California Court of Appeal Mar 29, 2024 No. E081571Unpublished
Filed 3/29/24 In re M.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E081571 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J291182) v. OPINION M.M..,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda,
Judge. Affirmed.
Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center and Jonathan Grossman as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
1
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2021, a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that M.M.
committed murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). M.M. appeals
from an order made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707, transferring
consideration of a claim that a trial court abused its discretion . . . because the lower court
applied an incorrect legal standard is tantamount to independent or de novo review.”];
Barron v. Stanta Clara County Valley Transportation Authority (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1115, 1123 [Under review for abuse of discretion, “proper interpretation of statutes and
court rules are issues of law, and in such instances we review the trial court’s decision de
novo.”].) Nevertheless, we disagree with M.M.’s proffered interpretation of the
amendments to section 707 and conclude that the record does not show the juvenile court
applied an incorrect legal standard in this case.
“Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended section 707, adding the
following language: ‘In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’
[Citation.] This changed the finding a juvenile court must make before ordering a
transfer in two ways: (1) raising the standard of proof and (2) requiring a new specific
finding regarding amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277,
1284.) In our view, the plain meaning of the words used in the amended statute do not
support M.M.’s proffered interpretation of the statute.
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While section 707 now specifies that the juvenile court is to make an ultimate
finding that “the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation,” the very next sentence instructs
that: “In making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in
subparagraphs (A) to (E) . . . .” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) Thus, the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous that the juvenile court’s finding that a minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation should be based upon an evaluation of the five statutory criteria. Put
differently, the requirement that the juvenile court make an ultimate finding that a minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation is not an independent factual finding intended to
supplant the other statutorily enumerated factors. Instead, the five statutory factors are
the means by which the juvenile court is to reach the ultimate determination of whether a
minor is amenable to rehabilitation.
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. We observe that, to date, the
published decisions that have considered the argument posed by M.M. have concluded
that the five statutory factors set forth in section 707 are intended to inform the juvenile
court’s ultimate determination on the question of amenability to rehabilitation. In In re
S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, the Court of Appeal explained that section 707 now
“makes ‘amenab[ility] to rehabilitation’ the ultimate determination”; the amended statute
requires that “[t]he analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute should be focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation” (In re S.S., at p. 1288); and the juvenile
court is required “to consider each of the five statutory criteria and how those criteria
affect minor’s amenability to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court” (id. at p. 1294). Likewise, in In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, the Court of
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Appeal concluded that: “The amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider
all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation.
Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to
conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result,
even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result.” (In re E.P.,
at p. 417.) M.M. has not directed our attention to any published decision that has
concluded that the amendments to section 707 constitute the creation of a new “super
factor” to be determined separately from the statutorily enumerated factors.2
We are also unpersuaded by M.M.’s argument that Rules of Court, rule 5.770(b),
supports his argument that section 707 now creates a new, independent “super factor” for
the juvenile court’s consideration. Rule 5.770(b) expressly provides that the juvenile
court may order transfer “if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence each of the
following: [¶] (1) the youth was 16 years or older at the time of any alleged offense . . . ;
[¶] (2) The youth should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court based on
an evaluation of all the criteria in [section 707, subdivision (a)(3)]; and (3) The youth is
not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Rules
of Court, rule 5.770(b).) Thus, by its very terms, the rule mandates an evaluation of the
five statutory criteria set forth in section 707 as part of the juvenile court’s determination
2 M.M.’s reliance on H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709; People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698; and J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706 are unavailing. Each of these cases predate the amended version of section 707 now in effect. Accordingly, these cases are not persuasive when compared to published decisions that have actually addressed the proper interpretation of the amended version of the statute.
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on a motion to transfer. Interpreting this rule to permit the juvenile court to make a
transfer determination regardless of how the statutory factors are weighed would render
portions of the statute and relevant rule of court superfluous, instead of harmonizing the
provisions to give each provision relevance in the statutory scheme. (People v. Fouse
(2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145 [“ ‘ “We must harmonize ‘the various parts of a
statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of
the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ”]; Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469,
476 [“ ‘When two statutes touch upon a common subject,’ we must construe them ‘in
reference to each other, so as to “harmonize the two in such a way that no part of either
becomes surplusage.” ’ ”].)
Thus, we disagree with M.M. that recent amendments made to section 707 create a
new, separate, and dispositive “super factor” for the juvenile court’s consideration.
While we agree with the general proposition that the juvenile court’s decision should be
based upon an ultimate determination that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation, the
five statutory factors are intended to be the means by which the juvenile court is to make
this ultimate determination. (In re Miguel R. (Mar. 1, 2024, E082250)
___Cal.App.5th___[2024 Cal.App.Lexis 141].) As we explained in In re Miguel R.,
under section 707, the juvenile court is to consider each of the five statutory factors;
determine the extent to which each factor suggests the minor may be amenable to
rehabilitation; and weigh the factors in order to make an ultimate determination of
whether, collectively, the factors show the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. (Ibid.)
The record in this case shows the trial court followed that exact process when it expressly
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found that the last three factors “weig[h] heavily in support to find that the youth is not
amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” This was a
correct understanding and application of section 707, and we find no basis to conclude
that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to consider amenability to
rehabilitation as a separate and independent “super factor.”3
C. The Juvenile Court’s Factual Findings Are Supported by Substantial Evidence
Alternatively, M.M. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because its
factual findings with respect to each of the statutory factors was not supported by
substantial evidence. In this case, the juvenile court made an express finding that M.M.
was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based
upon three statutory factors: (1) the minor’s previous delinquent history (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(C)); (2) the lack of success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)); and (3) the circumstances and gravity of
the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(E)). We conclude that the juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of these
factors is supported by substantial evidence.
3 Further, even assuming the statute now creates a “super factor” that overcomes all the other statutory factors, we fail to see how M.M. could have been prejudiced under the facts of this case. The juvenile court concluded the transfer hearing by making the ultimate finding that “the People have met their burden to show that the youth is not amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and the youth should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court.” Thus, even assuming that this represented a super factor that could overcome the other statutory factors, the trial court made a specific, factual finding against M.M. on this very issue and, as a result, M.M. could not have suffered any prejudice.
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First, the evidence of M.M.’s previous delinquent history was undisputed. M.M.
had previously admitted to grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c));
misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242); assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)); and possession of an assault weapon
(Pen. Code, § 3605). As the juvenile court observed, two of the prior incidents involved
violent behavior and infliction of physical injury on the victim, and the subsequent
possession of a lethal weapon and commission of a murder represents a pattern of
escalating violent behavior. This was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court
could rely to reasonably conclude that M.M.’s previous delinquent history weighed in
favor of finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile court.
On appeal, M.M. does not dispute the evidence of his delinquent history and does
not argue that the juvenile court drew an unreasonable inference based upon this
evidence. Instead, M.M. directs our attention to other evidence offered to show that
M.M.’s behavior was impacted by childhood trauma. It is true that M.M. presented the
testimony of a social worker and a clinical psychologist, who both offered the opinion
that M.M. had suffered from significant childhood trauma. However, on review for
substantial evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638; People v. Nelson (2011)
51 Cal.4th 198, 210; People v. Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 110.) Notably, both the
social worker and clinical psychologist identified M.M. and M.M.’s mother as the source
of the foundational facts upon which they based their opinions. The trial court had the
opportunity to hear directly from M.M.’s mother, who was called to testify to these
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foundational facts and subject to cross-examination. Ultimately, the trial court concluded
that the reports of childhood trauma were entitled to little weight because the evidence of
trauma consisted of largely self-reported incidents.
Having heard directly from a key percipient witness to the foundational facts upon
which M.M.’s experts subsequently relied to form his opinions, the trial court was in the
best position to assess the credibility of the witness in order to determine the appropriate
weight to be given any expert opinion based upon these foundational facts. It is not our
role on appeal to reexamine these credibility determinations. M.M. does not meet his
burden to show a lack of substantial evidence by pointing to conflicting evidence in the
record and suggesting that this court reweigh or reassess the credibility of witness
testimony in order to draw a different inference in his favor on appeal.
Second, the evidence of unsuccessful previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate M.M. was also undisputed. As the juvenile court observed, M.M. had
previously successfully completed two separate terms of probation, lasting six months
and one year, respectively. M.M. was also required to complete anger management,
victim awareness, and substance abuse classes as part of the terms of his probation.
Despite this, M.M. was arrested for possession of a firearm and murder. Notably, the
murder occurred only months after his completion of probation for a prior offense. This
was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to conclude that prior
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate M.M. were unsuccessful.
On appeal, M.M. directs our attention to testimony by the clinical psychologist,
who opined that the rehabilitative services provided to M.M. were insufficient because
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they “were just scratching the surface” and would not be able to get “to the root of what
his actual issue is.” However, [s]ubstantial evidence does not mean evidence free of
ambiguities or inconsistencies. . . . A ‘defendant does not defeat the sufficiency of the
evidence merely by offering “competing inferences he wishes the jury had drawn” ’
[citation]; and ‘[t]he existence of possible exculpatory explanations, whether they are
simply suggestions not excluded by the evidence or even where they could be reasonably
deduced from the evidence, could not justify [a reviewing court’s] rejecting the
determination of the trier of fact . . . .’ ” (People v. Tice (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 246, 256-
257; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 74 [Upon review for substantial evidence,
when more than one inference “can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing
court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of [the trier of fact].”].)
Here, we observe that the testimony of the clinical psychologist actually gives rise
to two, competing inferences. One reasonable inference is that M.M. was not provided
the correct services during prior periods of probation and, as a result, little weight should
be given to otherwise undisputed evidence that prior attempts had been unsuccessful in
rehabilitating M.M. But an equally reasonable inference is that prior services were
inadequate because the services necessary to rehabilitate M.M. were simply not available
in the juvenile system. Indeed, other evidence in the record supported this second
inference. While the clinical psychologist testified that she believed the “ARISE”
program could “benefit” M.M., she also acknowledged that M.M. suffered from
intellectual limitations that would impede his ability to successfully complete the
program. Similarly, the supervising probation officer regularly charged with screening
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youth for the “ARISE” program testified that M.M. was screened but was not a suitable
candidate. Taken together, this was substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court
could rely to conclude that the services necessary to successfully rehabilitate M.M. were
simply not available in the juvenile system. The fact that the juvenile court could have
reached a different conclusion if it disregarded some evidence and credited other
evidence more favorably to M.M. does not establish a lack of substantial evidence.
Third, the evidence regarding the circumstances and gravity of the current offense
was undisputed. With respect to the murder, the evidence showed that M.M. used a
firearm specifically modified to increase its lethality, and that he discharged the firearm
multiple times in the direction of the victim, striking a vehicle as well as entering an
occupied residence. Additionally, M.M. posted multiple videos and photographs on
social media within hours of the shooting, suggesting he had no remorse for his actions.
(see D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441, 457-458 [“Expressive writings,
while generally not evidence of their literal truth, may well be evidence of the writer’s
mental and emotional state” and can be considered as evidence of a juvenile’s “continued
attraction to violence”]; RT 1234-1237) In fact, one of M.M.’s own experts admitted that
the circumstances of the current offense were “pretty significant and serious”; “show[ed]
a blatant disregard to the rights of others and, also, a grave callousness to an individual’s
life”; and that research shows “that such characteristics are difficult to rehabilitate.” All
of this constituted substantial evidence upon which the juvenile court could rely to
conclude that the circumstances and gravity of the offense weighed in favor of finding
that M.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
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Finally, we address M.M.’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
with respect to whether M.M. could be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction. While the juvenile court found this factor to be “neutral” and did not
rely on this factor in determining that M.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation, M.M.
suggests on appeal that the juvenile court should have considered this factor as one that
weighed in favor of retention. However, M.M.’s own expert acknowledged that she
could not put a time line on when M.M. could be expected to rehabilitate4 and, at one
point, even conceded that M.M. might have difficulty completing the services that could
potentially be offered in juvenile jurisdiction. Given this testimony, the juvenile court
could reasonably find that there was simply insufficient evidence to make a finding as to
whether there was sufficient time for M.M. to rehabilitate prior to the expiration of
juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
determination that this factor was neutral and did not weigh in favor of either transfer or
retention.
Upon review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s factual findings that three of the five statutory factors suggested M.M.
was not amenable to rehabilitation within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Because
the juvenile court’s careful review of the statutory factors and the applicable evidence as
to each support its ultimate finding that M.M. was not amenable to rehabilitation, we
4 Specifically, the clinical psychologist testified that “[t]he time frame is yet to be determined,” and “[i]t really would just depend on how well he performs in treatment . . . .”
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cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s decision to order a transfer constituted an abuse
of discretion.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court did not err in its application of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, as the statute does not create an independent "super factor" for amenability but rather requires the court to weigh five statutory criteria to reach an ultimate determination. Substantial evidence supported the court's finding that the minor was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard by failing to treat amenability to rehabilitation as an independent "super factor" under section 707.
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous that the juvenile court’s finding that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation should be based upon an evaluation of the five statutory criteria.”
“The amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation.”
“the five statutory factors are the means by which the juvenile court is to reach the ultimate determination of whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation.”