TAHIMA LATIF VS. WESTERN STONE & METAL CORP

Marie C. Avery is ORDERED TO APPEAR to explain why the memorandum of points and authorities she subscribed cites to (1) Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, (2) Mendez v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 557, and (3) Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, without disclosing that all three were expressly disapproved in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, and (4) Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87 for the proposition that courts consistently limit discovery to complaints of employees similar to the plaintiff’s allegations when the case involved a trial court’s exclusion of evidence at trial and the Court of Appeal found it was error to do so.

Plaintiff Tahima Latif has failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to declarations in support of the motion, in violation of the California Rules of Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4).) Latif and her counsel are ordered to comply with all California Rules of Court with respect to future filings.

B. Motion to Compel Further Responses

Plaintiff Tahima Latif seeks further responses from defendant Western Stone & Metal Corp. (Shane Co.) to requests for production nos. 14–17 of the first set of requests served on

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Shane Co. on June 26, 2025. The first two requests seek all documents related to the termination of the employment of defendant John Paul Murphy with Shane Co. (Jan. 15, 2026 Separate Statement, at pp. 3, 5.) The latter two seek all documents related to complaints about Murphy and Shane Co.’s actions in response to such complaints. (Id., at pp. 5–6.) Shane Co.’s initial responses were composed of objections and a refusal to provide any responsive documents. (Id., at pp. 3, 5–6.) Shane Co. later provided further responses stating that Shane Co. was withholding all responsive documents based upon Murphy’s objections on grounds of privacy. (Id., at pp. 4– 6.)

Upon receipt of a response to a request for production, a propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses if the party deems, inter alia, a statement of compliance incomplete or an objection without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) As a prerequisite to such an order, the moving party must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)

“To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 (Digital Music), disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 (Williams).) While good cause for discovery from a nonparty must be shown by “factual evidence ... supplied to the court by way of declarations” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224), good cause for discovery from a party may be shown by reference to the pleadings. (Digital Music, supra, at p. 224 [“facts of consequence in the New York lawsuit between UMG and Escape may be found in UMG’s complaint and Escape’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims”].)

Here, good cause is apparent from the pleadings and the evidence submitted by Latif. The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Murphy harassed Latif based on her sex by making sexual innuendo and talking about his particular sexual interests in a manner that could be interpreted as a sexual advance. (June 11, 2025 Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 13.) Whether Murphy engaged in such conduct and whether Murphy was motivated by Latif’s sex is in dispute in this case, as both Shane Co. and Murphy have denied these factual allegations. (See July 15, 2025 Answer, at p. 1; July 28, 2025 Answer, at pp. 1–2.)

Testimony from a Shane Co. employee also indicates that Murphy’s employment was terminated for making sexual advances on a coworker at a company retreat. (Jan. 15, 2026 Declaration of Laura Fentonmiller (Fentonmiller Decl.), ¶ 12.) Apart from a significantly different characterization of a mere ‘comment’ that may have ‘offended’ a coworker at the retreat, Murphy has denied knowledge of the reasons for his termination, including who may have been offended. (Id., ¶ 14.)

In addition to bearing on Murphy’s credibility, the information in the requested documents may show the extent of Murphy’s purported unlawful conduct and Shane Co.’s action or inaction in response, establishing Murphy’s and Shane Co. potential liability on the causes of action asserted in the Complaint. Accordingly, Latif has demonstrated good cause for the discovery.

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ With good cause for the requests shown, the burden is shifted to Shane Co. to justify its objections. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 541 [“the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting” discovery].) The only one Shane Co. asserts here — and the only one asserted by Murphy who also opposes the motion — is Murphy’s purported right of privacy.

When a party raises a privacy objection to resist discovery, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.) “The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Ibid.)

Shane Co. asserts Murphy has a right to privacy in his “personnel information.” (June 4, 2026 Shane Co. MPA, at pp. 2, l, 18.) Notably, Shane Co. did not raise a privacy objection in its initial responses to Requests Nos. 16 and 17, thereby waiving the objection. Murphy, meanwhile, asserts his right of privacy is in his “confidential and private employee records and third-party complaint information concerning [him].” (June 4, 2026 Murphy MPA, at p. 2, ll. 5– 7.) Neither Shane Co. nor Murphy provide any caselaw applying the constitutional right of privacy to personnel files in total nor to complaints made by third parties.

Nor is there any authority for such a proposition; courts in cases involving discovery of employee records have held that employees have a legally protected privacy interest in confidential personnel records and, especially non-parties, have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the information in those records.

Shane Co. and Murphy provide no evidence whatsoever that the information in the records sought is confidential. That is, while personnel files generally are not considered public information, it cannot be presumed that all the information in any given file is confidential — the information in any person’s file may be so widely known as to be deemed not private. For example, the fact that an employee was fired for cause and the reason therefor may be publicly announced by an employer — only information kept in confidence in personnel records is confidential. Indeed, the present evidence already indicates that Murphy’s employment was terminated and the reasons for the termination were disseminated to Shane Co.’s other employees. (See Fentonmiller Decl., ¶ 12.)

Moreover, Shane Co. and Murphy rely heavily on outdated law, most of which was expressly disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Williams nearly a decade ago. Only in one instance, in Shane Co.’s opposition, does either party disclose that the cited authority has been disapproved, and even then without mention of when or what opinion abrogated part of the holding. (See Shane Co. MPA, at pp. 2, II.21–26.) Williams confirmed the correct test to be applied to privacy objections, and Shane Co.’s and Murphy’s failure to cite to relevant authority applying the correct test is independently fatal to their attempt to establish the merit of their objections.

June 17, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ The burden on Shane Co. and Murphy is to establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. They have not carried this burden here. Accordingly, the privacy objection is unsubstantiated and without merit, and further responses must be provided.

Even were the requested documents considered to have confidential information such that Murphy had a reasonable expectation of privacy and the requests presented a serious invasion, the relevance of the documents and the information therein to Latif’s claims demonstrate a legitimate and countervailing interest in disclosure. When weighed against each other in light of the standing protective order already entered to preserve the confidentiality of such documents — the existence of which Shane Co. and Murphy conspicuously omit from their briefing — the privacy objection would still lack merit.

Accordingly, Shane Co. is ordered to serve verified further, code-compliant responses no later than thirty (30) days after service of notice of the formal order.

C. Request for Sanctions

Latif requests the imposition of monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,850.00 against Shane Co. and its counsel, Jackson Lewis P.C., for the reasonable expenses she incurred as a result of Shane Co.’s refusal to submit to the discovery. A court is required to “impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2031.310.) Shane Co. and its counsel, Jackson Lewis P.C., have unsuccessfully opposed the motion. Especially in light of the reliance on disapproved caselaw, Shane Co. and its counsel have not acted with substantial justification and there are no circumstances that would make the imposition of sanctions unjust. While Shane Co. argues that it was obligated to withhold documents upon Murphy’s objection, Shane Co. itself asserted the merits of Murphy’s objection and requested denial of the motion “in its entirety[.]” (Shane Co.

Opp., at p. 4, l. 3.)

However, Latif has not presented any evidence that she in fact incurred attorney fees in the amount requested or any other expenses. (See Fentonmiller Decl., passim.) Without evidence substantiating the hours worked and billing rate, sanctions cannot be imposed. Accordingly, the request for sanctions is DENIED without prejudice.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.