Gonzalez v. Buffalo Inn CA4/2 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Gonzalez v. Buffalo Inn CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 1, 2013 No. E052396Unpublished
Filed 7/1/13 Gonzalez v. Buffalo Inn CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
STEPHANIE GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E052396
v. (Super.Ct.No. RCVRS081741)
BUFFALO INN, INC. et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Martin A. Hildreth,
Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Muni. Ct., West Valley Division, sitting
under assignment by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed with directions.
Law Offices of Kersten & Associates, William C. Kersten and Brandon R. Creel
for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Lisa L. Maki, Lisa L. Maki and Betty J. Boyd for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Stephanie Gonzalez was employed by the Buffalo Inn restaurant.
Defendants Richard Rinard, Janna Hickler, and Buffalo Inn Route 66 Corporation
(collectively Buffalo) appeal from a postjudgment order, awarding plaintiff attorney‟s
Defendants appeal, arguing the attorney‟s fee award was an abuse of discretion.
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion and affirm.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We discussed the factual background of this case in a previous appeal, (Gonzalez
v. Rinard (Jan. 31, 2008, E041658) [nonpub. opn.]) (the default appeal). As described in
that opinion, plaintiff was the single mother of a mixed-race child. Plaintiff began dating
Forrest K. Rinard2 in July 1995. Plaintiff lived with Forrest and worked at the Buffalo
Inn for two years between July 1999 and July 2001. Forrest was the owner and plaintiff
was the manager. Forrest drank alcohol at work and was abusive toward plaintiff in their
personal life and as his employee. He made racist comments and was violent toward her
child. He called her a “Nigger lover” and told her she was fired. He continued to employ
1 After the briefs in this case were filed, a fourth defendant, Buffalo Inn, Inc., filed bankruptcy. Pursuant to our order of December 17, 2010, that defendant‟s appeal has been severed and is now proceeding under case No. E052396.
2 Forrest K. Rinard is not a party to this appeal.
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her until he beat her in the face with a mop. Plaintiff moved out of their house but still
managed the Buffalo Inn. In July 2001, plaintiff dated another man and Forrest fired her
again. Forrest threatened and harassed plaintiff. Forrest called plaintiff a thief, an
embezzler, an extortionist, a liar, crazy, and incompetent. He failed to pay her wages and
left a number of angry, threatening, and profane messages on her telephone. In 2003,
Forrest transferred ownership of the Buffalo Inn to his brother, defendant Richard Rinard,
who agreed to accept the liabilities of the business.
In July 2004, plaintiff sued defendants for alleged sexual harassment and
discrimination, wrongful termination, and related causes of action.
In August 2006, the court entered a default judgment in the amount of $1.3 million
against defendants. Between October 2006 and early 2008, defendants successfully
pursued the default appeal, obtaining a reversal of the default judgment.
On February 11, 2009, plaintiff served defendants with an offer to compromise
(Code Civ. Proc., § 998) in the sum of $95,000.
A jury trial began on March 2, 2009. On March 3, defendants accepted plaintiff‟s
offer to compromise for $95,000, plus attorney‟s fees and costs.
Plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment, including fees of $262,268.50, costs of
$38,974.27, and interest of $598. The court rejected the proposed judgment because
“attorney‟s fees and costs were not determined. Interest was not included.”
The court entered a judgment for $95,000 on May 21, 2009.
Plaintiff then filed a motion, pursuant to Government Code section 12965 and
Labor Code section 218.5, seeking attorney‟s fees of $509,231. The court rejected
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plaintiff‟s argument that she was entitled to a multiplier of 2.0 on the amount of fees.
The court ordered actual fees of $254,615.50.
III
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court‟s determination of reasonable attorney fees under the
abuse of discretion standard: “[T]here is no question our review must be highly
deferential to the views of the trial court. [Citation.] As our high court has repeatedly
stated, „“„[t]he “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his judgment is of course subject to
review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly
wrong”—meaning that it abused its discretion.‟”‟ [Citations.]” (Children’s Hospital &
Medical Center v. Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 777; Lealao v. Beneficial
California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 25-26 (Lealao).)
The trial court‟s award of fees must be reasonable: “In determining the amount of
reasonable attorney fees to be awarded under a statutory attorney fees provision, the trial
court begins by calculating the „lodestar‟ amount. (Ketchum [v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th
1122,] 1131; Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437,
448-449 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 913] (Meister).) The „lodestar‟ is „the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.‟ (PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) To determine the reasonable hourly rate, the
court looks to the „hourly rate . . . prevailing in the community for similar work.‟ (Ibid.)
Using the lodestar as the basis for the attorney fee award „anchors the trial court‟s
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analysis to an objective determination of the value of an attorney‟s services, ensuring that
the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [Citation.]‟ (Ibid.)” (Bernardi v. County of
a limited degree of success, engaged in vexatious litigation tactics, and made an improper
request for costs—all of which supply other reasons to reduce the fee award.
5
A. The Default Judgment and Appeal
Defendants calculate the amount of fees related to the default judgment and
default appeal as being $103,250 for 252.43 hours of work between September 2005 and
March 2008. The record, however, shows the amount of fees incurred for the appeal was
only $32,764 between April 2007 and February 2008. Notwithstanding this discrepancy
in amounts, we reject defendants‟ claims about the unreasonableness of these fees.
We agree with defendants‟ assertion that “reasonable” fees are “necessary” fees:
“[T]he predicate of any attorney fee award . . . is the necessity and usefulness of the
conduct for which compensation is sought.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 92
Cal.App.4th at p. 846; Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682-684.)
Defendants further argue that plaintiff employed a questionable litigation strategy by
pursuing a default judgment against defendants that was later reversed on appeal. The
record, however, does not demonstrate that plaintiff‟s efforts to litigate her case against
defendants, including obtaining a default judgment, were unnecessary or unreasonable.
Defendants‟ litigation conduct, as we described it in our previous opinion, contributed a
great deal to the difficulties encountered by plaintiff in pursuing her claims. For more
than a year, defendants switched attorneys, failed to make many court appearances, and
did not cooperate. Although defendants secured relief from the default judgment,
plaintiff was entirely justified in trying to defend the judgment on appeal. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude the fees were necessarily and reasonably incurred for the
litigation and appeal involving the default judgment.
Nor, if the litigation is ultimately successful, is a party precluded from recovering
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fees for interim appellate work, as defendants urge. In some circumstances, a party may
not recover for fees incurred in an unsuccessful interim proceeding which the party
initiated. In Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407,
424 (Harman), the appellate court determined the trial court had properly deleted the
hours spent on an unsuccessful petition for rehearing of a prior appeal. But a different
situation occurs, as here, where plaintiff had to respond to an interim appeal brought by
defendants. It is uncontestable that it was both necessary and useful for plaintiff to
participate in the default appeal.
In our previous opinion, we ordered the parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
(Gonzalez v. Rinard, supra, E041658, p. 12.) That order does not, as proposed by
defendants, constitute an order that each party bear its own attorney fees on appeal.
Appellate attorney fees are not recoverable as appellate costs under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(d)(2).
B. Specific Billings
Defendants object to the award of attorney‟s fees in the amount of $3,315 incurred
for review of two other related lawsuits and depositions, which involved defendants and
Forrest Rinard. Defendants also object to $1,686.25 in fees for a discovery motion that
was withdrawn and to billings of $9,383.50 related to plaintiff‟s deposition.
As we have already noted, an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value
of professional services rendered in court unless we are convinced the judge was clearly
wrong and abused his or her discretion. (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) The trial court considered defendants‟ arguments
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below and rejected them, as do we now.
C. Other Factors: Hourly Rate, Degree of Success, Litigation Conduct
Plaintiff‟s attorneys charged an hourly rate ranging between $350 and $450.
Plaintiff offered evidence that a reasonable hourly rate was between $400 and $675.
Defendants claim a more reasonable hourly rate is $250.
The trial court did not award the 2.0 multiplier sought by plaintiff, which would
have doubled the actual fees requested. But the court did expressly find plaintiff‟s
claimed hourly rate “is within the customary range for attorneys of her caliber and
experience” and “defendants‟ counsels‟ self-serving declarations respecting prevailing
rates are considerably less persuasive.” Again, the trial judge assesses the value of legal
services. The amount of a fee awarded will not be “set aside on appeal absent a showing
that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22
Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Such a showing has not been made in this case.” (Children’s
Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.)
Defendants further maintain that plaintiff‟s fee award should be reduced,
presumably because she settled her claims against these defendants for only $95,000. In
Harman, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at page 421, we explained: “„[W]e do not reflexively
reduce fee awards whenever damages fail to meet a plaintiff‟s expectations in proportion
to the damages‟ shortfall.‟ (Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. (4th Cir. 2007) 478
F.3d 183, 190.)” We decline to adopt defendants‟ contention: “[W]hile the degree of the
plaintiff‟s success in obtaining the objectives of the litigation is a factor that the trial
court may consider in determining an award of reasonable attorney fees under a fee
8
statute (Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 455; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 1096) . . . we determine that there is no requirement that the trial court
make an award of attorney fees in an amount that is commensurate with or in proportion
to the degree of success in the . . . litigation.” (Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p.
1398.)
Finally, we reject defendants‟ characterization of plaintiff‟s litigation conduct as
“vexatious.” Both plaintiff and defendants have delayed and prolonged the subject
litigation. But we do not perceive circumstances justifying a reduction of plaintiff‟s fees
based on the application of equitable principles. (Enpalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 770, 774-775.)
IV
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and order plaintiff as the prevailing party to recover her
costs on appeal. Plaintiff‟s request for attorney‟s fees on appeal is remanded to the trial
court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
McKINSTER J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $254,615.50 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff, finding the fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred despite the defendants' objections regarding the default judgment, hourly rates, and the degree of success.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees for work related to a default judgment and subsequent successful appeal by the defendants.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the reasonable hourly rates and total fee amount awarded to the plaintiff.
Whether the fee award should be reduced based on the plaintiff's degree of success or alleged vexatious litigation conduct.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude there was no abuse of discretion and affirm.”
“we determine that there is no requirement that the trial court make an award of attorney fees in an amount that is commensurate with or in proportion to the degree of success in the . . . litigation.”