Through the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) in the Breach of Contract Action, CVC prays the Court for a declaration of CVC and CVHG’s respective rights in and to those proceeds, pursuant to their written agreement. (See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 15-17, 31-35, and Prayer at 12:4-11.) As such, the Court finds common questions of law and fact between the two actions, and further finds that consolidation would promote convenient and judicial economy. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subs. (a); see also Wouldridge v. Burnes, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 86.)

That the Breach of Contract Action also seeks damages for alleged breach, by CVHG, of the parties’ agreement does not, in the Court’s estimation, defeat the advantages of consolidation.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Kenneth Salomon 25CV001875

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. Defendant is granted 15 days’ leave from notice of entry of order to file and serve a response to the Summons and Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (b).) Plaintiff is directed to provide notice of entry of order.

Defendant Kenneth Salomon (“Defendant”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), 5 for an order quashing Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank’s (“Plaintiff”) personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant on March 31, 2026.

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over him because service of the summons and complaint was not completed within 180 days of filing the complaint on September 11, 2025, as required by Rules of Court, rule 3.740(d).

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In Opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute the 180-day service- and proof-filing deadline, or that Plaintiff failed to comply with that deadline. However, Plaintiff argues that noncompliance is not a jurisdictional defect or a ground to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), and it alone does not render service void. Rather, the consequence for noncompliance is set out in rule 3.740(e), which provides that the Court may issue an OSC regarding reasonable monetary sanctions. Plaintiff points out that Defendant has not challenged any other defect in the service.

Defendant filed nothing by way of a reply or response to the Opposition.

5 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Rule 3.740 is not a jurisdictional rule; rather, it establishes case management procedures for collections cases. Subdivision (e) of rule 3.740 is entitled “Effect of failure to serve within required time” and provides the mechanism by which noncompliance with the 180-day service rule is handled by the court—i.e., the court may set an OSC why reasonable monetary sanctions should not be imposed, which hearing is to be continued if plaintiff thereafter files a proof of service.

This timing requirement is a procedural mandate designed to promote efficient case management rather than jurisdictional prerequisites that affect the court’s fundamental authority. In sum, Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint is not void solely by the fact that service occurred outside of the 180-day deadline. Defendant raises no other challenges to service. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.

Integon National Insurance Company v. Andrew Madison 26CV000413 Mackenzie-Davis et al

MOTION BY PLAINTIFF FOR ORDER PERMITTING SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT ANDREW MADISON MACKENZIE-DAVIS BY PUBLICATION

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.

Plaintiff Integon National Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50, 6 for an order directing that service of the summons and complaint in this action on defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis (“Mackenzie-Davis”) be effected by publication of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in Napa County.

The matter originally came on for hearing on May 8, 2026. Attorney Robert Stoll appeared on behalf of defendant Bryson Hall, who is involved in separate litigation with Mackenzie-Davis in another California state court. Attorney Stoll represented that Plaintiff is apparently providing Mackenzie-Davis a defense in the separate litigation. Therefore, Attorney Stoll argued, Plaintiff’s contention that it cannot locate Mackenzie-Davis for purposes of the instant motion lacks credibility. Attorney Patrick Howe appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

No one appeared on behalf of Mackenzie-Davis. Attorney Howe did not dispute that Plaintiff is providing a defense to Mackenzie-Davis in the separate litigation. However, Attorney Howe stated that Plaintiff is represented by separate attorneys in that litigation and that Mackenzie- Davis has an interest in Plaintiff losing the present case. The Court continued the matter to allow Attorney Stoll to serve and file a response to the motion by May 22, 2026. Attorney Howe was granted leave to file a Reply no later than May 27, 2026.

There is nothing new on file from the May 8, 2026 hearing.

“A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable

6 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

diligence be served in another manner specified in this article and that either (1) A cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he or she is a necessary or proper party to the action, [or] (2) The party to be served has or claims an interest in real or personal property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action consists wholly or in part in excluding the party from any interest in the property.” (§ 415.50, subd. (a).) The basic test is whether the declaration shows plaintiff took “those steps which a reasonable person who truly desired to give notice would have taken under the circumstances.” (Donel, Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 327, 333.)

The Court finds, from the Declaration of Patrick Howe, that Mackenzie-Davis cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner, as Mackenzie-Davis’ current address is unknown after various attempts and manners to locate it. Even though no opposition was filed despite the Court granting a continuance, the Court has considered the comments made at the May 8, 2026 hearing. Given Attorney Howe’s assertions—that separate attorneys represent Plaintiff in its defense of Defendant in the separate litigation and that the present action is against the interest of Defendant—the Court is not persuaded by Attorney Stoll’s suggestion that Plaintiff has or can obtain the requisite information necessary to serve Mackenzie-Davis in another manner. Moreover, the Court is satisfied by Plaintiff’s showing that Mackenzie-Davis is a necessary or proper party to this action.

The Nichols Partnership LLC v. SRGA LP et al 26CV000499

[1] APPLICATION OF JONATHAN G. PRAY FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE

TENTATIVE RULING: There is no proof of payment of $600 to California Bar Association. If the missing proof is filed prior to the hearing, the application will be GRANTED without need for appearance. If no proof of service is filed, the petition will be CONTINUED to June 26, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B to allow petitioner time to remedy the deficiency.

The moving party fails to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith.

The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

[2] APPLICATION OF REILLY E. MEYER FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE

TENTATIVE RULING: There is no proof of payment of $600 to California Bar Association. If the missing proof is filed prior to the hearing, the application will be GRANTED