DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Volunteers of America Northern California & Northern Nevada’s (“VOA”) demurrer to plaintiff in pro per Raymond Douglas’ First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Moving party failed to comply with CRC Rule 2.111(3).

Both moving and opposing parties failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3).

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Opposing party also failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1113(f).

Factual Background

In July 2016, plaintiff Douglas filed a civil action against defendant VOA and his Second Amended Complaint filed in September 2021 alleged that in 2015 and 2016, plaintiff experienced various forms of battery and other interference with his rights, including restricting his movement around the VOA shelter where plaintiff was residing and improperly attempting to evict him. In April 2022, plaintiff’s 2016 action was dismissed due to his failure to bring the matter to trial within five years and a judgment of dismissal was entered on 4/7/2022.

One and one-half years later, plaintiff Douglas commenced the present action against defendant VOA with a complaint filed on 10/31/2023. After defendant VOA filed an initial demurrer, plaintiff filed his 1AC on 8/27/2024 and in it, he again alleges that in 2015 and 2016 he experienced various forms of battery, theft, harassment by defendant VOA staff and other shelter residents, and other interference with his rights, including restricting his movement around the VOA shelter where plaintiff was residing and improperly evicting him from the shelter in August 16. (1AC, pp.1-6.)

Notably, the 1AC expressly refers to the earlier 2016 action at Page 5:9-12 but plaintiff insists that he “lacked actual facts of who was committing the violent acts, how and why and was not aware of any right to sue, any violation of rights or lawful grounds to sue, due to the unripe nature of the complaint,” as well as “not hav[ing] the actual facts or limitationtriggering information to sue.” (1AC, p.5:12-16.) The 1AC proceeds to generally describe to his filings in the 2016 action and its eventual dismissal in April 2022 (Id., at ¶¶15-23) before alleging the following in Paragraph 24:

On October 31st, 2023, the plaintiff filed the above entitled action on the same facts and causes of action as the prior second amended complaint, as the discovery of the actual facts or limitation-triggering information giving rise to and the accrual of the causes of action and rights to sue occurred around April of 2021 against the new defendant, despite dismissal of the prior action solely upon failure to bring that action to trial within the required five (5) year period. Based upon the equitable toll [sic] and delayed-discovery rule, in which the plaintiff, hereby, relies, the action, herein, is still timely. (Underline added for emphasis.)

In any event, like the last operative complaint in the 2016 action, the 1AC in the present action purports to assert a total of five (5) causes of action against defendant VOA alone for negligence, violation of Civil Code §52.1(c), violation of Civil Code §52.7(b)(1) and §52(b), professional negligence and violation of Civil Code §52(b).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Moving Papers. Defendant VOA now demurs to the 1AC and each cause of action therein on the grounds it is barred by the applicable statute(s) of limitation including but not limited to “CCP [sic] 335, 338, and 340.” In short, defendant maintains that the 1AC and all causes of action therein relate to events occurring no later than 2016 and that the doctrines of “equitable tolling” and “delayed discovery” on which plaintiff’s relies are inapplicable.

Opposition. Plaintiff Douglas opposes, arguing that the 1AC pleads facts sufficient to constitute a valid of action against defendant VOA and that the 1AC includes facts sufficient to “employ the equitable toll [sic] doctrine and the delayed-discovery rule.” Notably, the opposition admits that all events giving rise to this action occurred in late 2015 and 2016 (Opp., pp.2-4) but contends the 1AC does not on its face disclose facts giving rise to a statute of limitations defense which plaintiff must “plead around” (Id., at p.5:18-20).

According to plaintiff, “consideration of the first case against the defendant under the same and similar ‘ultimate facts’ was required when pleading facts employing delayed discovery rule and equitable toll [sic] doctrine” (Id., at p.6:23-25) and “since the first case against the defendant was not litigated to finality, the plaintiff must state facts employing delayed discovery rule, as such fact have supported the rule as a matter of law” (Id., at p.8:10-11). The opposition further assert that the facts pled in the 1AC “support a pleading employing the equitable toll [sic] doctrine as a matter of law.” (Id., at p.12:26-27.)

Reply. Defendant VOA filed a reply which maintains that the delayed-discovery rule has no application to the facts of this case, as plaintiff was present at each of the alleged incidents of harm and was therefore obligated to find the facts necessary to file suit, rather than merely wait for the facts to find him. Defendant VOA also insists equitable tolling does not apply but even if it does, plaintiff is merely claiming 171 days of tolling, which is not enough to make timely the causes of action alleged in this case.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure §422.10 and §589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant VOA’s request for judicial notice of plaintiff’s original and amended complaints filed in his 2016 action, along with the judgment of dismissal of same which was entered in April 2022, is granted but only for those limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Discussion

As noted above, defendant VOA maintains that the entirety of the 1AC, including each cause of action therein, is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Although the opposition suggests that nothing on the face of the 1AC indicates any claim therein may be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, this is not borne out by the actual contents of the 1AC which specifically describe the events which occurred in the 2015- 2016 period and which have given rise to the present litigation.

Since none of the statutes of limitations applicable to the causes of action currently alleged in the 1AC exceeds four years (see, Code Civ. Proc. §335.1 [two years for battery, personal injury]; §338 [three years for statutory liability]; §340 [one year for statutory penalty, false imprisonment, property seizure]; §340.5 [one year for professional negligence of healthcare provider]; §343 [four years for any relief not otherwise provided]), this Court finds that the entirety of the 1AC is by its own terms barred by the applicable statutes of limitation because the present action was not commenced until 10/31/2023, far more than four years after the events occurring in 2015-2016.

In opposition, plaintiff maintains that the statute of limitations is not a defense here because he can establish tolling of the aforementioned limitations periods under the equitable tolling doctrine and/or the delayed-discovery rule. Therefore, the Court will now address each of these separate but distinct doctrines.

Delayed Discovery. Under this judicially-created rule, “a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that a reasonable investigation at that time would not have revealed a factual basis for that particular cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803.) Accordingly, plaintiffs are “charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put them on inquiry or if they have the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to their investigation.” (Id., at 807-08.)

A plaintiff seeking to invoke the delayed-discovery rule must plead facts showing not only the time and manner of discovery but also the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Id., at 808.) California law is clear that the burden is on the plaintiff to show the requisite diligence and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand demurrer. (See, e.g., E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319.) Still, a plaintiff need not be aware of the specific “facts” necessary to establish the claim in order to file suit, since “that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery” which may be conducted once litigation is commenced. (See, e.g., Jolly v.

Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

In the case at bar, plaintiff clearly had back in July 2016 sufficient knowledge of the facts to suspect he had suffered some injury and the existence of some wrongful cause because July 2016 is when he commenced his initial action against defendant VOA, filing a complaint alleging a variety of incidents occurring in the 2015-2016 time period which caused some harm and/or injury to him. Moreover, plaintiff subsequently filed a first and second amended complaint which not only included additional details relating to the occurrences described in the original July 2016 complaint but also included allegations relating to events occurring after the original complaint was filed in July 2016.

While it may be true that plaintiff did not at the time know at the time these earlier complaint were filed exactly who may have committed some of the incidents alleged battery or otherwise caused him harm, such knowledge was not required in order to commence the initial 2016 suit against defendant VOA since, as explained above, a plaintiff need not be aware of the specific “facts” necessary to establish the claim in order to file suit as this is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery to be conducted after litigation is commenced. (See, e.g., Jolly v.

Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1111.) Consequently, under these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how the delayed-discovery rule could be properly applied to the present 2023 action in order to establish tolling of the statutes of limitations governing the causes of action now alleged in the 1AC.

As explained above, California law requires a plaintiff relying on the delayed-discovery rule to plead facts showing not only the time and manner of discovery but also the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at 808.) The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s 1AC and finds that the paragraphs which ostensibly address these requirements are Paragraphs 21 through 24, which allege as follows:

21. In April 2021, the plaintiff had inspected his case file and was finally able to understand the full meaning of the observation notes and entire file; which lead him to the discovery of the actual facts or limitation-triggering information of the substantial harm to him and the negligent and malicious cause, giving rise to each cause of action set forth in the second amended complaint. Despite any reasonable diligent investigation, such as the questioning of suspect client and staff and the grievance procedures, which only resulted in more harm to the plaintiff and confirmation of the truth of the violent acts on a experiential or circumstantial basis, the plaintiff could not have discovered the limitation- triggering information because of the lasting emotional and mental distress and anguish suffered and the limitation-triggering information contained in the plaintiff’s case file was confidential and not subject to disclosure or release by reasonable investigation or through the grievance procedures, but was only obtainable and obtained through discovery after the action was filed.

The

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

plaintiff’s inability to discover the actual facts or limitation-triggering information earlier was due to his lasting emotional and mental distress and anguish, which prevented him from understanding the full meaning of the notes, coupled with his, then, concern only for the nightly observation notes and what was contained therein, rather than the other relevant facts contained in the rest of his case file and his economic suffering, as to whether or not he would have even been able to continue the prosecution of the suit.

22. On July 8th, 2021, the plaintiff applied for leave to file the second amended complaint, which a substantial amount of actual facts giving rise to the action and rights to sue, substantial amount of causes of action where such right(s) to sue were discovered, substantial additions to facts required for punitive damages and prayer for relief were added. The plaintiff’s application was granted and he filed the second amended complaint on September 10th, 2021.

23. On January 18th, 2022, the defendant moved to dismiss the action for failure to bring the case to trial in the required five (5) year period, and the court granted the motion and Judgement of Dismissal was entered on April 7th, 2022.

24. On October 31st, 2023, the plaintiff filed the above entitled action on the same facts and causes of action as the prior second amended complaint, as the discovery of the actual facts or limitation-triggering information giving rise to and the accrual of the causes of action and rights to sue occurred around April of 2021 against the new defendant, despite dismissal of the prior action solely upon failure to bring that action to trial within the required five (5) year period. Based upon the equitable toll [sic] and delayed-discovery rule, in which the plaintiff, hereby, relies, the action, herein, is still timely.

In sum, the 1AC alleges in pertinent part that (1) plaintiff did not discover the facts essential to prosecute this action until April 2021 when he “inspected his case file and was finally able to understand the full meaning of the observation notes and entire file,” “lead[ing] to the discovery of the actual facts or limitation-triggering information of the substantial harm to him and the negligent and malicious cause” and (2) plaintiff could not with reasonable diligence have been able to earlier make this discovery because his “case file was confidential and not subject to disclosure or release by reasonable investigation” but could only be “obtained through discovery after the action was filed.” (1AC, ¶21.)

Even assuming the above-cited allegations about plaintiff’s “case file” being “not subject to disclosure or release by reasonable investigation” until it could be “obtained through discovery after the [2016] action was filed” are true, the 1AC fails to adequately explain

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

why plaintiff could not with reasonable diligence have obtained this “case file” earlier in the course of the litigation that had been commenced nearly five years before his alleged April 2021discovery of the “limitation-triggering information” in the “case file.” Moreover, the 1AC fails to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that any of the information allegedly contained in plaintiff’s “case file” was actually essential to filing a lawsuit and it stands to reason that the information contained in the “case file” was not needed in order to commence a lawsuit since plaintiff had in fact already commenced his lawsuit back in July 2016.

Reinforcing this conclusion is plaintiff’s own admission that his 2016 action was dismissed solely due to his failure to diligently prosecute it, rather than because of some inability to plead facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action. For these reasons, the information which plaintiff claims was in his “case file” is of no clear legal significance and plaintiff’s purported discovery of it in April 2021 remains an insufficient basis on which to invoke the application of the delayed-discovery rule with respect to plaintiff’s present lawsuit.

In the end, regardless of the fact that plaintiff commenced litigation against defendant VOA back in July 2016, the 1AC at issue here admits that plaintiff was subjectively aware he had been harmed by the conduct of others in the 2015-2016 time period and under California law, a party who suspects s/he has been injured by another’s wrongful conduct cannot wait for the facts to find him/her but must instead go find them in order to file suit. (See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-398.)

In the case at bar, plaintiff himself knew or at least suspected injury as a result of some wrongful conduct occurring back in 2015-2016 but delayed filing the present action for over seven years until 10/31/2023. Specific details relating the underlying events in 2015-2016 were not necessary to commence a lawsuit since such details may be elicited through pretrial discovery once litigation is filed. (See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1111.) Thus, the 1AC here does not support application of the delayed discovery rule.

Equitable Tolling. To invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) Timely notice to the defendant; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant; and (3) reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. (See, e.g., McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 102.) In addition, equitable tolling is appropriate only where the plaintiff “has satisfied the notification purpose of a limitations statute” and its application to a particular case must not compromise a defendant’s “significant interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them.” (Id., at 100, 102.)

Further, equitable tolling applies “[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” (Id., at 100.) More recently, the California Supreme Court has clarified that the third element for equitable tolling requires the plaintiff’s conduct to be “objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith.” (Saint Francis Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV010857: DOUGLAS vs VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NORTHERN NEVADA 03/04/2025 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

9 Cal.5th 710, 729.) Construing equitable tolling’s third element as containing both an objective and a subjective component “fits the doctrine’s underlying rationales” and the doctrine applies only “in carefully considered situations to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action.” (Id.)

Setting aside for the moment the question of whether the equitable tolling doctrine is appropriately applied to the case at bar, it is important to note that both plaintiff’s 1AC and his opposition explicitly contend the statutes of limitation governing the causes of action currently alleged were tolled for a total of 171 days in order to account for two separate grievance procedures which plaintiff pursued back in 2016. (1AC, ¶15; Opp., p.15:6-16.) However, because the present litigation was not commenced until more than seven years after plaintiff allegedly suffered various harm and other wrongdoings in the 2015-2016 timeframe and because the causes of action now alleged by plaintiff are subject to statutes of limitations of no more than four years, the 171-day tolling period claimed by plaintiff would be entirely insufficient to withstand the present demurrer.

Consequently, plaintiff’s reliance on the equitable tolling doctrine is misplaced and it need not be discussed further.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant VOA’s demurrer to the 1AC is SUSTAINED in its entirety.

While the Court questions whether plaintiff will be able to cure the above-cited defects by amendment, the Court does not presently hold that leave to amend should be denied. Further, given that this is the first challenge to plaintiff’s complaint in this case on which this Court has had opportunity to rule and that plaintiff has alternatively requested leave to amend, the Court shall in its discretion GRANT leave to amend.

Plaintiff may file and serve a second amended complaint no later than 3/24/2025. Although not required by Court rule or statute, plaintiff is directed to present a copy of this order when the amended complaint is presented for filing.

Defendant VOA to respond within 30 days if the amended complaint is personally served, 35 days if served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)