. The miserable result would be to defeat the Legislature’s stated goal of reducing the number of reconsideration motions and would remove an important incentive for parties to efficiently marshal their evidence.” (Id. at 688-89.) The court further found that “[t]he information consisting of Garcia's own declared knowledge was obviously always within his possession, and no satisfactory explanation appeared for not bringing it out earlier,” such that it was not the sort of “new” evidence required by section 1008. (Id. at 690.)

Zamani provides no explanation as to why the purported new fact was not set forth earlier. That is, he does not explain why he did not execute the grant deed at any time prior to October 27, 2023. The subject motion for summary adjudication was filed and served on August 15, 2023, and specifically asserted the existence of a joint tenancy as an undisputed material fact. (Caranizadeh RJN Exhs. B, C.) Yet, in his opposition to the motion for summary adjudication, Zamani expressly did not dispute the undisputed material fact that the parties held the property in joint tenancy.

Zamani even filed a verified answer on August 31, 2023, stating that the parties purchased the property as joint tenants. (Id. Exh. D ¶ 13.) Zamani has failed to demonstrate a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the purported new fact earlier. Indeed, the only apparent explanation is that Zamani did not understand that CCP § 874.317 did not apply to joint tenancies until he read Caranizadeh’s reply brief filed and served on October 26, 2023. Again, however, a mistake in the law is no basis for reconsideration.

Zamani is simply seeking a second shot at opposing the motion.

None of the arguments presented in reply change the above. In essence, Zamani argues in reply that he had no reason to seek to sever the joint tenancy because the issue was not relevant until Caranizadeh argued in reply to the summary adjudication motion that Zamani could not utilize CCP § 874.317 because that section did not apply to joint tenancies. This assertion is nothing more than an argument that Zamani misunderstood the law governing CCP § 874.317, which as noted above, is not a basis for reconsideration. Again, even if briefing was closed when Caranizadeh filed his reply brief, nothing prevented Zamani from presenting the purported new information to the Court prior to the October 31, 2023, hearing. At a minimum, Zamani could have appeared at the hearing and requested a continuance to address the deed purporting to sever the joint tenancy.

The Court also notes that Zamani argues in reply that denying the motion would effectively result in a waiver of the rights set forth in CCP § 874.317. Zamani cites case law providing that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00333705-CU-BC-GDS: Naeim Zamani Mahfroujaki, individually, and as a derivative action vs. Zoom, Inc., a California corporation 02/29/2024 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration in Department 53

a “statutory benefit may be waived if (1) the statute does not prohibit waiver, (2) the statute's public purpose is incidental to its primary purpose, and (3) the waiver does not seriously undermine any public purpose the statute was designed to serve.” (Lanigan v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1030.) This case law, however, was in the context of addressing whether there can be a waiver of a law established for a public purpose, for example waivers of rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act.

Zamani presents no analysis of how laws governing joint tenant relations, such as CCP § 874.317, is a law that was established for a public purpose. Indeed, there is no introductory provision in the Act that provides any indication that the Act was established for a public purpose. Denying the motion for reconsideration under these circumstances does not result in the waiver of any law established for a public purpose. Further, even assuming that CCP § 874.317 involved a law established for a public purpose, this does not mean that the Court would have to grant a motion for reconsideration where Zamani failed to meet the standards set forth in CCP § 1008.

While Zamani correctly notes that CCP § 874.313 provides that “[i]n an action to partition real property, the property shall be partitioned under this chapter unless all of the cotenants otherwise agree in a record.” (CCP § 874.313(a).) This, however, provides no support for the proposition that the Court must grant the motion for reconsideration simply because Zamani chose to wait until after the briefing closed on the motion for summary judgment to attempt to sever the subject joint tenancy.

The Court concludes that Zamani failed to establish any “new or different facts, circumstances, or law” sufficient to support a motion for reconsideration much less a satisfactory explanation for failing to present any purported new fact earlier. A court “acts in excess of jurisdiction when it grants a motion to reconsider that is not based upon ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law.’” (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)

The motion is denied.

Given the above, the Court need not consider Caranizadeh’s additional arguments raised in opposition, including that the motion seeks improper relief. The Court also need not rule on Caranizadeh's objections to Zamani's supplemental declaration, which in any event was not even filed with the Court or served on Caranizadeh until February 28, 2024.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.