Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication Against Defendant Villa Rita Housing Partners, LP
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Judge Benson – Law & Motion – Wednesday, May 6, 2026 @ 9:00 AM
1. 21CV03075 Hall, Chantelle v. City of Chico et al.
EVENT: Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication Against Defendant Villa Rita Housing Partners, LP
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication Against Defendant Villa Rita Housing Partners, LP is DENIED. The Court declines ruling on Defendant’s evidentiary objections as they are not necessary to the disposition of the matter. As an aside, going forward, Plaintiff and other parties should refrain from incorporating by reference documents that were previously filed with prior motions. While the Court appreciates that may be more efficient, the practice results in the record becoming difficult to follow.
Defendant Villa Rita’s Leasing Office Qualifies as a Place of Public Accommodation for Title III Purposes Preliminarily, Defendant references a 2024 ruling on a previous motion for summary adjudication brought by Plaintiff in which the Court found an apartment complex was not a place of public accommodation. Without rehashing that ruling, it appears Plaintiff attempted to submit new evidence in the reply which was denied. In any event, Plaintiff has submitted evidence in this motion that Defendant Villa Rita operates a leasing office, a fact that Villa Rita does not dispute. Pursuant to 28 CFR 36.207, a leasing office is a place of public accommodation for Title III purposes.
A Triable Issue of Fact Exists Whether Villa Rita Had Control Over the Sidewalk for Title III Purposes The previously referenced 2024 ruling also found allegations that both the City and Reed Francis controlled the sidewalk were contradictory. There is an inherent factual question based on the moving papers’ position that a land survey identified Reed Francis as owner of the property where the incident occurred; Villa Rita as owner of the tree which allegedly raised the sidewalk at issue; and the City of Chico owned the sidewalk.
It is unclear how all (3) of these parties could have control over the same section of sidewalk for Title III purposes. As it pertains to Villa Rita and Reed Francis, Plaintiff appears to allege both had control over the same section of sidewalk for Title III purposes. At a minimum, Plaintiff has failed to meet her initial burden in clarifying this factual issue. Further, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Chico Municipal Code and Streets and Highways Code section 5610 fails. Williams v. Foster (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 510 found section 5610 does not impose a duty on landowners with respect to the general public.
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The takeaway from Williams 1
is that unless the statute or ordinance explicitly makes the owner liable to the public, the general rule is a landowner is not liable to the general public. Chico Municipal Code section 14.20.030 fares no better. It contains similar language to Streets and Highways Code section 5610. Thus, Plaintiff’s reference to the municipal code and the streets and highway’s code fail to meet the initial burden of demonstrating no triable issue of fact exists with respect to Villa Rita’s control of the sidewalk.
Additionally, the Court is skeptical as to how a state statute or local ordinance would be relevant on the issue of whether Villa Rita had control of the sidewalk for purposes of Title III – which is Federal law. In the reply Plaintiff appears to almost concede as much by attempting to explain why Williams, supra, is not applicable to ADA claims. (“ADA and CDPA claims are not rooted in tort or negligence – it’s a civil right.”) Even if Williams, supra, is not relevant to the issue before us, Plaintiff has failed to meet her initial burden on this issue as neither the Municipal Code nor the Streets and Highway Code is dispositive on whether Defendant Villa Rita had control of the sidewalk in the context of an ADA claim.
A Triable Issue of Fact Exists Whether Repair Was Reasonably Feasible In February the Court found the issue of whether repair was readily achievable to be a triable issue of fact. The Court is again adopting that reasoning here. As an additional note, while we certainly pay close attention to Federal decisions with respect to Federal Law holdings and the ADA in particular, when it comes to application of summary judgment and summary adjudication standards we apply state law. In this Court’s view, under California jurisprudence concerning summary judgment/summary adjudication, whether repair is readily achievable is inherently a factual question.
High California courts have routinely found (albeit in other areas of the law) that some issues are not appropriate for summary adjudication as they are “not determinable on paper”. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 286 [Employment cases present issues not determinable on paper]) It is apparent to this Court that whether repair is readily achievable is not determinable on paper. It involves weighing of evidence and multiple factors. We do not weigh evidence on summary judgment/summary adjudication. (See Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 826, 856) Further, Plaintiff’s contention that the 2025 repair still does not comply with ADA standards undermines Plaintiff’s contention that repair was readily achievable based on that attempt. It cannot be conclusively said repair was readily achievable based on the 2025 repair when that repair did not comply with the ADA and was thus inadequate. Additionally, pursuant to Wilson v. Haria and Gogri Corp (E.D. 2007) 479 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133 Plaintiff contends Villa Rita has waived argument as it has failed to plead the affirmative defense.
However, the Court’s research indicates Wilson has received negative treatment on this holding. In Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc. (2020) 974 F.3d 1030,1035, the 9th Circuit established a burden shifting approach: ...
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only if the plaintiff first makes a plausible showing that the barrier removal is readily achievable, does the defendant then have to negate that showing and prove that the removal is not readily achievable ... Here, the moving papers did not make “a plausible showing that removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Again, this invokes the circular argument of whether (allegedly) non-code compliant repairs demonstrate a specific repair is readily achievable. Logically, the Court fails to see how reference to non-compliant repairs meet Plaintiff’s initial burden.
The Court finds Plaintiff has not met her initial burden under Lopez, therefore the issue of waiver of the affirmative defense is moot. A triable issue of fact exists. Because the Court finds multiple triable issues of fact exists, the Court declines addressing other issues raised in the papers at this time. Defendant Villa Rita shall prepare and submit a form of order consistent with this ruling within two weeks.
2. 23CV02654 Feng, Zhu v. Xie, John et al.
EVENT: Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Judgment and to Enter Another and Different Judgment (CCP 663 and 663a) and Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes in the Judgment Entered March 5, 2026
Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Judgment and to Enter Another and Different Judgment (CCP 663 and 663a) and Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes in the Judgment Entered March 5, 2026 is GRANTED in PART. The motion is granted with respect to the “Judgment is on the merits” language. It is well settled that statute of limitations dispositions are not merit dispositions. The motion is denied with respect to the alleged clerical errors. Plaintiff states “the Judgment misidentifies counsel by referring to defense counsel as though he were Plaintiff's counsel.”
The Court is not finding that in the judgment. The judgment clearly states Plaintiff was in pro per. “Pro per” is a Latin phrase used to describe a person who is representing themselves in Court. The March 5, 2026 judgment is vacated. Counsel is directed to submit an amended judgment omitting the judgment on the merits language within 10 days of this order.
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