Bourgeois, et al, v. AJTGC Trucking, et al

Relevant here, Defendant Sandslide Materials Corp. (Sandslide) seeks to strike the prayer for punitive or exemplary damages stated in Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief.

Punitive damages are available in instances in which the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (See Civ. Code, § 3294(a) & (c)(1)-(3).) “Malice” is defined by statute as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ.

Code, § 3294(c)(2).) “Despicable conduct” is therefore a part of both “oppression” and “malice.” Despicable conduct is defined as “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050.) Such conduct has been described as “[having] the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Ibid.) “[A] conclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,’ within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau v.

Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) However, conclusory allegations will not be stricken when other factual allegations in the complaint lend to the conclusion that the conduct satisfies the requirements for punitive damages. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) Further, “accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis for punitive damages under [California] law.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1181.) California “cases have uniformly recognized that . . . even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient” to meet the extreme standard of conduct required to support punitive damages. (Dawes v.

Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 87.)

The SAC alleges that Defendant Sandslide, as a “licensed weighmaster” [SAC, ¶11] and “DOT regulated corporation” [SAC, ¶30], loaded Defendant Rodriguez’s truck “such that it weighed 79,400 lbs., dangerously in excess of the 73,001 GCVWR that the equipment was rated to safely haul.” (SAC, ¶49.) The SAC asserts that it was “readily apparent” to Sandslide that the truck was “dangerously overloaded” because the truck only had three axles and the manufacturer’s information that the truck was only rated at 73,001 lbs. was “present and visible to . . . .

Sandslide.” (SAC, ¶50.) Sandslide was “knowledgeable” that trucks loaded in excess of their safety rating “are more prone to overturn,” have problems with braking, and that it is illegal. (SAC, ¶75.) Despite knowing the dangers, Sandslide “knowingly overloaded the equipment” that created “an extremely dangerous hazardous situation for other road users wherein Sandslide knew it was likely that the weight of the equipment would cause a crash and seriously hurt or kill someone.” (SAC, ¶¶76-77.)

California ”cases have uniformly recognized that . . . even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient” to meet the extreme standard of conduct required to support punitive damages. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 87.) Although Plaintiffs allege that the truck’s weight rating was “visible and available” to Sandslide, there are no allegations that the 3 Sandslide employees were aware of this information and loaded the truck in willful or conscious disregard of such requirements. Therefore, the factual allegations are insufficient to support the conclusory assertion that Sandslide knew that the weight of this truck would “likely” cause it to crash.

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16. Melendez v. Kennedy, et al, Case No. CIVSB2530506 Specially Appearing Defendant Kennedy’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint 6/16/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17 Tentative Rulings

As to Evidentiary Objections: The Court would SUSTAIN Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection numbers 1 and 3. The Court would OVERRULE objection numbers 2 and 4. As to the Motion: The Court would DENY. Case Summary This is a motor vehicle accident case. Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2023, Defendants negligently operated their vehicles by driving at an unsafe speed and caused an automotive accident in Fontana. Plaintiff alleges he incurred injuries and damages. As such, he filed a suit on October 16, 2025, alleging causes of action for (1) motor vehicle and (2) general negligence.

Summary of the Law The service of a summons is the process by which the court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action. (MJS Enterprises Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.) Without substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for service of summons personal jurisdiction is not conferred, even if the defendant has notice of the litigation. (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) A defendant on or before the last day to plead, or any further time that the court for good cause allows, may bring a motion to quash service of summons because the court lacks jurisdiction. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 418.10(a)(1).) When challenging service by a motion to quash, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the service and the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant by proving the facts requisite to effective service. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)

Analysis

Here, Defendant Kennedy specially appears and moves to quash service.

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