People v. Paige CA1/1

Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Paige CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A169627

v. (Alameda County LEONDRE PAIGE, Super. Ct. No. 176452A) Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Leondre Paige appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95, now Penal Code section 1172.6.1 We affirm. In November 2015, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and the jury found true that he personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)). He was sentenced to 50 years to life (25 years to life for the first degree murder conviction and a consecutive 25-years-to-life sentence for the personal use of a firearm enhancement). This court affirmed his conviction, but remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its then newly conferred

Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered 1

Penal Code section 1172.6, with no substantive changes to the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

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discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.53, subd. (h); Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2.)2 The trial court declined to strike or dismiss the enhancement. In April 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). He attached as an exhibit our prior opinion and quoted from it in his petition, including that he “testified on his own behalf, admitting that he shot [the victim] but that his intention was that he ‘just wanted to scare him,’ as he was scared for, you know, my friend.” “[H]e confirmed he ‘had a black 9 millimeter “semi-automatic” gun with an extended clip.’ ” Although the trial court recognized defendant’s admission that he was the actual killer seemingly made him ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law, the court nevertheless deemed his petition “ ‘facially sufficient,’ ” appointed counsel, and asked for additional briefing by both parties as to whether defendant had made a “prima facie showing” of entitlement to resentencing relief. The prosecutor argued the record of conviction, and specifically the jury instructions, demonstrated defendant was not convicted under a vicarious theory of culpability—i.e., either the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule, the theories of culpability as to which sentencing relief would be available. Rather, the jury was instructed on first degree, premeditated murder and the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter-heat of passion and voluntary manslaughter-imperfect defense of another. In connection with murder, the jury was instructed on malice