STEPHENS VS BVE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION

Plaintiff argues that she did not agree to the proposed Settlement Agreement drafted by the HOA and there is no mutual consent by the parties to all non-monetary terms of the Settlement. Plaintiff argues that the Court may only enforce the Settlement terms but may not add terms or conditions not agreed to by the parties. Plaintiff argues that neither she nor the Board Defendants have signed the proposed Settlement, and

the attorney’s agreement is not sufficient. Plaintiff argues that sanctions are unwarranted.

No Reply has been filed as of June 10, 2026.

Analysis

Pursuant to CCP §664.6, “[i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (CCP § 664.6(a).)

The statute was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specific performance of a contract without the need for a new lawsuit. (Weddington Productions v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 809.) Disputes regarding the terms of the settlement, or other disputed facts, may be adjudicated on the basis of declarations and other evidence. (Malouf Bros. v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 284.) Importantly, on a motion to enforce a settlement under section 664.6, the court may only interpret the terms of the settlement but may not create material terms upon which the parties did not previously agree. (Weddington Productions, supra, 60 Cal.

App. 4th at 810.)

On December 5, 2026, counsel for the HOA prepared a draft of a Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release. (Decl. of Sardoni, ¶6; Ex. A.) It is undisputed that the Settlement Agreement was not signed by Plaintiff. Counsel contends that the proposed Settlement Agreement does not include certain non-monetary terms required by Plaintiff, including the following:

No further discussion or communication concerning placement of any fence on the Stephens’ Property;

1. No claim of adverse possession of county property by BVE, including all homeowners’ fences; 2. No approval needed from the HOA for the Stephens’ backyard and design landscaping; 3. The Stephens’ RV will be permitted to be parked on the Property without a time limit or calendar restrictions and be moved at Ms. STEPHENS’ convenience; 4. A letter to every homeowner must be provided by the HOA, stating that the yellow gates were placed as an agreement between the County of Riverside and the homeowners living on Tulip Tree Circle in order for the homes to be built in Bella Vista Estates; 5. There will be no further violation letters of admonishment, threats, fines, or notices to perform sent by the HOA to Plaintiff and/or her family; 6. The Stephens family will be given access to all HOA meetings with the correct date, time, and links; and

7. There will be no Non-Disclosure Agreement included in the settlement agreement.

(Id at ¶ 7.)

HOA argues that Plaintiff’s counsel agreed orally before the Court that Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. For the purpose of section 664.6, an attorney who represents a party to the settlement may sign the agreement. (CCP § 664.6(b).) This also applies to oral settlements before the court. Following the 2021 amendment to the statute, parties are not required to orally stipulate to the terms of settlement; instead, counsel may orally stipulate on the party’s behalf. (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal. App. 5th 1310, 1325-1326.)

However, while Plaintiff’s counsel had the power to orally agree to the terms of the Settlement Agreement before the Court, there is no evidence that he did so. Counsel for the HOA states that during OSC hearings on March 9, 2026 and May 7, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel represented that Plaintiff had agreed to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Decl. of Arlen, ¶¶4, 6.) However, there are no transcripts of the hearings, and it is not clear that the terms of the Settlement were recited to the Court such that the Court could be satisfied that the parties agreed to all material terms thereof.

The HOA asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel declared under oath the terms of the Settlement Agreement had been approved by Plaintiff. (Id at ¶¶3, 5.) In fact, in the March 2, 2026 Status Report, counsel states that counsel that he “suggested revisions to the draft Settlement Agreement which have been approved by Ms. Stephens.” (Id, Ex. 2, ¶ 4.) Counsel indicates that he is confident that a final draft of the Settlement Agreement will be approved for signature by the parties. (Id, ¶ 5.) Counsel made the same representations in his April 30, 2026 Declaration. (Decl. of Arlen, Ex. 3, ¶¶ 4, 5.)

These declarations clearly demonstrate that the parties have not executed or orally agreed to a binding settlement agreement.

“The fundamental rules of contract interpretation are based on the premise that the interpretation of a contract must give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.” (Canaan Taiwanese Christian Church v. All World Mission Ministries (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1124.) In order for a settlement agreement to be enforced pursuant to CCP § 664.6, it must be shown that the parties agree to the same material terms, be it orally or in writing. (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal. App. 4th 1421, 1428.)

Under section 664.6, the oral stipulation must be presented in a judicially supervised proceeding to ensure that the parties’ understand the specific terms of the settlement and the binding nature of the stipulation. (In re Marriage of Assemi (2010) 7 Cal. 4th 896, 906.) Because there is no evidence that the specific, material terms were recited or agreed to before the Court, and it is not clear that there is mutual consent to all material term, the Court should not enforce the Settlement Agreement pursuant to section 664.6.

HOA argues that the Court should use its inherent powers under CCP § 128 to force Plaintiff to sign the proposed Settlement Agreement or authorize the Clerk of Court to sign on Plaintiff’s behalf. Citing Canaan Taiwanese Christian Church, supra, the HOA argues that, “having orally agreed to settlement terms before the court, parties may not escape their obligations by refusing to sign a written agreement that conforms

to the oral terms.” (Canaan Taiwanese Christian Church, supra, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 1122, FN 3; citing Elyaoudayan, supra, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1431.) However, as stated above, the HOA has not established that the terms of the Settlement Agreement were orally agreed upon before the Court. The HOA has not cited any authority that the Court may use inherent powers to force a party to sign a settlement agreement where there is no mutual consent to all material terms. Accordingly, the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is denied.

The HOA requests attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the present Motion. Since the HOA has not established that Plaintiff agreed to the proposed Settlement Agreement, either in writing or orally before the Court, the Motion lacks merit. As the Motion was denied, the request for attorney’s fees is likewise denied.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION (VEXATIOUS LITIGANT) TO HAVE PLAINTIFF DECLARED A MEJIA VS COUNTY OF CVRI2500547 VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND FOR RIVERSIDE PRE-FILING ORDER PROHIBITING THE FILING OF NEW CASES Tentative Ruling:

Summary of Ruling: The Court grants the motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. The Court grants Defendant’s request for a prefiling order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing any new litigation in California courts in propria persona without leave of court.

Factual/Procedural Context

Complaint & Allegations

Plaintiff Ruben Mejia alleges that Defendant County of Riverside (the “County”), acting through its employees David Huff, Warren Chu (“Chu”), and Chief County Counsel, intentionally subordinated perjury and conspired with other agencies to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. He contends that County made defamatory statements to public defenders and private attorneys representing Plaintiff, including assertions that Plaintiff was involved in events surrounding the death of his children’s mother.

He contends that these falsehoods lead to his counsel abandoning their ethical duties and misrepresenting Plaintiff in court, which resulted in Plaintiff having to represent himself. He alleges that Chu collaborated with social workers Michelle Leflore (“Leflore”), Amanda Young (“Young”), and Plaintiff’s own family members to fabricate false allegations against Plaintiff. He argues that he has been divorced for ten years from his ex-wife, Adriana Melendez. However, County used false testimony from her during a hearing to try and establish a past history of domestic violence.

Plaintiff argues that this testimony was used to justify the wrongful removal and potential adoption of his children. The Complaint alleges that Justin Janzen was aware of his colleagues’