LaMarr v. The Regents of the U. of Cal.
Filed 4/5/24; Certified for Publication 4/23/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----
JUNE LAMARR, C097235
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2015- 00181352-CU-OE-GDS) v.
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and Respondent.
After performance problems and friction with her supervisor, plaintiff June LaMarr temporarily transferred to a new department at the University of California Davis Medical Center, a unit of defendant the Regents of the University of California (Regents). LaMarr was later given the option to move back into her prior position, but was told she would face discipline, including possible termination, if she did. LaMarr ultimately accepted a permanent position in the new department for less pay and sued the Regents alleging it violated her due process rights by not providing her a hearing under Skelly v.
1
State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly) prior to her demotion. After a court trial, the trial court found against LaMarr. LaMarr now appeals contending the trial court’s finding lacked substantial evidence. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The evidence introduced at trial established LaMarr was a medical office services coordinator (coordinator) level V at the University of California Davis Medical Center’s cancer center in 2014. LaMarr’s supervisor, Walter Knowles, suspended her for three days in July 2014 for performance issues. Performance issues persisted after the suspension, however, and Knowles subsequently prepared, but did not issue, a “Letter of Intent to Dismiss” LaMarr in August 2014. Knowles’s supervisor, Chris Jackson, testified at trial he thought this was an unusually expedited discipline procedure and it concerned him. LaMarr had also told Jackson she was having difficulties with Knowles. Jackson consequently sought a transfer for LaMarr to a different department to defuse the situation. Jackson testified, “There were no [coordinator level] V positions available,” but he found a coordinator level III position at another department, the MIND Institute (Institute), that Jackson offered to LaMarr on a “temporary” basis at her normal level V salary. Jackson did not inform LaMarr of the letter of intent to dismiss drafted by Knowles. In September 2014, LaMarr e-mailed Jackson she “would like to move forward on temporarily moving from the [c]ancer [c]enter.” In an e-mail chain spanning between February and March 2015, Jackson e-mailed LaMarr confirming that her supervisor at the Institute was pleased with LaMarr’s performance and was comfortable making the role permanent. On March 10, 2015, Jackson e-mailed LaMarr explaining they “were seeking to be able to keep [LaMarr’s] current [level V] salary if possible” but unfortunately, if she stayed at the Institute she would be a coordinator level III with a lower salary. Jackson then stated: “The two basic options we have now are: [¶] 1) Remain at the [Institute] as a [coordinator level ]III with a max salary of $25.49 (top of the range)[; or] [¶] 2) [m]ove back to the [c]ancer [c]enter
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