California Court of Appeal May 13, 2024 No. E078804Unpublished
Filed 5/13/24 In re F.L. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re F.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E078804 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INJ2100012) v. OPINION F.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Susanne S. Cho, Judge.
Affirmed.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, and Felicity Senoski,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
While riding as a passenger in an SUV, defendant and appellant F.L., a minor, fired
a gun at a moving car, a Toyota Yaris. A passenger in the Yaris returned fire and lethally
shot the driver of the SUV, causing the SUV to careen out of control and kill a pedestrian.
F.L. was charged with murder in a wardship petition filed with the juvenile court.
F.L. appeals from the juvenile court’s findings that he committed two counts of second
argues that exclusion of the testimony of Psychologist William H. Jones, Ph.D. was
prejudicial and violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and to
present a complete defense.
“‘Expert opinion testimony is admissible only if it is “[r]elated to a subject that is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact.”’ [Citations.] ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial
court’s discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to
admit or exclude expert testimony [Citation], and its decision as to whether expert
testimony meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 425-26.)
At the jurisdiction hearing, F.L. requested to introduce expert testimony by Dr.
Jones concerning F.L.’s inability to exercise mature judgment because of the biological
immaturity of his brain. At the time of the charged crimes, F.L. was 16 years old.
Defense counsel stated he wanted to introduce expert testimony by Dr. Jones to make
sure the court was aware that brain development of an adolescent is not complete until a
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male is approximately 25 years old, and “science has shown that they lack the ability to
exercise mature judgment because of the biological immaturity of the brain.”
The People argued Dr. Jones’s proffered testimony was inadmissible during the
jurisdiction hearing under sections 25, 29, and 29.2 (former § 21). The juvenile court
acknowledged recent changes in the law regarding adolescents and brain development
but noted the focus of those changes was on the disposition of a case and punishment, not
guilt. The court noted that, as a result of these developments in the law, F.L.’s case was
not transferred to adult criminal court. However, the juvenile court concluded the
changes in the law regarding a minor’s brain development do not affect the elements of
implied malice murder, and it would be improper to allow expert testimony on F.L.’s
mental state. The court added that, if F.L. wanted the court to know about the changes in
the law and research done on adolescent brain development, F.L. could request judicial
notice of the statutory changes and legislative history focusing on adolescent brain
development. The juvenile court therefore excluded Dr. Jones’s testimony as irrelevant
and inadmissible 2 Citing People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582 and its progeny, F.L.
argues that Dr. Jones’s expert testimony was admissible under sections 28 and 29. In
People v. Coddington, supra, at page 582, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction
for first degree murder. (Id. at p. 547.) The Coddington court stated that sections 28 and
2 See, e.g., People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970; and In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 453.
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29 “permit introduction of evidence of mental illness when relevant to whether a
defendant actually formed a mental state that is an element of a charged offense, but do
not permit an expert to offer an opinion on whether a defendant had the mental capacity
to form a specific mental state or whether the defendant actually harbored such a mental
state.” (People v. Coddington, supra, at p. 582.) The Coddington court reiterated that
“Sections 28 and 29 do not preclude offering as a defense the absence of a mental state
that is an element of a charged offense or presenting evidence in support of that defense.
They preclude only expert opinion that the element was not present.” (Id. at p. 583.) The
Coddington court thus concluded that the “appellant was free to offer evidence that he
suffered from a mental disease or defect as well as evidence about that disease or defect.”
(Ibid.)
In In re Harper, the petitioner argued that his youth at the time of the crime
decreased his culpability and therefore his young age should be considered when
determining whether sufficient evidence supported the robbery-murder special
circumstance. (In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) We noted that several
courts (People v. Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
434, and People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970) recently concluded that, when
determining whether a special circumstance applies, it is proper to consider the
perpetrator’s youth, particularly when determining whether the perpetrator acted with
reckless disregard for human life. (In re Harper, supra, at pp. 467-472; see also In re
Moore, supra, at pp. 439, 454; People v. Ramirez, supra, at pp. 990-991; People v.
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Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416-418.) This is because, as the court in Harris
explained, the definition of reckless disregard for human life “encompasses both
subjective and objective elements. The subjective element is the defendant’s conscious
disregard of risks known to him or her.’” (People v. Harris, supra, at pp. 960-961,
quoting People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617.)
None of the cases cited by F.L. are dispositive here on the admissibility of expert
testimony regarding adolescent brain development, because the cited cases’ facts,
circumstances, and procedural postures differ from those in the instant case. Here, unlike
the cited cases, the excluded evidence consisted of proposed expert testimony on
adolescent brain development, which was offered during the guilt phase to refute malice.
Also, unlike in People v. Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pages 416-418, the record
shows that the trial court was well informed that the biological immaturity of the brain
can affect the ability to exercise mature judgment, such that there was no need for expert
testimony in this regard.
Even if Dr. Jones’s expert testimony regarding adolescent brain development was
admissible to show adolescents are physiologically predisposed to risky, impulsive
decision making, excluding it was not an abuse of discretion and was harmless error
under both Chapman and Watson (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Although the juvenile court found there was
insufficient evidence to prove specific intent to kill, the juvenile court found true the
provocative act murder charges based on a finding of implied malice. The court further
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indicated there was no need for expert testimony on adolescent brain development
because the court was already well aware of research on adolescent brain development
and its impact on adolescent male behavior. The court noted that, as a result of these
developments in the law, F.L.’s case was not transferred to the court of criminal
jurisdiction.
When denying the expert testimony during the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile
court stated: “I actually have read the legislative findings of all the changes in the law to
understand why the government has changed the way youths are treated differently than
adults. And the legislative findings actually incorporate all the research that has been
done to support the change in the law to focus on rehabilitation of youths. So I don’t
think you need to worry about the trier of fact not knowing that young men, such as your
client, are not the same as young men who are 25 and older and the accompanying issues
that go with youth. I mean, it’s obvious. [¶] . . . I’ve read the research; so it’s not lost
on me. You can argue your case, and if your client needs to call the doctor in for
disposition, that’s a different story. But for the circumstances of the shooting, I don’t
think that the doctor adds anything to this hearing.”
We conclude based on these comments and the record as a whole that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Jones’s testimony. Furthermore, it is
highly unlikely that, had the juvenile court permitted his testimony on adolescent brain
development, the outcome would have been any different. Therefore, even if the court
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erred in excluding it, doing so was harmless error. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386
U.S. at p. 24; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
V.
DISPOSITION
The true findings on the provocative act murder allegations (counts 1 & 2) are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
We concur:
MILLER J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's findings of provocative act murder based on implied malice, as the minor's act of firing a gun at an occupied vehicle was a proximate cause of the deaths. The court further held that the petition provided sufficient notice of the murder charges and that the minor failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of provocative act murder.
Whether the minor received adequate notice of the underlying crimes supporting the provocative act murder allegations.
Whether the minor received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to object to the notice provided.
Whether the juvenile court erred in excluding expert testimony on adolescent brain development.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“F.L.’s life-threatening act of firing a gun multiple times at the Yaris was a provocative act, which provoked a lethal response from A.B., and was a substantial factor contributing to the victims’ deaths”
“The juvenile court’s findings that there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted murder charges, counts 3 and 4, are not inconsistent with the provocative act murder findings, because attempted murder requires a finding of specific intent to kill, whereas second degree, implied malice murder does not.”