California Court of Appeal Jun 28, 2024 No. E080932Unpublished
Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Arredondo CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E080932
v. (Super.Ct.No. FMB22000234)
QUINCY ANTHONY ARREDONDO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Melissa A.
Rodriguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Garrick Byers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher P. Beesley and
Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2022 Quincy Arredondo pled guilty to burglary in exchange for probation.
Arredondo almost immediately violated probation and then violated it again a few
months later. In response, the court executed the suspended sentence. Arredondo argues
the court erred when it did so because its comments indicated it did not know that it could
In June 2022, Arredondo pled guilty to first degree residential burglary. (Pen.
Code, § 459.)1 He also stipulated to aggravating factors that allowed the court to impose
the upper term. In exchange the trial court dismissed all other charges, imposed the
upper term of six years, suspended that sentence, and placed Arredondo on four years’
formal probation.2
Arredondo failed to report to the probation department, and later that same June
the probation department filed a petition alleging he had violated the terms of his
probation. Arredondo admitted to the probation violation in July, and the court
reimposed probation.
In October 2022 the probation department again alleged Arredondo violated
probation by failing to report as required. The court revoked probation and issued a
1 Unlabeled statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Arredondo’s victim was a person defined in Family Code section 6211, which permitted the court to impose more than two years’ probation. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.097, subd. (a), 1203.1, subd. (l).)
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bench warrant. The police eventually executed that warrant, but Arredondo allegedly
obstructed or resisted them in the process, in violation of section 69. (§ 69.)
In December the court found Arredondo violated his probation term requiring he
violate no law due to the alleged obstruction charge. However, it reserved sentencing
because Arredondo had another pending case.
The court eventually sentenced Arredondo in March 2023. Arredondo requested
the court reinstate probation because he struggled with mental health issues and was
remorseful. The People requested the court execute the suspended sentence because
Arredondo had violated probation once before, had picked up a new charge, and was
mostly uncooperative with the probation department. The court executed the suspended
six-year sentence by stating that “[p]robation previously revoked will remain revoked,
and pronouncement of judgment previously withheld or suspended will now be
imposed.” In so doing, the court stated it was “bound by the agreement that [Arredondo]
made. So, there really isn’t anything that the Court can do.”
DISCUSSION
Arredondo argues the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion and
therefore he is entitled to a new probation violation sentencing hearing. We disagree.3
“The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation (and thus send
the defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (People v.
3 The People argue Arredondo forfeited this argument by failing to object to the court’s sentence below. Because we find that his argument fails on the merits, we do not address whether he forfeited it.
3
Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421 (Bolian).) “ ‘Defendants are entitled to
sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing
court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can
no more exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been
based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ ” (People
v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, quoting People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d
335, 348, fn. 8.) Therefore, “when the record indicates the court misunderstood or was
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, we should remand to allow the court to
properly exercise its discretion.” (Bolian, at p. 1421.) However, “remand is unnecessary
if the record is silent concerning whether the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion.” This is because “ ‘ “[A] trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law,” ’ ” and therefore “[e]rror may not be presumed from a
silent record.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229.)
We conclude the trial court was aware of its discretion to reinstate probation, and
deliberately chose not to do so. It is hard to conclude otherwise. At the sentencing
hearing Arredondo argued the trial court should reinstate probation, and neither the
prosecution nor the court objected to that request or otherwise indicated that they thought
it was beyond the court’s ability to grant. The only evidence the court misunderstood its
discretion is its statement that “[u]nfortunately, we are bound by the agreement that you
made. So, there really isn't anything that the Court can do.” However, we agree with the
People that we should read this statement to say that once the court decided not to
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reinstate probation it had no choice but to execute the suspended sentence. That is, the
court did not mean to imply that executing the suspended sentence was its only choice, it
was merely lamenting that it had no options between reinstating probation and executing
the suspended sentence.
This is further supported by the court’s statement that “[p]robation that was
previously revoked will remain revoked.” This implies that the court knew probation
need not remain revoked, and was making a decision to keep it revoked. There is no
reason to state that the status quo will remain the status quo unless the court believed that
it could do otherwise and needed to clarify that it would not.
Similarly, there would have been no reason to hear argument at the sentencing
hearing if the court was unaware of its discretion. If the court truly believed it had no
choice but to execute the suspended sentence, the hearing would have been a mere
formality, and argument would have been pointless. Instead, the court entertained
argument from both parties, including argument from Arredondo that the court should do
exactly what he now claims the court did not know it could do. The only reason to
entertain such argument is if the court understood that it had a choice other than
executing the suspended sentence and needed or wanted to hear how the parties felt it
should exercise that discretion.
Finally, even if we agreed the trial court’s statements were unclear, “ ‘a trial court
is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” (People v.
Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court
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is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is
not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional
doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564,
italics omitted.) Thus, even assuming the court’s statements are ambiguous about
whether it fully understood its sentencing discretion, Arredondo cannot overcome this
presumption without further affirmative evidence of misunderstanding.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order executing the suspended sentence.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not misunderstand its sentencing discretion when it executed a previously suspended sentence, as the record indicates the court was aware of its authority to reinstate probation but chose not to do so.
Issues
Did the trial court err by failing to recognize its discretion to reinstate probation instead of executing a suspended sentence?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation (and thus send the defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.”
“We conclude the trial court was aware of its discretion to reinstate probation, and deliberately chose not to do so.”
“a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.”