RICHARD BUNKER SQUYRES VS. META PLATFORMS, INC.

4. All documents, communications, and ESI relating to all posts and comments published in the Facebook Group by the Facebook account with the username “Anonymous Member 478” in July 2025 (such as the screenshot attached as Exhibit 3) including the text of the posts and comments, the dates and times of their publication, the

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ device used to publish them, and all location and IP address information collected when they were published.

5. (Withdrawn by petitioner)

(April 30, 2026 Pagan Decl., exh. C.) The subpoena concludes with the following statement:

The subpoena specifically excludes any communications, contents of a user’s private mail messages, or stored content files held or maintained on behalf of a user that are protected by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.

Following a meet and confer between petitioner and Meta, Meta stands by its objections and has refused to produce any of the requested documents. Petitioner moves to compel their production.

1. Anonymous Member 490

As to the First and Second categories of documents sought by the subpoena (pertaining to Anonymous Member 490), the Motion is DENIED.

To unmask an anonymous speaker, petitioner must demonstrate that (1) he has attempted to notify the account holder(s), and (2) there is a prima facie cause of action against the anonymous speaker. (Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623, 634 (Glassdoor); Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1171-1172 (Krinsky); ZL Techs., Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 603, 633 (ZL Techs) [requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of the elements of defamation before allowing disclosure of a defendant’s identity].)

First, to the extent these requests seek the contents of communications published by Anonymous Member 490, the Stored Communications Act (SCA) bars their production. Petitioner’s Motion focuses on documents that would identify the anonymous publisher (which the briefing refers to as “basic subscriber information,” such as documents revealing the name(s), Facebook username(s), email addresses, phone numbers, etc. of the publisher), but on their face, these requests also seek actual content/communications posted by Anonymous Member 490. The SCA prohibits Meta from disclosing the content of such communications. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), (2), (b)(1)–(9); Negro v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 879, 892-893 (2014), as modified (Nov. 18, 2014).) Petitioner has not shown that the publisher has given consent to disclosure of these communications.

The court rejects petitioner’s attempt, in his reply brief, to assert a new argument — namely, that the SCA does not apply because Meta maintains its users’ content for Meta’s own business purposes. (Reply, at pp. 6-8.) This argument was not made in petitioner’s moving papers, and Meta has not no opportunity to address it.

Although the SCA bars production of communications, not-content based subscriber information (such as documents revealing the anonymous publisher’s identity) is not protected by

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ the SCA, which Meta concedes. (See Meta’s Separate Statement, at p. 10 [“Meta agrees that if Petitioner is only seeking non-content based subscriber information (“BSI”), the SCA does not present a bar to disclosure.”].)

As to Anonymous Member 490, the court agrees with petitioner that the public postings are not purely opinions, as Meta suggests. The statements include some opinions (“sweet talker,” “narcissist,” “monster,” “temper is scary”). But they also include factual statements. (e.g., “He cheated on his daughter’s mother while she was pregnant and living with him,” and “[h]e threw his pregnant girlfriend’s belongings out in the yard when she confronted him about cheating”).

Petitioner has made reasonable efforts to provide notice to the anonymous posters that Petitioner seeks to unmask their identities. Meta argues that “if the anonymous speaker has not received notice of the attempt to lift the shield of anonymity, the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to provide such notice.” (Opp. at p. 7, citing Glassdoor, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.) Meta argues that it has not yet provided notice to the anonymous posters, nor has petitioner, and thus, since no notice has been provided, the petition should be denied. The court is perplexed by this argument. It seems apparent that petitioner has no way to contact or identify Anonymous Member 490 without the information sought from Meta by the subpoena, and thus, could not possibly provide such notice.

Where an internet service provider from whom documents are sought itself notifies the defendant that the disclosure of their identity is sought, notification by the plaintiff should not be necessary. (Krinsky, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.) Meta objected to petitioner’s subpoena many months ago, on December 23, 2025, and stated that “[b]efore producing any basic subscriber information, Meta will provide notice to the affected users and allow the users 21 days to file an objection with the court...” (Pagan Decl. ¶ 8 & exh.

E.) It appears that petitioner has since provided Meta with the URLs of the anonymous publishers for whom he seeks identifying information. (Pagan Decl. ¶ 14.) But Meta has not provided the anonymous publishers with notice of petitioner’s subpoena because Meta claims it is still investigating what accounts are associated with the links that petitioner provided. (Opp. at p. 7.) Meta does not offer any explanation as to why it has been unable to determine what accounts are associated with the posts and comments, when only Meta can do so, and only Meta can provide notice to the publishers.

It is unfair for Meta to use its own refusal or failure to provide notice as a basis for claiming that petitioner has not met his burden. Thus, the court finds that this requirement is met.

With respect to Anonymous Member 490, petitioner’s Motion falls short in providing evidence that he has been damaged by the publications. In Texas, the elements of a defamation cause of action are: (1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a third party, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite degree of fault, and (4) damages, in some cases. (In re Lipsky (Tex. 2015) 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Lipsky).) The plaintiff must plead and prove damages, unless the defamatory statements are defamatory per se. (Ibid.)

Defamation per se refers to statements that are so obviously harmful that general damages may be presumed. (Lipsky, supra, 460 S.W.3d at pp. 593-594.) When an offending publication qualifies as defamation per se, a plaintiff may recover general damages without proof of any

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ specific loss. (Id., at p. 596.) Thus, if Anonymous Member 490’s remarks concerning petitioner are actionable per se, then any failure in proof as to special damages is irrelevant. (Ibid.)

Accusing someone of a crime, of having a foul or loathsome disease, or of engaging in serious sexual misconduct are examples of defamation per se. (Lipsky, supra, 460 S.W.3d at p. 596.) Remarks that adversely reflect on a person’s fitness to conduct his or her business or trade are also deemed defamatory per se. (Ibid.) And whether a statement qualifies as defamation per se is generally a question of law. (Ibid.) Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that any of Anonymous Member 490’s statements constitute defamation per se. Petitioner offers no evidence that Anonymous Member 490 accused him of committing a crime. Lying, engaging in sexual promiscuity, or even adultery, are not crimes.

Further, Anonymous Member 490 does not appear to have accused petitioner of any “serious” sexual misconduct. Promiscuity, having multiple partners, and/or being dishonest in one’s personal relationships, cannot reasonably be characterized as “serious sexual misconduct” in this context.

The more difficult question is whether Anonymous Member 490’s statements adversely reflect on petitioner’s fitness as an attorney, which could qualify as “defamation per se.” To qualify as defamation per se under this category, the disparaging words must affect the plaintiff in some manner that is peculiarly harmful to the plaintiff’s trade, business, or profession and not merely upon the plaintiff’s general characteristics; a statement injures one in his profession when it would “adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct” of the business. (Lipsky, supra, 460 S.W.3d at p. 596.)

Petitioner argues that honesty and integrity is particularly important for attorneys, and thus, the accusations of petitioner purportedly being a habitual liar, and of exhibiting dishonesty in his personal relationships, constitutes defamation per se. Neither party appears to cite any case law directly on point (i.e., a case involving allegations of dishonesty directed at an attorney.)

In Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tex. 2013), the Texas Supreme Court held that statements that a physician lacked veracity and dealt in half-truths were not defamatory per se because they did not injure the physician in his profession by ascribing that he lacked a necessary skill peculiar or unique to the profession of being a physician. (Id., at p. 67.) “Disparagement of a general character, equally discreditable to all persons, is not enough unless the particular quality disparaged is of such a character that it is peculiarly valuable in the plaintiff’s business or profession.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 cmt. e.” (Id., at p. 67.) “If an accusation of untruthfulness is defamatory per se for a physician in her profession, it would likewise be defamatory per se for other trades, businesses, and professions that rely on human interaction.” (Id., at p. 68.) Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 (1977)), the Hancock court further stated:

Examples provide guidance of what injury to a person in her profession actually means. Comments to the applicable section of the Restatement provide: When peculiar skill or ability is necessary, an imputation that attributes a lack of skill or ability tends to harm the other in his business or profession. Statements that a physician is a drunkard or a quack,

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ or that he is incompetent or negligent in the practice of his profession, are actionable. So too, a charge that a physician is dishonest in his fees is actionable, although an imputation of dishonesty in other respects does not affect his character or reputation as a physician.

Disparagement of a general character, equally discreditable to all persons, is not enough unless the particular quality disparaged is of such a character that it is peculiarly valuable in the plaintiff’s business or profession .... Thus, a statement that a physician consorts with harlots is not actionable per se, although a charge that he makes improper advances to his patients is actionable; the one statement does not affect his reputation as a physician whereas the other does so affect it. Id. § 573 cmt. c, e.

(Hancock v. Variyam (Tex. 2013) 400 S.W.3d 59, 67.) The Hancock court concluded:

The specific trait of truthfulness is not peculiar or unique to being a physician ... Accordingly, the allegations that Variyam lacked veracity and dealt in half truths do not adversely affect his fitness for proper conduct as a physician. Id. § 573.

Variyam also asserts that a reputation for untruthfulness hinders his relations with his peers and his ability to research and publish. But few trades, businesses and professions involve no human interaction. If an accusation of untruthfulness is defamatory per se for a physician in her profession, it would likewise be defamatory per se for other trades, businesses, and professions that rely on human interaction. In short, Hancock’s charges do not adversely affect Variyam’s fitness for the proper conduct of being a physician and are not defamatory per se.

(Ibid.)

In Bedford v. Spassoff (Tex. 2017) 520 S.W.3d 901, 905, the court held that statements that a children’s baseball coach was attempting to seduce the mother of one of the children on his team, and that the baseball organization, having learned about this conduct, did nothing to stop it, did not constitute defamation per se. The court held that defendant’s publications did not accuse the coach or the team of lacking a peculiar or unique skill related to baseball or to running a baseball organization. (Ibid.) “If an accusation that a baseball-instructional business failed to prevent its contractor or employee from having an extramarital affair, or that the business did not handle the situation properly after the affair was discovered, is defamation per se, then it would likewise be defamatory per se for all other businesses that encounter people who are married.” (Ibid.)

As we said in Hancock, that cannot be. Because the statements in the Facebook post were not defamatory per se, [plaintiffs] bore the burden of establishing damages .... They failed to so. (Ibid.)

Here, Anonymous Member 490 published statements accusing petitioner of sexual promiscuity and of displaying a general lack of honesty, loyalty, and integrity in his personal relationships. None of the alleged defamatory statements are tied in any way to petitioner’s profession, ability, or integrity as a lawyer. Anonymous Member 490 did not accuse petitioner of engaging in any dishonesty with any client(s) or otherwise showing a lack of honesty or integrity

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ in his law practice. Petitioner is not accused, for example, of stealing client funds, of over-billing clients, or even of becoming personally involved with his clients. Petitioner cites no authority suggesting that exhibiting dishonesty in one’s personal relationships impugns one’s reputation as an attorney, any more than such publications would affect those in other vocations.

Because the court finds that Anonymous Member 490’s publications are not defamatory per se, and because petitioner offers no evidence of damage caused by Anonymous Member 490’s alleged defamatory statements, petitioner has not set forth a prima facie claim for defamation.

Accordingly, as to Anonymous Member 490, the Motion is DENIED.

2. Anonymous Member 478

As to the Third and Fourth categories of documents sought by the subpoena (pertaining to Anonymous Member 478), the Motion is also DENIED.

First, to the extent these requests seek the contents of communications published by Anonymous Member 478, the SCA bars their production. Petitioner’s Motion focuses on documents that would identify the anonymous publisher (“basic subscriber information,” such as documents revealing the name(s), Facebook username(s), email addresses, phone numbers, etc. of the publisher), but on their face, these requests also seek actual content/communications posted by Anonymous Member 478. The SCA prohibits Meta from disclosing the content of such communications. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), (2), (b)(1)–(9); Negro v. Superior Court, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 892-893.) Petitioner has not shown that the publisher has given consent to disclosure of these communications.

Second, petitioner has not shown a prima facie cause of action against Anonymous Member 478. As discussed above, to unmask an anonymous speaker, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a prima facie cause of action against the anonymous speaker. (Glassdoor, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 634; Krinsky, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1171-1172; ZL Techs., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.)

Petitioner has not asserted a defamation claim against Anonymous Member 478. (See Complaint ¶¶ 43-54 [alleging (1) invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion; (2) invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private facts; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)].) The Petition contains no legal analysis of any of these claims. (See Petition at pp. 6-10 [analyzing only defamation claim].) The court rejects petitioner’s attempt to remedy this omission in the moving papers by inserting an argument in its Reply brief. (Reply, at pp. 3-5). Petitioner’s moving papers do not address the elements of any cause of action asserted against Anonymous Member 478. Therefore, petitioner has not demonstrated a prima facie cause of action against Anonymous Member 478.

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Further, while defamation is not asserted against Anonymous Member 478, the statements posted by Anonymous Member 478 appear to constitute opinion, not false statements of fact. Petitioner’s claim against Anonymous Member 478 appears to be based on the following post:

I dated him. He was emotionally abusive, manipulative, and has scary anger issues. He’s a charmer, but don’t be fooled. He’ll sweep you off your feet then break your spirit, erode your confidence, and make you question your reality. Trust me it’s not worth it!

The statements above are more reasonably characterized as non-actionable opinions rather than false statements, and thus, even had petitioner addressed the merits of the claims asserted against Anonymous Member 478 in the moving papers, it appears the result would have been the same.

As to the Fifth category of documents sought by the subpoena, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT, given petitioner’s withdrawal of that request.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s Motion is denied.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, Meta’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.