TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

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TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendant’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Defendant City of Sacramento’s (“Defendant”) Demurrer to Plaintiff Omar Tapia’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This is a personal injury action for injuries to a minor Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s form FAC alleges a single cause of action for premises liability, based on the assertion that Defendant or its employees negligently maintained, operated, and controlled a playground, thus failing “to provide a safe and secure environment for children to play in, and failed to warn the general public of a dangerous situation.” (FAC., p. 5.) On or around July 5, 2023, “Plaintiff was playing on a trampoline and/or a similar playground equipment. As he was jumping off said playground equipment, he fell causing him to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

sustain injuries.” (Ibid.)

On February 18, 2026, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s initial complaint, finding that Defendant was entitled to immunity pursuant to Government Code sections 831.7 and 835.

Defendant now demurs to Plaintiff’s FAC on the grounds that it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for premises liability against Defendant. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140- 141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s cause of action for premises liability fails because: (1) falling off of a trampoline is an inherent risk and not a property defect, and thus Defendant is entitled to immunity pursuant to Government Code section 831.7; (2) Plaintiff has not properly pled his claims showing that Defendant knew or should have known of the alleged dangerous condition, thus Defendant is entitled to immunity pursuant to Government Code section 835; (3) FAC is a “sham pleading”; and (4) the alleged dangerous condition is a “trivial defect.”

Governmental Immunity

Defendant argues that it is immune from the instant action pursuant to Government Code sections 831.7 and 835, and Civil Code section 846. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to immunity under these sections.

Government Code section 831.7

Defendant argues that use of a trampoline in an inherently risky activity, as delineated by Government Code section 831.7(b)(3), and therefore, Defendant is immune to injuries which arise out of said inherently dangerous activities.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Section 831.7(c)(1) provides a statutory exception to the immunity provided therein where there was a failure of the public entity to guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or the injuries were caused by the public entity’s failure to properly construct or maintain in good repair the equipment utilized in the hazardous recreational activity.

California law imposes a higher pleading standard for statutory claims, requiring they be pleaded with particularity and show every fact essential to the existence of liability under the relevant statute. (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Trans. Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.)

Government Code section 831.7(a) provides:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable to any person who participates in a hazardous recreational activity, including any person who assists the participant, or to any spectator who knew or reasonably should have known that the hazardous recreational activity created a substantial risk of injury to himself or herself and was voluntarily in the place of risk, or having the ability to do so failed to leave, for any damage or injury to property or persons arising out of that hazardous recreational activity.

(emphasis added.) Subsection 831.7 (b) defines “hazardous recreational activity” to mean “a recreational activity conducted on property of a public entity that creates a substantial, as distinguished from a minor, trivial, or insignificant, risk of injury to a participant.” Section 831.7 further enumerates certain activities that qualify as hazardous recreational activity, including “trampolining.”

Government Code section 831.7(c) further provides:

(c)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), this section does not limit liability that would otherwise exist for any of the following:

(A) Failure of the public entity or employee to guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity or employee that is not reasonably assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.

(C) Injury suffered to the extent proximately caused by the negligent failure of the public entity or public employee to properly construct or maintain in good repair any structure, recreational equipment or machinery, or substantial work of improvement utilized in the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.

(E) An act of gross negligence by a public entity or public employee that is the proximate cause of the injury.

(emphasis added.) Subsection (c)(1)(A) “establishes that the Legislature's aim was to withhold immunity if the public entity failed to warn or guard against a dangerous condition or hazardous activity that was not an inherent part of the activity specified in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

the statute. Thus, in determining whether a public entity is entitled to statutory immunity, a plaintiff's knowledge of any particular risks is irrelevant.” (Mubanda v. City of Santa Barbara (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 256, 263 (Mubanda) (quoting Perez v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1387 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] (Perez).)

Here, Plaintiff’s cause of action, as currently pled, alleges that Plaintiff sustained injuries when he fell after jumping off a trampoline. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants negligently, recklessly and/or wantonly owned, maintained, managed, operated, controlled and safeguarded the premises and/or playground at or near 1990 Roma Ct, Sacramento, CA 95833, such that employees and/or staff failed to provide a safe and secure environment for children to play in, and failed to warn the general public of a dangerous situation.

Plaintiff alleges that all times relevant hereto, Defendants knew of the condition of the premises, or should have known of the premises under reasonable inspection procedures. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that Defendants failed to properly train their employees and/or supervise their staff to address potential dangers to children, and failed to barricade the area and/or to warn of the dangerous condition, rendering the area on said premises dangerous, and resulting in serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff in the following manner: On or about July 5, 2023 Plaintiff was playing on a trampoline and/or a similar playground equipment. As he was jumping off said playground equipment, he fell causing him to sustain injuries.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the trampoline equipment and component parts did not meet current ASTM and CPSC safety standards. Plaintiff is informed and believes that trampoline itself was in a defective and dangerous condition as evidenced by wear, tear, debris, and graffiti on the surface of the trampoline at the time of the incident. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that the rope that surrounds the trampoline did not meet all relevant safety codes or standards, because dimensions of the walking, climbing or crawl space surrounding the trampoline were larger than what is allowed by law. Plaintiff alleges that due to these deficiencies, he lost his balance on the trampoline and fell tearing the meniscus in his knee.

The actions of the Defendants and/or it’s employees were below the standard of care and were the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

(FAC., p. 6.)

Falling while jumping off a trampoline is a risk reasonably assumed by a participant that is inherent in the hazardous recreational activity of trampolining. Plaintiff’s FAC alleges additional facts that “Plaintiff is further informed and believes that Defendants failed to properly train their employees and/or supervise their staff to address potential dangers to children, and failed to barricade the area and/or to warn of the dangerous condition,” and “Plaintiff is informed and believes that the trampoline equipment and component parts did not meet current ASTM and CPSC safety standards Plaintiff is further informed and believes that the rope that surrounds the trampoline did not meet all relevant safety codes or standards, because dimensions of the walking, climbing or crawl space surrounding the trampoline were larger than what is allowed by law.” (Ibid.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant failed to warn or guard against a dangerous condition that was not an inherent part of the activity. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED on this ground.

Government Code section 835

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for premises liability. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff must allege actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition with sufficient time to remedy it, supported by specific facts. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, and that “detail beyond ultimate facts is not required at the pleading stage.” (Opp., p. 4:22-23.)

Government Code Section 835 sets out the exclusive framework under which a public entity can be held liable for injuries caused by a condition of its property. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129.) Under Government Code section 835 public entities such as Defendant may be liable on a claim for “dangerous condition of public property” if the subject property was in a “dangerous condition” at the time of the injury, the injury was proximately caused by the “dangerous condition,” the “dangerous condition” created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the “dangerous condition” a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken remedial action. (See Tansavatdi v.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 647 [“Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code § 810 et seq.), a public entity can be held liable for either creating a dangerous condition on its property or failing to protect against such a condition when the entity had notice of the danger and sufficient time to remedy the situation.”].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

“To establish actual notice, ‘[t]here must be some evidence that the employees had knowledge of the particular dangerous condition in question’; ‘it is not enough to show that the [public entity's] employees had a general knowledge’ that the condition can sometimes occur.” (Kabat v. Department of Transportation (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 651, 665 [quoting Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 519].) “A public entity has ‘constructive notice of a dangerous condition’ ‘only if’ (1) “the condition had existed for” some period of time prior to the plaintiff's accident, and (2) ‘the condition ... was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.’” (Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.)

The FAC alleges that “Defendants knew of the condition of the premises, or should have known of the premises under reasonable inspection procedures.” (FAC, p. 5.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to establish that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of that dangerous condition given the heightened pleading standard required to plead statutory claims. (See Lopez, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 795.) As such, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts of notice to Defendant. While Plaintiff is correct that he is not required to prove his case at the pleading stage, however he is required to set forth specific facts in support of his claims, which he has not done here.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

Sham Pleading

Defendant argues that pursuant to the sham pleading doctrine, “if a previous pleading contained facts which were fatal to the complaint, and they were removed in a subsequent pleading, the fatal facts from the previous pleading can be used to attack the subsequent/current pleading.” (Mtn., p. 9:4-6.) Defendant argues that because the original complaint does not allege any defect to the subject trampoline, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to allege such facts now. Plaintiff argues that adding additional detail does not constitute a sham pleading, but rather the intended purpose of leave to amend a complaint following a challenge on the pleading stage.

“Under the sham pleading doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) The sham pleading doctrine was not “intended to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations...or to prevent correction of ambiguous facts.” (Id. at p. 426.) “If a party files an amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the original complaint by either omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective or adding facts inconsistent with those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and disregard any inconsistent allegations.” (Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, 151.)

However, “[t]he doctrine is not intended to prevent honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations or to prevent the correction of ambiguous facts.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751.) “Under the sham pleading doctrine, a pleader cannot circumvent prior admissions by the easy device of amending a pleading without explanation.” (Womack v. Lovell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772, 787, emphasis in original.)

As noted above, when the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the first amended complaint, it found that Plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts showing the existence of a dangerous condition. Plaintiff was given leave to amend to cure the deficiencies. Plaintiff's new allegations are not inconsistent with his previous allegations, and he has not omitted previously pled allegations. Therefore, the sham pleading doctrine does not apply and Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Trivial Defect

Defendant argues that the alleged defect in the trampoline do not constitute a dangerous condition, but rather a trivial defect. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that triviality cannot be determined on demurrer.

A trial court may determine a condition is trivial as a matter of law and enter judgment for the defendant where the only reasonable conclusion is that the condition is not dangerous. (Gov. Code § 830.2; McKray v. State of California (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 59, 62; Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park Dist. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 826.) Put another way, whether a dangerous condition exists is a question of fact for the jury unless reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion. (Zelig v County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1133.)

Here, the alleged defects of “wear, tear, debris, and graffiti” are not so clearly trivial to the extent that the only reasonable conclusion is that the condition was not defective. As set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show the existence of an allegedly dangerous condition. Accordingly, the Court will OVERRULE Defendant’s demurrer on this ground.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013067: TAPIA vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 06/15/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 8D

Disposition

As set forth above, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend with respect to Government Code Section 835, but overruled on all other grounds.

Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than June 25, 2026. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiff is directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the Second Amended Complaint. Defendant may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.