JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al.

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

Tentative Ruling: Defendant Sutter Valley Medical Foundation’s (“Sutter”) demurrer to Plaintiff Jane LS Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint (“SAC”) is ruled upon as follows. Plaintiff’s SAC alleges the following causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) gender violence; (3) sexual harassment; (4) sexual assault; (5) sexual battery; (6) constructive fraud; (7) negligence; (8) negligent supervision; (9) negligent hiring and retention; (10) negligent failure to warn, train and educate; (11) unfair business practices.

Plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, constructive fraud, negligence, negligent supervision, negligent hiring and retention, negligent failure to warn, train and educate and unfair business practices against Sutter. Sutter brings the instant Demurrer as to the following causes of action only: the first cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress; the third cause of action for sexual harassment; the sixth cause of action for constructive fraud; and the eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices, on the grounds that these causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and on the grounds that they are uncertain.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against demurrer.' (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39; Bagatti v. Dept. of Rehabilitation (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 352.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ.Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

The Court treats as true not only the complaint's material factual allegations, but also facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Amarel v. Connell, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 141.) “A court will not consider facts which have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably inferred from the matters which have been pled or are proper subjects of judicial notice.” (Hall v. Great Western Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 722, n. 7.) Rather, “facts not alleged are presumed not to exist.” (Schick v.

Lerner (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1327.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318; William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v.

Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn.2.) The Court is to give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318) A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v.

Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733, citation omitted.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v.

Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Analysis

First Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress In order to state a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (2) extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and (3) proximate causation between the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct and the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. (Carlsen v. Koivunaki (2004) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 896).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

Sutter contends that while the SAC details the actions of other defendants, it lacks specific factual assertions demonstrating that Sutter either intended to inflict emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard for the probable emotional harm. Sutter argues that this deficiency is crucial as established by case law, which mandates that mere conclusory statements or vague allegations are inadequate to support an IIED claim. (Sutter Memorandum, 6:19-23.) Sutter further argues that the SAC fails to specifically state any action or inaction allegedly taken by Sutter which caused Plaintiff emotional distress.

Sutter argues that, as pled, the SAC fails to set forth the minimum specific facts necessary to enable Sutter to intelligently respond to the pleading without having to guess or speculate as to the items of material or essential facts. (Ankeny v. Lockheed Missile & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal.All.3d 531, 537.) Hence, Sutter asserts that this cause of action is uncertain and ambiguous as to Sutter. (Sutter Memorandum, 7:1-8.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has alleged extreme and outrageous conduct engaged in by Sutter, in alleging that Sutter “[put] a known sex predator in charge of a vulnerable population that he is known to target.” (Opposition, 4:27 – 5:1.)

Plaintiff refers to paragraph 62 of the SAC, which alleges: A reasonable person would not expect or tolerate Defendants intentionally putting KNOX, who was known to Defendants to have physically and sexually abused other female patients, in a position of care over any additional patients, including Plaintiff. However, Defendants intentionally assigned KNOX to treat Plaintiff, continued to hold him out as a legitimate medical provider, despite knowledge of the May 2021 complaints from another female patient, which only enabled KNOX to have access to Plaintiff so that he could commit wrongful sexual acts, including the conduct described herein.

Plaintiff had great trust, faith and confidence in Defendants, which, by virtue of Defendants' wrongful conduct, turned to fear. (SAC, ¶ 62.) The Court concludes that the SAC is not ambiguous as to its claims against Sutter. The Court notes that Sutter also spends considerable time in its moving and reply papers discussing the requirement that the conduct must be directed at Plaintiff in order to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on Plaintiff. The Court finds this argument unconvincing.

Sutter’s demurrer to the first cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is OVERRULED on the grounds that it is ambiguous, and on the grounds that insufficient facts are alleged to show that conduct was directed at Plaintiff. However, the Court concludes that the SAC is deficient in that it fails to allege facts demonstrating that Sutter either intended to inflict emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard for the probable emotional harm.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

This is the first attack on the pleadings, and the Court concludes that it is possible for Plaintiff to amend to add factual allegations, if such facts exist, which would cure this defect. For this reason, Sutter’s demurrer to the first cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Third Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment in violation of Civil Code section 51.9. On demurrer, Sutter argues that the SAC asserts that all Defendants intentionally, recklessly, and wantonly engaged in acts of a sexual nature, resulting in harmful and offensive contact with the Plaintiff’s intimate parts, but fails to provide clear allegations regarding Sutter’s intent or the specific actions that demonstrate such intent.

Sutter further argues that Plaintiff appears to be alleging respondeat superior liability against Sutter, and that, if so, Plaintiff must allege facts that Sutter had prior knowledge of a propensity on the part of Dr. Knox to engage in sexual abuse. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corporation (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105, 1110-1112). Sutter asserts that the SAC contains no such facts. In opposition, Plaintiff argues she has alleged sufficient facts to support a theory of liability based upon respondeat superior or ratification.

The Court finds the SAC does not plead sufficient facts to support respondeat superior liability against Sutter based on the alleged sexual acts perpetrated against Plaintiff by Dr. Knox. (See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291.) In Lisa M. plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by an ultrasound technician during an ultrasound exam. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the employer was not vicariously liable for this conduct because the assault was not an outgrowth of the technician's job duties.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee if those acts occurred during the 'course and scope of employment.' (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal. 4th at 296.) However, for an employer to be held liable for an intentional tort, the tort must have a causal nexus to the employee's work, meaning that the tort must arise from the work of the employment. (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal. 4th at 297.) In other words, 'the risk of tortious injury must be 'foreseeable' in the sense it is inherent in the working environment' of the employee's typical employment. (MP. v.

City of Sacramento (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 121, 129.) 'But for' causation is not applicable to respondeat superior liability; it is not enough that employment merely brought tortfeasor and victim together. (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal. 4th at 298- 99.) 'The employment must be such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.' (Id. at 299.) Plaintiff has alleged that Sutter continued to give Dr. Knox access to patients, and gave Dr.

Knox access to Plaintiff, “despite knowledge of the May 2021 complaints from another female

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

patient.” (SAC, ¶ 62.) Plaintiff further pled in a conclusory manner that Dr. Know “was known to Defendants to have physically and sexually abused other female patients.” (Ibid.) These allegations are insufficient to support the foreseeability necessary to place respondeat liability on Sutter for his actions. Furthermore, the conclusory allegations are insufficiently particular to support a ratification theory of liability. This is the first attack on the pleadings, and the Court concludes that it is possible for Plaintiff to amend to add factual allegations, if such facts exist, which would cure this defect.

As a result, Sutter’s demurrer to the third cause of action for sexual harassment is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Sixth Cause of Action for Constructive Fraud Pursuant to Civil Code section 1573: Constructive fraud consists: (1) In any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or anyone claiming under him/her, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him/her; or (2) In any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud.

Like an action for fraud, constructive fraud must be pled with specificity. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1250.) Sutter argues that the SAC fails to meet these requirements. Sutter posits that the SAC broadly asserts that all Defendants engaged in acts of suppression and concealment, allegedly with the intent to induce the Plaintiff to forbear her rights and cause harm, and that Defendants made misrepresentations, suppressions, and concealments meant to mislead the Plaintiff and others, and that Defendants knew or should have known of these actions.

However, Sutter argues that the SAC “is conspicuously lacking in the necessary factual detail required to support these allegations. It fails to specify what, if any, misrepresentations, suppressions, or concealments were made, or to provide essential information such as ‘how, when, where, to whom, and by what means’ the alleged misrepresentations or concealments occurred.” (Sutter Memorandum, 9:14-22.) Sutter argues that this lack of specificity, in addition to the failure to distinguish these allegations amongst the Defendants, makes it impossible for Sutter to properly respond to the fraud claim. (Sutter Memorandum, 9:22-24.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that fraud is adequately pled and argues that by holding Dr. Knox out as an agent of Sutter and by allowing him to undertake the medical care of its patients, such as Plaintiff, Sutter entered into a confidential, fiduciary, and special relationship with Plaintiff, and that Sutter’s the actions taken contrary to these interests were a breach of that relationship. On reply, Sutter aptly emphasizes that Plaintiff’s opposition fails to address Sutter’s argument

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

that the cause of action fails because it does not include the specifics of the alleged fraud, such as the “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means” the alleged misrepresentations or concealments occurred. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's opposition does not specifically address Sutter’s argument, which the Court construes as a concession on the merits. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4.) This is the first attack on the pleadings, and the Court concludes that it is possible for Plaintiff to amend to add factual allegations, if such facts exist, which would cure this defect.

Sutter’s demurrer as to the sixth cause of action for constructive fraud is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Eleventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices Business and Professions Code §17200 prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. Claims brought under Section 17200 must be supported by facts stated with reasonable particularity. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 (a “plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation”).)

Sutter contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support her allegations, let alone facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. Sutter argues that Plaintiff only generally claims that Defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair and deceptive business practices, including allowing Dr. Knox to engage in repeated harassment of patients and failing to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment and abuse from occurring. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the SAC alleges that Sutter engaged in unfair business practices by concealing Dr.

Knox’s history of sexual abuse, thereby misleading patients, like Plaintiff, and the public at large. (SAC, ¶ 51.) This allegation, coupled with the alleged financial benefit Defendant received from retaining Dr. Knox as a physician (SAC, ¶ 13), is sufficient to state a claim under Business and Professions Code §17200 et seq. Plaintiff argues that the SAC provides sufficient notice of the nature of the unfair business practices claim, and further details can be obtained through discovery. As discussed by the Court above, while the SAC does, in a conclusory fashion, allege that Sutter knew of Dr.

Knox’s prior sexual abuse, mere conclusions are not enough. Plaintiff must allege facts to supports its claims that Sutter possessed such knowledge. This is the first attack on the pleadings, and the Court concludes that it is possible for Plaintiff to amend to add factual allegations, if such facts exist, which would cure this defect. As a result, Sutter’s demurrer to the eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013840: JANE LS DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK KNOX, et al. 05/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint in Department 54

Plaintiff may file and serve a third amended complaint no later than June 12, 2025. Defendants shall file and serve its response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the second amended complaint is served by mail. This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)