Motion to Quash
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MARCH 20, 2026
3. CHEEK, ET AL. v. FITZPATRICK, ET AL., 25CV0391
Motion to Quash
On January 7, 2026, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10,
subdivision (a)(1), specially-appearing defendants James Fitzpatrick and Gloria
Fitzpatrick (collectively, “specially-appearing defendants”) filed the instant motion to
quash service of summons and second amended complaint (“SAC”) on the grounds that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction (general and specific) over specially-appearing
defendants. On March 9, 2026, plaintiffs filed a timely response to the motion. On
March 13, 2026, specially-appearing defendants filed a timely reply.
On March 16, 2026, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a supplemental declaration in response
to specially-appearing defendants’ reply. Because this declaration is not an authorized
filing, the court does not consider it.
1.
Background
This is a personal injury action brought against the driver and owners of the
allegedly at-fault vehicle. Specially-appearing defendants own the subject-vehicle and
are both residents of Nevada. Neither of them were physically present during the
underlying incident.
On November 26, 2025, specially-appearing defendants were served the summons
and SAC as nonresidents pursuant to the provisions of Vehicle Code section 17451. (Bissonnette Decl., filed Mar. 9, 2026, ¶ 4 & Ex. 2.)
2. Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice (contained in plaintiffs’ opposition brief filed
March 9, 2026) is not properly before the court because it was not filed in a separate
document. (Cal. Rules of Ct., R. 3.1113, subd. (l).) Even if the request were properly
before the court, the court would deny it for the same reasons as stated in the court’s
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LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MARCH 20, 2026
tentative ruling issued September 18, 2025, related to specially-appearing defendants’
first motion to quash.
3. Legal Principles
If a defendant properly files a motion to quash service of summons for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence the prima facie facts entitling the court to assume jurisdiction. (Viaview,
Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 209–210.) A judge has jurisdiction to make an
initial determination about the court’s alleged lack of personal jurisdiction where, as here, it is challenged by a “specially appearing” defendant. (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH
v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1228.)
4.
Discussion
Plaintiffs argue the court has personal jurisdiction over specially-appearing
defendants because they gave their son express or implied permission to use the
subject-vehicle within the State of California. (Veh. Code, § 17451.) Vehicle Code
section 17451 (“Service of process on nonresident”) provides: “The acceptance by a
nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred upon him by this code..., or in the
event the nonresident is the owner of a motor vehicle then by the operation of the
vehicle anywhere within this state by any person with his express or implied permission,
is equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident of the director [of motor vehicles]
or his successor in office to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against the ... nonresident owner
growing out of any accident or collision resulting from the operation of any motor
vehicle anywhere within this state by himself or agent, which appointment shall also be
irrevocable and binding upon his executor or administrator.” (Ibid.)
Specially-appearing defendants appear to concede in their moving papers that they
permitted their son to drive the subject-vehicle and knew he would drive it in California. (See Mtn. at 1:27–28.) They claim, however, that these facts do not give rise to the level
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MARCH 20, 2026
of intentional conduct needed to establish California’s personal jurisdiction over
defendants. The court disagrees.
In the absence of evidence showing that specially-appearing defendants did not
permit their son to use the vehicle within the State of California, the court finds that
plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the
prima facie fact that specially-appearing defendants implicitly permitted their son to use
the vehicle in the State of California. (Cf. Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866,
869–870 [finding no permissive use of a rental vehicle where the rental agreement expressly limited use of said vehicle to use in the State of Arizona].)
Therefore, service was valid under Vehicle Code section 17451. The motion to quash
is denied.
TENTATIVE RULING # 3: THE MOTION TO QUASH IS DENIED. NO HEARING ON THIS
MATTER WILL BE HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247),
UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS
TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE
TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS
ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY
TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.