H. HERRERA VS. STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, ET AL.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 25 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 7 26-CIV-00001 H. HERRERA VS. STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, ET AL.

H. HERRERA DANIEL L FEDER STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM

DEFENDANT MONTALBANO, INC.’S PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Montalbano, Inc.’s Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED, as follows:

Background:

Plaintiff Heriberto Herrera alleges he began his employment with defendants STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM and Montalbano, Inc. on or around 2016-2017 as a Counter Parts Employee. (Complaint, ¶6.)

In April of 2024, he was promoted to Parts Manager. (Id., at ¶9.)

In July 2024, he suffered a stroke and was placed on disability leave for one year. (Id., at ¶10.)

Plaintiff was initially released by his medical provider to return to work on July 1, 2025, but he suffered a second minor stroke shortly before that date and thereafter received a revised return-to-work date of July 14, 2025, with work restrictions. (Id., at ¶15.)

Plaintiff alleges he was not offered any accommodations when he returned to work, and that he was terminated on August 5, 2025 with the explanation that “the owner Scott Wright said you are 50% and we need 100%.” (Id., at ¶¶18-23.)

Plaintiff brought this action on January 2, 2026, and defendant Montalbano, Inc. filed the present Petition to Compel Arbitration on March 4, 2026, presenting three arbitration agreements signed over the course of plaintiff’s employment.

Montalbano attaches the three employment agreements to the declaration of Mike Keylin, general manager for Montalbano:

Exhibit A, signed by plaintiff on or about July 18, 2016

Exhibit B, signed by plaintiff on or about April 1, 2024

Exhibit C, signed by plaintiff on August 4, 2025, a day before he was terminated.

All three employment agreements contain arbitration clauses. The arbitration clauses in exhibits B and C look to be the same and state that they contain provisions that they are controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act.

Plaintiff argues that the July 2025 agreement was fraudulently induced, and that all three agreements are procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 26 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Petition to Compel Arbitration

California law strongly favors arbitration finding it a speedy and relatively inexpensive manner of dispute resolution. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125; Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97 (Armendariz.)

A party to an arbitration agreement may seek a court order compelling the parties to arbitrate a dispute covered by the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1291.2.)

The court must grant the petition to compel arbitration unless it finds the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the moving party; grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Id., § 1281.2.)

Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties and is accordingly governed by contract law. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.)

A proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479.)

Defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle) [citing Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972].)

Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate

Montalbano provides evidence that the parties entered into three agreements to arbitrate, firstly when Plaintiff was hired on July 18, 2016, secondly when he was promoted to Parts Manager in April 2024, and finally when his Pay Plan was updated in July 2025. (Keylin Decl., ¶¶2-4, Exh.’s A-C.)

Plaintiff does not contest the authenticity of the arbitration agreement.

Parties to the Agreement

Plaintiff argues that Montalbano has not established that it is a party to the arbitration agreements it seeks to enforce.

The first agreement at issue, the 2016 Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, states that it is between “Company” and “Employee,” with Company defined as “the employer and all of its officers, directors, managers, agents, employees, and owners.” (Keylin Decl., ¶2, Exh. A.)

Plaintiff’s complaint in this action alleges on information and belief that “Defendant MONTALBANO, INC. is a related entity, parent company, or alter ego of Defendant STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, as evidenced by the fact that Defendant MONTALBANO, INC. issued Plaintiff's final paycheck dated August 5, 2025.” (Complaint, ¶3.)

It further alleges that “Plaintiff Heriberto Herrera began his employment with Defendant STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM and MONTALBANO, INC. (herein after “Defendants”) on or around 2016- 2017 as a Counter Parts Employee.” (Id., at ¶6.)

All of the claims in the complaint are based upon plaintiff being an employee of all defendants.

Thus, as alleged and not shown to be incorrect by plaintiff’s opposition, Montalbano was plaintiff’s employer and is a party to the arbitration agreement.

Based upon these allegations, plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration with Montalbano.

It would be unfair for plaintiff to group all defendants together for purposes of his claims while at the same time denying the joint

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 27 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ relationship in order to avoid arbitration. (Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 111, 124; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1717–1718 [parent-subsidiary context]; Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 272–273 [employment and predecessorsuccessor liability contexts]; Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 784–785 [employment arena involving temporary staffing agency placement].)

The Federal Arbitration Act Governs

Although Montalbano does not provide evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Agreement’s language that it is made under the FAA and the lack of any invocation of California arbitration law is sufficient to make the FAA applicable. (Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1053–1054; Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963; Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 63, 76; Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 342-243, 346-347.)

Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary.

The legal matters that this court is required to interpret for an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA are: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and (2) if there is, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 90; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84; Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 960–961.)

The language of the agreement needs to be sufficiently clear regarding the scope of disputes subject to arbitration. (E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 289.)

In this case, there is an arbitration agreement.

Exhibit C was in effect when plaintiff was terminated.

Thus, it applies.

However, Exhibit B, the prior agreement, covers the same terms.

The arbitration agreement by its terms covers the dispute at issue.

Fraud in the Inducement

Plaintiff contends that this court, rather than an arbitrator, decides the issue of fraud in the inducement citing to Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 394 (Rosenthal) and Larian v. Larian (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 751 and defendant does not argue otherwise.

California law distinguishes between fraud in the execution or inception of a contract as compared to fraud in the inducement; fraud in the execution or inception of an entire agreement renders the contract void ab initio.

In that instance, "the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void." (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p 415 [quoting Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1028.])

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 28 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Here, plaintiff argues that his “challenge here goes directly to the arbitration agreement itself — specifically the July 2025 Pay Plan — not merely to the underlying employment relationship.” (Opp. at 4:20-22.)

Plaintiff claims that defendants had an affirmative duty to disclose that his termination was imminent or already decided before presenting him with an agreement which contained an arbitration provision and the failure to make that disclosure is fraudulent concealment and voids the 2025 agreement.

Plaintiff also contends that Kayln made an affirmative misrepresentation that the document was the “same as last time” and directed him to sign it without reading it or consideration its terms.

Both the facts and the law do not support plaintiff’s position.

Factually, the argument fails because the agreements in 2024 and 2025 contain the same language for the arbitration agreement; thus there was nothing false about a statement that the agreement was the same as last time.

Legally, plaintiff cites to no law, and the court is aware of none, that requires an employer to disclose in advance that termination was imminent.

Further “The fact that [a plaintiff] either chose not to read or take the time to understand [the] provisions is legally irrelevant.” (Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 383; see also Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 226 [“An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.”].)

Unconscionability

The general law regarding unconscionability is well-established.

Unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, and both must be found in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause based on unconscionability. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)

Procedural unconscionability looks at the process surrounding the contract formation, and focuses on “oppression” or “surprise” due to unequal bargaining power. (Ibid.)

Substantive unconscionability applies such that even if a contract or provision is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, the contract or provision will not be enforced if it is “overly harsh” or has “one-sided” results. (Ibid.)

Although both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be found, they need not be present in the same degree. (Ibid.)

In other words, the more substantively oppressive a provision or contract, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required. (Ibid.; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910 (Sanchez).)

Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionably because it was presented on a take-it-or leave it basis and was a condition of employment, he never received a copy of it, and he could not review it.

This court recognizes our Supreme Court’s statement that “jobseekers are more likely to face particularly acute’ economic pressure to sign an employment contract with a predispute arbitration provision, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.” (Sanchez, supra 61 Cal.4th at p. 919 [citations and internal quotations omitted].)

However, the

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 29 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ finding of an adhesion contract is only the beginning, not the end of the inquiry and the court will scrutinize the substantive terms of the contract to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or onesided. (Id. at p. 915; Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 157.)

The court finds a slight degree of procedural unconscionability.

The fact that as our Supreme Court states that few employees are in a position to reject a job because of an arbitration requirement (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 115) supports some finding of procedural unconscionability.

However, the facts demonstrate that plaintiff signed three employment contracts containing arbitration agreements over a nine year period.

He introduces no facts that he ever asked to have a copy of the agreements and was refused.

Since the 2024 and 2025 agreements contain the same arbitration language, plaintiff had sufficient time after signing the 2024 agreement to obtain a copy and review it, even with a lawyer is he so desired, and plaintiff shows no facts that he was precluded from asking more questions or requesting time when presented with the 2025 agreement.

His conclusory statements are insufficient.

Further, a company is not required to highlight an arbitration clause of its contract nor is it required to specifically call the agreement to the plaintiff’s attention. (Sanchez, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 914.)

“Arbitration itself is a fairly common means of dispute resolution and would not be beyond the reasonable expectation of the weaker party.” (Parada v. Superior Court, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1571.)

Substantive Unconscionability

Plaintiff claims that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because it seeks to deprive plaintiff of the substantive protections afforded by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code and implies that not all relief can be awarded, arbitration needs to be before a retired California Superior Court judgement, which may impose substantial costs on plaintiff, there is a class action waiver, and Labor Code section 432.6 prohibit the FEHA and Labor Code violations to be arbitrated.

The court finds no substantive unconscionability.

The arbitration agreement does not take away any of plaintiff’s rights to sue under FEHA or the Labor Code, and it does not limit plaintiff’s right to relief.

Defendants pay the arbitration costs.

Class action waivers are permissible. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 347–348.)

Labor Code section 432.6 is preempted by the FAA. (Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473; see Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 582, review denied (May 14, 2025) [acknowledging the Ninth Circuit held that this legislation was preempted by the FAA].)

Plaintiff thus has not proven unconscionability.

Thus court thus compels this case to arbitration.

Under the FAA, litigation must be stayed if any part of the claim is determined to be arbitrable.

“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trail of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 30 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” (9 U.S.C. § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

The court sets a case management conference for January 19, 2027 at 9:30 a.m. in Department 4 with a joint case management conference statement due five court days before the conference.

If the parties want to advance or continue the conference, they should jointly email Department 4 with alternative dates.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court.

Thereafter, counsel for defendant shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 31 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 8 26-CIV-00963 ROBSON GONCALVES DE OLIVEIRA VS. CITY OF BURLINGAME

ROBSON GONCALVES DE OLIVEIRA PRO SE CITY OF BURLINGAME SUSAN A. DENARDO

DEMURRER TO THE PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE (CCP §1085)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The court continues Respondent City of Burlingame’s (Burlingame) demurrer to Petitioner Robson Goncalves de Oliveira’s petition for peremptory writ of mandate to July 28, 2026 at 2:00 p.m. in Department 4.

The clerk of the court is to provide notice to all parties.

The clerk of the court is also to set a case management conference for September 8, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Department 4 and to provide notice to all parties.

On March 12, 2026, Burlingame filed and served its demurrer and stated in the notice that the hearing was on April 14, 2026.

The clerk’s office, due to the court’s impacted calendar, changed the hearing date to June 16, 2026.

Burlingame did not provide notice by federal express of this new date until June 2, 2026, which is not sufficient notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005.)

This court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion that has not been properly noticed for hearing on the date in question. (Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1204–1205)

Accordingly, the court continues the hearing to provide petitioner with proper notice of the hearing and the statutory time to file an opposition.

If the tentative is not contested, it will become the order of the court without the need for a formal order.