DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 16, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
as to any of the facts in the separate statement, the motion may be denied. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) Opposition declarations are to be liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)
IV. DISCUSSION The Court finds the above facts are sufficient to satisfy the elements of plaintiff’s claims. The burden therefore shifts to defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the causes of action or a defense thereto. Defendant has failed to meet this burden as he has not filed an opposition and raised any triable issue of disputed fact. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment against defendant in the amount of $20,855.54.
No. 25CV04146
POORSINA v. HOGAN DBA HOGAN LAND SERVICES
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The motion is granted. The Court’s ex parte order of April 14, 2026 vacating an earlier court order granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is vacated. The result is that defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted and this matter is stayed pending the result of that proceeding.
I. BACKGROUND
Self-represented plaintiff Mohammad Poorsina sued defendant Michael R. Hogan dba Hogan Land Services for unlicensed contracting, breach of contract, fraud, negligence, unfair competition, and statutory penalties regarding a dispute resulting from their contractual relationship. Plaintiff hired defendant to prepare design plans for plaintiff’s residence and driveway. Plaintiff alleges defendant failed to obtain proper zoning and land use approvals for the project, performed work not authorized by the contract, and misrepresented that the work satisfied regulatory requirements.
On April 8, 2026, this Court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court’s basis for granting the motion was that plaintiff’s opposition argument that fraud in the execution occurred was not supported by the parties’ contract. The Court found the contract did not state defendant or his firm had a general contractor’s license; instead, it was clear from the Master Service Agreement and addenda that all personnel were licensed as engineers, land
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LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 16, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
surveyors, and architects. (Complaint, Ex. B, D.) Plaintiff’s “evidence” that defendant was unlicensed was faulty; he sought licensure information from the Contractor State License Board which does not license engineers.1 (Complaint, Ex. A; Hogan Declaration Supporting Motion to Compel Arbitration, ¶¶ 3, 5.)
On April 14, 2026, without any hearing, this Court granted plaintiff’s ex parte application and vacated that previous order on the grounds that Business & Professions Code section 7031 prevented an unlicensed contractor from collecting compensation and enforcing an arbitration clause in the parties’ contract.
However, based on the Court’s earlier analysis, and plaintiff’s inappropriate legal grounds for his ex parte application, that order granting plaintiff’s ex parte relief was in error. This Court will vacate it and reinstate the previous order granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order (extended for service) and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, a party may make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1008, 1013.)2
The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered, and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) The burden under section 1008 “is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at [the hearing].” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) A party seeking reconsideration based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law must provide a satisfactory explanation for not presenting it earlier. (Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.)
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s ex parte application to vacate the Court’s motion compelling arbitration was based on section 473, subdivision (d). Plaintiff argued that the Court had inherent power to vacate an order void on its face, but he failed to raise any other legal authority for the ex parte.
1 The Court takes judicial notice, sua sponte, of licensing by the California Department of Consumer Affairs, Board for Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, and Geologists. 2 All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise stated.
LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 16, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
“The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) This section only allows a court to correct clerical errors in orders and judgments, not to rectify judicial errors. (Blake v. Municipal Court for Northern Judicial Dist. (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 131, 135; Estate of Careaga (1964) 61 Cal.2d 471, 474 [clerical errors do not include court’s failure to correctly interpret law or apply facts]; McLaughlin v. Superior Court (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 62, 66 [court has no power, having once made its decision after regular submission, to amend judgment or order for judicial error].)
To correct judicial error, the court is limited to statutory means, such as reconsideration under section 1008, which is the exclusive means for modifying, amending, or revoking an order of the court. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498-1499.) A party cannot use section 473 to circumvent the jurisdictional requirements of section 1008. Where the request is to vacate a prior order of the court, the requirements of section 1008 must be met. (Id. at p. 1501.)
The Court’s grant of the ex parte application based on section 473, subdivision (d) was improper since the application sought to vacate the order, not just correct a clerical mistake. Further, had the application been based on section 1008 for reconsideration, plaintiff’s ex parte application failed since it was based on the same facts and legal argument as he presented to the first motion. Plaintiff presented no new facts, law or circumstances, thereby rendering his ex parte application without legal or factual basis.
Plaintiff still incorrectly insists that the contract is void because defendant was not licensed by the Contractors State License Board, based on Business & Professions Code section 7031. But as was shown in the previous motion (which facts have not changed), defendant did not hold himself out as a general contractor. He and his firm are engineers and entered the contract as licensed engineers; they were engaged to perform engineering and land surveying work. Architects and professional engineers acting in their professional capacities are exempt from the contractor licensing requirements (see Business and Professions Code § 7051) and land surveyors are licensed under an entirely separate chapter of the Business and Professions Code. (See Business & Professions Code § 8700 et seq.)
Defendant has shown sufficient new circumstances to warrant reconsideration under section 1008 of the ex parte application and order. Here, the Court’s misguided reliance on section 473, subdivision (d) to vacate an allegedly void order constitutes new circumstances, since that section cannot be used as a basis to correct or vacate an order. As discussed above, the Court finds plaintiff’s ex parte application was without correct legal basis, and plaintiff has not shown any facts to support his theory of fraud or a voidable contract; defendant was not licensed, nor needed to be licensed, under Business & Professions Code section 7031.
LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 16, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
Therefore, this motion for reconsideration is granted, and the Court’s Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Vacate Void Order Compelling Arbitration of April 14, 2026, is vacated. This action is ordered to arbitration and stayed pending its result.
No. 26CV00302, related to 26CV00585, 26CV01653
VILLAFRANCA et al. v. REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, INC., et al.
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE OR STAY
The motion for a stay of the unlawful detainer action (26CV00585) is granted.
On January 28, 2026, Mariann and Providence Villafranca (“plaintiffs”) filed this verified complaint against Real Time Resolutions, Inc. and Nemovi Law Group, alleging wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instruments, quiet title, declaration relief and unfair business practices. Next Door Neighbor Homes, LCC (“Neighbor Homes”) was added as a Doe defendant February 3, 2026. This case involves the non-judicial foreclosure sale of a property located at 825 Sir Francis Avenue, Capitola which was owned by the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs contend that Mariann Villafranca executed a deed in favor of Mariann G. Villafranca and Anthony and Providence Villafranca. Mariann G. Villafranca and Anthony Villafranca executed a deed of trust with First American Title as trustee and Charles Schwab Bank as lender. This deed of trust secured a $100,000.00 loan made to Mariann and Anthony Villafranca. Providence Villafranca did not execute a deed of trust. On November 4, 2018, Anthony passed away, leaving the property to Mariann and Providence. Plaintiffs assert that at this time 75% of the property was subject to the deed of trust lien with Charles Schwab Bank. Apparently, the loan remained unpaid and no action was taken to collect on the loan for nearly 10 years when the deed of trust was assigned to Real Time Resolutions.
On November 13, 2024, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under the deed of trust for $120,844.30 was filed. Mariann Villafranca filed a verified complaint against defendants for declaratory relief, wrongful foreclosure and violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Act. (See, no. 25CV02380.) Mariann Villafranca states she was also attempting to negotiate the overdue loan and, on advice of her former counsel, dismissed the case because she believed “settlement was imminent.” (MPA at p. 5.) However, the property was sold via a trustee’s sale to Neighbor Homes in December 2025 and the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded January 30, 2026. On February 24, 2026, Neighbor Homes filed an unlawful detainer action (26CV00585) against Mariann, Anthony and Providence Villafranca, seeking possession of the property.