Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

*** The Court finds in its file no proof of service demonstrating moving defendant’s service of the Notice of Disclosure issued on 5/21/2026, despite being directed to serve all other parties with the Notice of Disclosure “forthwith.” Moving defendant is directed to serve the Notice of Disclosure on all other parties forthwith and to file proof of service within five (5) court days. ***

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact all other counsel and advise them of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact all other counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Defendant AGCS Marine Insurance Company’s (“AGCS”) motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.360 to dismiss this 2021 action for plaintiff Saeed’s failure to bring it to trial within five years is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Saeed commenced this action on 4/13/2021, filing against various defendants a complaint for declaratory relief, accounting, disgorgement of partnership profits and restitution. No trial date has ever been set.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

Moving Papers. On 5/20/2026, defendant AGCS filed the present motion to dismiss this 2021 action on the grounds that plaintiff Saeed failed to bring this action to trial within five years of filing his complaint on 4/13/2021; no trial date was ever set; there has been no agreement to extend the five-year deadline; this Court’s jurisdiction has not been suspended; the prosecution or trial of the action has not been stayed or enjoined; and nothing has made it impossible, impracticable, or futile for plaintiff to bring this action to trial within five years, making dismissal of this action mandatory.

On 6/1/2026, defendant Platinum Express, Inc. (“PEI”) filed a “Notice of Joinder” in defendant AGCS’ motion to dismiss requesting that this action be dismissed with prejudice due to plaintiff Saeed’s failure to bring this action to trial within five years.

Opposition. Plaintiff Saeed opposes, “assert[ing] his rights under Code of Civil Procedure §583.360(a) for relief under Code of Civil Procedure §583.340 to avoid dismissal of the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure §583.360(b).” (Opp., p.2:7- 10.) Although the present motion is brought by defendant AGCS alone and defendant PEI is the only other party that has filed a “Notice of Joinder,” the opposition insists that “[e]ach defendant must be looked at separately because of tolling and estoppel,” which are “not ‘one size fits all’” and that no dismissal should occur here “because of the tolling impact of a related case and because a case management court did not issue necessary and timely scheduling orders, which are not dependent on any party’s acquiescence [and] were not exercised when there was an exigent duty to do so.” (Id., at p.2:12-18.)

More specifically, the opposition first argues that the five-year statute should be tolled pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c) with respect to non-moving defendants Sandeep Badhan, Paramveer Singh Sandhu, Capital City Logistics and Capital City Cargo “due to the[ir] obstructionist conduct” or alternatively, these non-moving defendants should be estopped from seeking dismissal. (Opp., p.4:6-p.5:6; p.5:16- p.7:2.) Plaintiff also insists defendant PEI should also be estopped from seeking dismissal for different reasons (Id., at p.7:4-p.8:3), while defendant AGCS should itself be estopped because (1) its 12/31/2025 Case Management Statement not only identified numerous dates beyond the five-year deadline for which its counsel was unavailable for trial but also indicated discovery would not be completed prior to the expiration of the five-year statute on 4/13/2026 and (2) “Plaintiff relied on these representations” (Id., at p.8:5-15).

Notably, in making this assertion, the opposition ignores another portion of defendant AGCS’s 12/31/2025 Case Management Statement which states:

Per C.C.P. section 583.310, the 5-year statute to bring the action to trial expires on April 13, 2026. The parties have not stipulated to extend the time for the case

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

to be brought to trial. Plaintiff’s counsel previously identified more than 10 lay depositions that he intends to take before the non-expert discovery cutoff, but there has been no action for over a year. (Def. AGCS 12/31/2025 Case Mgmt. Stm., p.5, ¶18.)

Plaintiff further contends in generic, conclusory terms that the existence of a related case in Arizona “can also toll the five-year statute” but the opposition includes no meaningful discussion of the purportedly related case in Arizona or the specific reasons why tolling should apply under the circumstances here, aside from a blanket claim that tolling should be equal to the (unspecified) “length of time it took to prosecute and resolved [sic] this related case.” (Opp., p.5:7-14.)

The opposition also maintains that non-moving defendants Badhan, Sandhu, Capital City Logistics and Capital City Cargo, as well as defendant PEI, failed to comply with their obligations under the Court’s Local Rules relating to case management and that this Court failed to fulfill its affirmative duty to issue timely and appropriate orders including but not limited to the timely setting of cases for trial. (Opp., p.8:17-p.9:22.) In particular, plaintiff asserts that once defendant AGCS’ 12/31/2025 Case Management Statement alerted the Court to the expiration of the five-year period on 4/13/2026, the Court should have immediately ordered this case to trial setting so trial could commence before the 4/13/2026 deadline. (Id., at p.9:24-p.10:11.)

In light of this failure, the Court should now grant relief under Code of Civil Procedure §583.340 and refer this case for trial setting. (Id., at p.10:11-14.)

Discussion

At the outset, the Court finds that many of the arguments advanced in the opposition relate to a group of defendants consisting of defendants Badhan, Sandhu, Capital City Logistics and Capital City Cargo even though none of these defendants is currently moving for dismissal under the five-year statute. As such, each of the arguments relating to these defendants are inapposite and do not have any direct bearing on the disposition of the present motion to dismiss by defendant AGCS, thereby obviating the need for further discussion of these arguments.

With respect to defendant PEI, its purported joinder in the present motion to dismiss by defendant AGCS shall be and hereby is DROPPED from calendar due to defective service of notice. Service of the “Notice of Joinder” by electronic transmission on 6/1/2026 for a hearing on 6/16/2026 does not provide the minimum of 16 court days plus two (2) additional court days’ notice as required by Code of Civil Procedure §1005(b) and §1010.6(a)(3)(B). (Code Civ. Proc. §12c.) Local Court Rule 2.09 further specifies that “the court will not grant relief to the party joining the motion unless that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

party has complied with all procedural requirements for the filing of motions, including payment of filing fees, proper notice, format of motion and method of service.” (Underline added for emphasis.) Because defendant Platinum Express, Inc. failed to provide sufficient notice for its joinder in the present motion to dismiss, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this joinder. (See, e.g., Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503, 509-511.) Accordingly, the Court need not consider or otherwise address the opposition’s arguments which are specifically directed at defendant PEI.

Turning the present motion by defendant AGCS, there can be no dispute that Code of Civil Procedure §583.310 establishes a five-year period within which a case must be brought to trial and this five-year period expired by its own terms on 4/13/2026, exactly five years after plaintiff commenced this action 4/13/2021. Additionally, §583.360 provides that “[a]n action shall be dismissed by the court if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in this article” and that the requirements of this article are not only “mandatory” but also “not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.”

Code of Civil Procedure §583.340 provides in its entirety:

In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended. (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.

As an initial matter, neither defendant AGCS nor plaintiff suggests in their respective papers that the jurisdiction of this Court to try the present action was ever “suspended” or that the prosecution of trial of this action was ever “stayed or enjoined” within the meaning of §583.340(a) or (b). Indeed, while the opposition does advance several arguments about why this action should not be dismissed at this time, each of these arguments is made in an attempt to demonstrate that bringing this case to trial on or before 4/13/2026 “was impossible, impracticable, or futile.”

However, California law is clear that an exclusion of time pursuant to §583.340(c) is not automatically available in all cases but rather, “[d]etermining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438.) The determination “of whether the prosecution of an action

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

was indeed impossible, impracticable, or futile during any period of time, and hence, the determination of whether the impossibility exception to the five-year statute applies, is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.” (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271.) “What is impossible, impracticable or futile must be determined in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves.” (Moran v.

Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 229, 238.) “‘[I]mpracticability and futility’ involve a determination of ‘ “excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,” ’ in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 731 [quoting Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 554].) Finally, a plaintiff seeking to rely on §583.340(c)’s tolling provision bears the burden of first establishing the existence of those circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial, along with the burden of demonstrating the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730 [citing Moran, supra].)

As noted above, Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c) indicates that the determination of the five-year limitations period shall exclude the amount of time, if any, when bringing the action to trial was impossible, impracticable or futile but case law confirms that in order for §583.340(c)’s provisions to be invoked, the plaintiff must show the existence of some facts or circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial within the five-year period, as well as the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730.)

Recently, the First District Court of Appeal in Seto v. Szeto (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 76 made clear that “a plaintiff’s duty of diligence increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period and a plaintiff has the duty to call the court’s attention to the deadline.” (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98 (citations omitted; emphasis added).) Consistently, the Second District Court of Appeal in Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action because even after the trial court assigned a specific trial date which was beyond the five-year period, the plaintiffs still had “ample time after [trial setting] to bring a motion to advance the trial date” but failed to do so. (Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274.)

The Second District Court of Appeal explained that where a plaintiff possesses the means to bring a matter to trial before the expiration of the five-year period by filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial, the plaintiff’s failure to bring such motion will preclude a later claim of impossibility or impracticability. (Id., at 1274 (citations omitted).)

Here, there is no claim that the jurisdiction of the Court to try the action was ever “suspended” or that the prosecution of trial of this action was ever “stayed or enjoined”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

as referenced in Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(a) or (b). Thus, all that remains is to determine whether plaintiff has satisfied his burden to warrant an exclusion of time under Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c) and the Court will therefore now consider each of the various arguments advanced by plaintiff in an attempt to show that it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring this matter to trial on or before 4/13/2026 and why time should be excluded from the calculation of the five-year period pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c).

The opposition’s first contention relating to “obstructionist conduct” is specifically addressed to non-moving defendants Badhan, Sandhu, Capital City Logistics and Capital City Cargo (see Opp., p.4:6-p.5:6; p.5:16-p.7:2) but because none of this allegedly “obstructionist conduct” is fairly attributable to defendant AGCS, this does not provide plaintiff with a basis for tolling of the five-year statute as applied to defendant AGCS. Likewise, the opposition specifically asserts that defendant PEI should be estopped from seeking dismissal on account of the conduct of its own counsel (see, Id., at p.7:4-p.8:3) but again, this conduct is not properly attributable to defendant AGCS and does not afford plaintiff with any grounds for tolling of the five-year statute with respect to defendant AGCS itself.

The only discernible argument offered by the opposition about why defendant AGCS should be estopped from relying on the five-year statute is that (1) defendant AGCS’ 12/31/2025 Case Management Statement not only identified numerous dates beyond the five-year deadline for which its counsel was unavailable for trial but also indicated discovery would not be completed prior to the expiration of the five-year statute on 4/13/2026 and (2) “Plaintiff relied on these representations.” (Opp., p.8:5-15).

While plaintiff claims to rely on these “representations,” it remains unclear to this Court what plaintiff believes was “represented” by such statements but more critically, such generic statements in a Case Management Statement do not constitute a “written stipulation” or an “oral agreement made in open court” to extend the five year period as required under §583.330, nor can such statements be reasonably construed as some sort of affirmative indication that defendant AGCS was effectively waiving the five-year statute.

Notably, a Case Management Statement is neither executed under penalty of perjury nor verified by the client. But regardless of plaintiff’s purported reliance on such “representations,” such asserted reliance was clearly neither reasonable nor justified under the circumstances given that in the very same Case Management Statement, AGCS specifically stated:

Per C.C.P. section 583.310, the 5-year statute to bring the action to trial expires on April 13, 2026. The parties have not stipulated to extend the time for the case to be brought to trial. Plaintiff’s counsel previously identified more than 10 lay depositions that he intends to take before the non-expert discovery cutoff, but

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

there has been no action for over a year. (Def. AGCS 12/31/2025 Case Mgmt. Stm., p.5, ¶18 (underline added for emphasis).)

Consequently, this Court is not persuaded that defendant AGCS’s 12/31/2025 Management Statement provides plaintiff with a valid basis on which to estop AGCS from seeking dismissal based on the five-year deadline.

Second, the opposition suggests that once the Court was alerted to the looming expiration of the five-year period on 4/13/2026, the Court was required to immediately order this case to trial setting so trial could timely commence before the 4/13/2026 deadline. (Opp., at p.9:24-p.10:11.) However, plaintiff’s suggestion entirely contradicts the law set forth in the various binding appellate decisions including those cited above, which unequivocally place the duty and burden of getting a case to trial within the fiveyear period on the plaintiff alone. (See, e.g., Seto v.

Szeto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98 [“a plaintiff’s duty of diligence increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period and a plaintiff has the duty to call the court’s attention to the deadline”]; Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274 [when trial date beyond the five-year period was assigned, plaintiffs still had “ample time to bring motion to advance the trial date” but failed to do so; failure to do so precludes a later claim of impossibility or impracticability]; Howard v.

Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 438 [whether §583.340(c) applies depends plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming obstacles].) Indeed here, as reflected by the Register of Actions, plaintiff did not seek either setting of trial, or if necessary, a special setting of trial, at any time during the five-year period. Worse yet, while the duty to be aware of and comply with the five-year statute lies entirely with plaintiff, even if he was not cognizant of when the five-year statute would expire, plaintiff was expressly told by AGCS in its 12/31/2025 Case Management Statement that AGCS’s position was that (1) the five-year statute “expires on April 13, 2026” and (2) “the parties have not stipulated to extend the time for the case to be brought to trial.” Upon being so notified on or around 12/31/2025, plaintiff still had time remaining to seek from the Presiding Judge by motion made under Local Rule 1.05, a special setting of a trial date to occur before 4/13/2026.

But again, plaintiff failed to take any prompt action. As indicated earlier, pursuant to Seto v. Szeto, plaintiff was under an increasing duty of diligence as the end of the five-year period approached.

Third, plaintiff has also argued in a generic, conclusory fashion that the existence of a related case in Arizona “can also toll the five-year statute” (see Opp., p.5:7-14) but the opposition offers no meaningful discussion of the purportedly related case in Arizona or the specific reasons why tolling should in fact apply under the circumstances in this case. Instead, plaintiff’s assertion consists of little more than a vague claim that “[t]he

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

proceedings in this case should be tolled for the [unspecified] length of time it took to prosecute and resolved [sic] this related case.” (Opp., p.5:12-14.) Plaintiff’s contention falls flat because his failure to offer relevant legal authority and meaningful analysis or discussion of the point advanced may be construed as a waiver of the point. (See, e.g., Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008 [“failure to offer reasoned analysis of the issue constitutes a waiver”]; Cahill v.

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [when party fails to support assertion with reasoned argument and citations to authority, point is treated as waived].) Additionally, based on the authorities cited above, a plaintiff seeking to rely on §583.340(c)’s tolling provision must not only establish the existence of those circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial but also demonstrate the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730 [citing Moran, supra].)

While plaintiff points to the existence of the purportedly related case which had been pending in Arizona from 2021 through 2024, the opposition papers fail to explain in a meaningful manner how the pendency of this Arizona case made it impracticable, impossible, or futile for plaintiff to bring the present action to trial on or before the 4/13/2026 deadline. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument based on the existence of a related case falls short of providing him with a valid basis for extending the five-year period beyond 4/13/2026.

It is worth adding here that California law indicates the “[t]ime consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the contemplation of the[] exceptions [for impossibility, impracticability or futility].” (Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1270 (underline added for emphasis).) Thus, plaintiff can here make no argument that time should be excluded under §583.340 as result of the time needed to conduct discovery, motion practice and/or waiting for hearing dates on the Court’s calendar.

Furthermore, this Court consistently permits parties to request via ex parte application the advancement of any hearing date if a trial date is quickly approaching and thus, plaintiff cannot justifiably complain regarding any of the Court’s processes. Additionally, while the opposition offers little evidence indicating that plaintiff has actually been diligent in prosecuting this case, the more critical inquiry is whether plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in overcoming the obstacles in prosecuting the action and ensuring a timely commencement of the trial. (See, e.g., Howard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 438.)

Here, there is in the final analysis no evidentiary showing that it would have been unreasonably difficult or impracticable for plaintiff to have taken those steps necessary to ensure this case proceeded to trial on or before the 4/13/2026 deadline.

Disposition

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00298634-CU-BT-GDS: Umar N. Saeed, individually and as assignee of Naiel Enterprises vs. Sandeep Badhan 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

Because the five-year statute expired on 4/13/2026 and because plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing entitlement to additional time pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c), defendant ACGS’s present motion to dismiss is GRANTED but only without prejudice.

Defendant PEI’s “Notice of Joinder” is DROPPED from calendar due to defective service of notice as explained above.

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, defendant ACGS to prepare for the Court’s consideration a proposed order and judgment of dismissal without prejudice consistent with this ruling.

Defendant ACGS to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)