Galyardt v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA4/2 (2024) · DecisionDepot
Galyardt v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 11, 2024 No. E080764MUnpublished
Filed 7/11/24 Galyardt v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHELLE C. GALYARDT,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080764
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1600152)
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION LLC et al., [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendants and Appellants.
The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on June 27, 2024, is denied. The
opinion filed in this matter on June 12, 2024, is modified as follows:
On page 6 and 7 of the opinion, the second and third paragraphs in
“DISCUSSION” are deleted and replaced with the following paragraph:
Lenders rely on People v. Jordan (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1136. That
case provides, “Waiver precludes successive appeals based on issues ripe for
consideration in the prior appeal and not brought in that proceeding.” (Id. at
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p. 1143) “[T]he ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition
that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set
of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable
the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy.”
Punitive damages are included when determining if a plaintiff
received a more favorable judgment than the section 998 offer; however,
interest is not awarded on the punitive damage portion of the award. (Lakin
v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 662, including fn. 13.)
Our 2022 opinion only reversed the punitive damages. Thus, we disagree
that the trial court needed to address the issue of prejudgment interest on
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remand because the reversal of punitive damages did not require the
recalculation of interest.
Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. The
modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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Filed 6/12/24 Galyardt v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA4/2 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHELLE C. GALYARDT,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080764
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1600152)
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, OPINION LLC ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Raquel A. Marquez,
Judge. Affirmed.
The Ryan Firm, Timothy M. Ryan, Andrew J. Mase and Katherine K. Meleski
for Defendants and Appellants.
Louis White Law and Jamil L. White for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2016 plaintiff and respondent Michelle Galyardt (Homeowner) sued
defendants and appellants Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (Servicer) and Residential
Mortgage Solution, LLC (Bank) for fraud, breach of contract, negligence, and other
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causes of action related to errors made in paperwork for the “Keep Your Home
California’s (KYC) Mortgage Reinstatement Assistance Program.” In 2019, a jury
found in favor of Homeowner. Homeowner was awarded damages of $918,232.31;
punitive damages of $2,840,000; and prejudgment interest of 10 percent.
In 2022, this court reversed the punitive damages award.1 Upon returning to the
trial court, Servicer and Bank (collectively, Lenders) moved the trial court to delete the
award of prejudgment interest on the theory that our reversal of the punitive damage
award caused the total judgment to be less than Homeowner’s final pretrial settlement
offer (Code Civ. Proc. § 998). (Civ. Code, § 3291.)2 The trial court denied the motion.
Lenders contend the trial court erred by denying their motion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. SETTLEMENT OFFERS
On February 6, 2017, Homeowner offered to settle the case for $130,000 (the
original offer). (Code Civ. Proc., § 998.) Lenders did not accept the original offer. On
June 20, 2018, Homeowner offered to settle the case for $1,000,000 (the final offer).
(Code Civ. Proc., § 998.) Lenders did not accept the final offer, and trial commenced in
2 All further statutory references will be to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
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B. 2019 JUDGMENT
The 2019 judgment reads, in relevant part, “Furthermore it is ordered, adjudged
and decreed that [Homeowner] have and recover from [Lenders] prejudgment interest at
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum under Civil Code § 3291 from the date of
[Homeowner’s] first offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 998 on February 6,
2017, which is exceeded by the judgment, until paid.”3
C. 2022 APPEAL
On May 18, 2022, we filed our opinion in the 2022 appeal. The disposition
reads, “The punitive damages awards of $2,160,000 against [Servicer] and $680,000
against [Bank] are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties
are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3).)”
3 Civil Code section 3291 provides, “In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any . . . corporation . . . or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful intent of the . . . corporation . . . or partnership, and whether the injury was fatal or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as provided in this section. “If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which the defendant does not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the date of the plaintiff’s first offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by the judgment, and interest shall accrue until the satisfaction of judgment.” Lenders have not argued in this court that section 3291 is inapplicable due to Homeowner failing to prove what aspect, if any, of her damages was caused by a personal injury. (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 660-661)
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D. MOTION FOR AN AMENDED JUDGMENT
In July 2022, in the trial court, Lenders moved for an amended judgment
contending that Homeowner’s final offer was $1,000,000 (Code Civ. Proc., § 998), and
her total damages were reduced to $918,232.31, so Homeowner was no longer entitled
to prejudgement interest due to the $918,232.31 award being less than the final offer.
(§ 3291.)
E. OPPOSITION
In opposing the motion, Homeowner contended, “[F]or the purpose of
“[T]he ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial
decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the
issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree
finally disposing of the controversy.” (Vandermost v. Bowen (2012) 53 Cal.4th 421,
452.)
In the 2022 appeal, if Lenders had wanted to raise the issue of the original offer
being extinguished, then they could have done so. Lenders could have argued that the
trial court erred by charging them an extra year of prejudgment interest because the
operative offer was the final offer (made in 2018)—not the allegedly extinguished
original offer (made in 2017). Thus, the issue was ripe at the time of the 2022 appeal.
There was no need to wait until after our 2022 opinion was finalized. Because Lenders
did not argue the issue within the 2022 appeal, we did not address it or include it in our
2022 disposition. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the issue following
the 2022 appeal. The trial court did not err.
Lenders contend “the trial court never ruled in the first instance on the issue of
the Last Offer Rule,” i.e., whether the final offer extinguished the original offer. The
2019 judgment reads, “[P]rejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum under Civil Code § 3291 from the date of [Homeowner’s] first offer pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure § 998 on February 6, 2017, which is exceeded by the judgment,
until paid.” The foregoing portion of the judgment is a ruling that the original offer
(from 2017) is operative.
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Lenders assert that prejudgment interest fell within the bounds of the remittitur
because “ ‘it is necessary for the trial court to determine the amount of the award.’ ”
Punitive damages are included when determining if a plaintiff received a more favorable
judgment than the section 998 offer; however, interest is not awarded on the punitive
damage portion of the award. (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th
at p. 662, including fn. 13.) Our 2022 opinion only reversed the punitive damages.
Thus, we disagree that the trial court needed to address the issue of prejudgment interest
on remand because the reversal of punitive damages did not require the recalculation of
interest.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to amend the judgment is affirmed. Respondent,
Michelle Galyardt, is awarded her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1).)4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
4 The portion of Homeowner’s request for judicial notice that has yet to be ruled upon is denied.
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AI Brief
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Holding. The court held that the appellants waived their right to challenge the prejudgment interest accrual date by failing to raise the issue in their prior appeal, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the judgment on remand.
Issues
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to address the applicability of the 'last offer rule' regarding prejudgment interest following a remittitur.
Whether the issue of prejudgment interest accrual was ripe for review during the initial 2022 appeal.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to amend the judgment to remove prejudgment interest.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because Lenders did not argue the issue within the 2022 appeal, we did not address it or include it in our 2022 disposition.”
“As a result, the issue was waived and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the issue following the 2022 appeal.”
“The issues the trial court may address in the remand proceedings are therefore limited to those specified in the reviewing court’s directions”