People v. Brown CA4/1

Filed 7/10/24 P. v. Brown CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082826

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD290671)

MCKENZIE LAURARENEE BROWN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Dwayne K. Moring, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions. Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION McKenzie Laurarenee Brown pled guilty to accessory after the fact and grand theft from a person in connection with robbery-murder. Brown

received a split sentence of one year and eight months in custody followed by one year of mandatory supervision. She challenges, as both unconstitutionally overbroad and invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), the Fourth Amendment waiver in the order granting mandatory supervision. The waiver requires Brown to submit her computers and other electronic devices for search “at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [a parole] or law enforcement officer.” We resolve this matter by memorandum opinion and affirm. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.) We remand, however, for the trial court to consider Brown’s letter under People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954 (Fares) concerning presentence custody credits to the extent it has not already done so. I. First, although she did not object to the constitutionality of the Fourth Amendment waiver below, Brown contends she preserved her claim of unconstitutional overbreadth by objecting at the sentencing hearing to the lack of nexus between her crimes and the search condition. Generally, a failure to object to a probation condition on a ground, even a constitutional one, at the sentencing hearing forfeits that specific claim on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 (Welch).) Constitutional claims preserved for appeal without an objection “generally involve pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 235.) Such “facial” challenges to the constitutionality of a probation condition, which argue that there is no circumstance in which the condition can be validly applied, are distinct from “as-applied” challenges, which rely on a